

VOL. LXXIX, 2

WHOLE No. 314

UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

MAY 27 1958

PERIODICAL
READING ROOM

2 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

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APRIL, 1958

BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

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The American Journal of Philology is open to original communications in all departments of philology, and especially in the field of Greek and Roman studies. It is published quarterly. Four numbers constitute a volume, one volume each year. Subscription price, \$6.00 a year, payable in advance (foreign postage 50 cents, Canadian postage 25 cents, extra); single numbers, \$2.00 each.

Claims for replacement of missing numbers must be received within 3 months (6 months in the case of foreign subscribers) following publication of the number.

Articles intended for publication in the Journal, books for review, and other editorial communications should be addressed to the editor, Henry T. Rowell, The Johns Hopkins University; proof should be returned to the secretary, Evelyn H. Clift, The University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware.

Contributors are entitled to receive twenty-five copies of their respective contributions free of charge. Additional copies will be supplied at cost.

Subscriptions, remittances, and business communications should be sent to

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS, Baltimore 18, Md.

The contents of the American Journal of Philology are indexed regularly in the International Index to Periodicals.

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1911, at the postoffice at Baltimore, Maryland, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917. Authorized on July 8, 1918.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY J. H. FURST COMPANY, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXXIX, 2

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THE CAREER OF M. ANTONIUS PALLAS.

Roman society in all epochs of its history was a society of status; furthermore, since the Roman ideal and canon of conduct was the *mos maiorum*, the man without ancestors was at a considerable disadvantage. On the other hand, one of the more successful accomplishments of Roman social organization under the Principate was the reconciling of a notable increase in social mobility with such a regime of status. Indeed, the Augustan settlement, not only with the beginnings of a *cursus honorum* for the *equites* but with its new dignities even for freedmen, made still more overt and emphatic the distinctions among groups and persons. Such an increased emphasis on the external forms of an institution at a time when its inner content is actually being altered is, of course, quite common in history and sociology. The principate, furthermore, was notoriously an attempt to clothe monarchy in the form and even in the spirit of the old Republic. Among many other things this meant that the Emperor, at least at first, could not use members of the ruling classes for the supervision of the details of the administration of his office. Like the magistrates of the Republic, of which he was now the first in *auctoritas* and *dignitas*, he must rely mostly upon his own slaves and freedmen.

These, briefly, were the historic circumstances which enabled M. Antonius Pallas to rise from slavery to what was, in fact, the position of principal financial officer of the Roman Empire. The corresponding post ordinarily ranks first among the sovereign's ministers in most modern states, and in the Late Empire

conferred upon its joint tenants the exalted rank of *Illustris* and membership in the Emperor's Sacred Consistory. Conditions in the first century of the Empire thus combined to make it possible for a man of Pallas' origins to rise to great power in a way which would have been difficult or impossible before, while in the second century positions of this sort were closed to freedmen and given to *equites*. Nevertheless the prejudice against former slaves was very great;¹ for a freedman like Pallas to overcome such a handicap required considerable good fortune as well as administrative talents of a high order,² and, in the court of the Julio-Claudian Caesars, a pronounced gift for intrigue. Historians have frequently condemned this last "virtue" in the roundest terms, but perhaps not with entire justification. In realistic terms of practical politics, as the source of power shifted from the Senate and the People to the Emperor, the object of the politically ambitious also became the manipulation of the latter rather than the former.³

Little is known about the origins of a slave like Pallas; he aroused the exasperated interest of the Roman historians only in connection with his power and influence in the reigns of Claudius and Nero. He was probably born around the beginning of the Christian Era, since he was still a slave in A. D. 31 (Josephus, *Ant. J.*, XVIII, 182), yet had obtained a position of great trust and confidence in the household of Antonia Minor at that time. This last presumably argues a certain degree of maturity, that Pallas was over thirty at the time; moreover the Roman law did not encourage the manumission of slaves under thirty,⁴ and Pallas was freed between 31 and 37 (see below). When he died in A. D. 62 (Tac., *Ann.*, XIV, 65, 1), he had probably lived, therefore, to an age of between sixty and

¹ Illustrative passages are innumerable; one of the most striking is Pliny, *Ep.*, II, 6, 3, who tells us that when he asked them to dinner he offered even freedmen the same fare as was set before himself.

² Cf. Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (2nd ed.; London, 1920), p. 103.

³ Cf. Julian, *Caesars*, 310 B, where Silenus is made to apply to Claudius some verses from the *Knights* of Aristophanes (probably 1111 ff.) which originally flattered Demos.

⁴ A. M. Duff, *Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1928), p. 77; W. L. Westermann, *The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Philadelphia, 1955), p. 89.

seventy years. Concerning his ethnic origins, we are no better informed. His name indicates that he derived from the Greek east; this would not certainly indicate an origin in the Hellenized provinces,⁵ but when in the days of his power it was desirable to flatter the Emperor's minister, he was said to be derived from Arcadian kings. This makes it certain that he was of eastern descent, and also raises some presumption that he was of Greek rather than of Hellenized Oriental extraction. The Arcadian connection, royal or otherwise, is purely fanciful, and suggested by the name "Pallas," which belonged to a mythological Arcadian king, the ancestor of the equally mythical Evander.⁶ It is also unknown how Pallas came to be a slave—whether he was born into servile status, or having been born free, was later enslaved.

In any event Pallas first appears as a slave belonging to Antonia, the daughter of Mark Antony and Octavia, who was the sister of Augustus. Antonia was also the mother of the Emperor Claudius, and by her son Germanicus the grandmother of the Emperor Gaius. In the summer of A. D. 31,⁷ believing that Sejanus, the praetorian prefect, was plotting against the Emperor Tiberius, her brother-in-law, she decided to write a warning to the Emperor at his retreat on Capri. Presumably she had some way of proving her allegations, although the source is quite vague about what she did actually write. At any rate, this was a very risky and dangerous business, to strike at the powerful prefect, who had so long enjoyed Tiberius' complete confidence. Obviously Antonia's choice of her slave Pallas to deliver the letter is excellent evidence for his discretion and ability as well as for the complete confidence reposed in him (Josephus, *Ant. J.*, XVIII, 182; cf. Dio, LXVI, 14, 1-2). Pallas delivered the warning; shortly thereafter began the chain of events which led to the downfall and murder of the prefect and the notorious witch hunt for his accomplices.

⁵ Duff, p. 5.

⁶ See H. Furneaux's edition of Tacitus' *Annals*, ad Ann., XII, 53, 3 (II [2nd ed.; Oxford, 1907], p. 127). To his references add Dion. Hal., I, 31, 4; and F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, ad VI, 11a, 1 (I [Oxford, 1957], pp. 664-5).

⁷ Since Sejanus was slain 18 October of that year; cf. Ehrenberg and Jones, *Documents*, pp. 42, 53, 64 (no. 52).

Antonia died 1 May 37, shortly after her grandson Gaius had succeeded Tiberius.⁸ Since as a freed Roman citizen Pallas assumed the style of M. Antonius,⁹ he was emancipated by Antonia either after 31 and during her lifetime, or at the latest by her will. Her son, Claudius, came into his mother's rights as patron of Pallas. There is a fair likelihood, however, that Pallas was manumitted in Antonia's lifetime. Certainly his services to his mistress and to the Emperor in 31 would naturally seem to merit such a reward for so trusted a slave. Some confirmation at least for the hypothesis that Pallas was liberated before 37 is derived from an Egyptian document of the reign of Tiberius, which shows Pallas as the owner of an estate in Egypt during the lifetime of Antonia.¹⁰ Theoretically perhaps, Pallas could have held such an estate as part of a slave's *peculium*, but it is much more likely that he owned it outright as a freedman.

In 41 Gaius was murdered, and Pallas' patron Claudius, more or less to his own surprise, became Emperor of Rome. Presumably during Gaius' reign Pallas performed services of some sort for his patron; it would not be surprising, for example, if he had managed Claudius' property as a general steward, but there is absolutely no information on this point in the sources. We do not even know for certain that he was in Claudius' service from the beginning of the latter's reign. The first reference to his relations with Claudius that can be definitely dated belongs to the year 48 (Tac., *Ann.*, XI, 29, 1). Upon that occasion Tacitus is about to describe how the three principal freedmen of Claudius, Pallas, Narcissus, and Callistus, were seriously disturbed by the activities of Messalina. The historian introduces both of the latter, the one explicitly, the other implicitly, by references to events previously described in the lost books in the middle of the *Annals*. Pallas, however, is identified only as enjoying the highest favor (*flagrantissima gratia*) at that time. Presumably, therefore, this is either the first time he has been

⁸ *C. I. L.*, XIV, Supp., 4535, lines 20-1.

⁹ This is certain; see the reasoning in P. von Rohden, s. v. "Antonius" (84), *R.-E.*, I (1894), cols. 2634-5, at 2634.

¹⁰ *Pap. Ryl.*, II, p. 255; additional references in M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1926), p. 574. Query: Could such a property have been a gift to him from Antonia or Tiberius as a further reward?

mentioned in Tacitus' narrative, or at least the first time he has played a prominent role. Dio also has not previously mentioned Pallas; he refers simply to Claudius' freedmen in general, or if he specifies one in particular it is usually Narcissus (e. g., LX, 14, 3; 15, 5; 16, 2; 5; 19, 2). The inference is clear that the freedman credited with the most influence in the first half of Claudius' reign was Narcissus (cf. esp. Dio, LX, 16, 2; Suet., *Vesp.*, 4, 1). If we can trust what Tacitus and Dio imply, it may reasonably be inferred that Pallas had been in the Emperor's service before 48, probably his financial service, and had gradually won credit in the eyes of his patron until by 48 he had joined Callistus and Narcissus as the most trusted and influential imperial freedmen.¹¹

In 48 Claudius' third wife, Valeria Messalina, entered into a conspiracy to depose Claudius; she would then marry the new *Princeps*, a young man named Silius, said to be her lover.¹² If Tacitus is to be trusted, the conspiracy was a secret to few persons of importance save Claudius himself (*Ann.*, XI, 28, 1). Tacitus does not plainly indicate why the freedmen, and indeed the *domus principis* in general, were opposed to a change of masters, except that such a change was feared as a menace to their own influence and power under a man characterized by strength of mind (*vi mentis*) compared with the docility (*facilitas*) of Claudius (*ibid.*, 28). If we assume for the moment (see below), that this estimate of Claudius' character is grossly exaggerated, nevertheless it is quite likely that it contains an element of truth. A new Emperor who came to power after the violent overthrow of the old would have his own freedmen and confidants; entirely apart from the question of Claudius' strength of mind, the principal servants of the Prince could be fairly

¹¹ From Suet., *Claud.*, 28 alone, it would probably be inferred that throughout the reign both Pallas and Narcissus were the most important freedmen; Suetonius, however, cannot prevail against his betters. Gerhard Schumann, *Hellenistische und griechische Elemente in der Regierung Neros* (Diss., Leipzig, 1930), p. 43, is sure that Pallas was in Claudius' service before 48, and regards it as probable that he was already a *rationibus*.

¹² On the conspiracy see esp. Tac., *Ann.*, XI, 26, 3-4; 28, 1 (*ad fin.*); 33, 1-2; and cf. Vincent M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1940), p. 90, with notes 34, 35 (on pp. 261-2).

certain that their influence would be gone even if they continued in the imperial service. And when it came to the point of taking positive action Callistus drew back because he thought that caution rather than zeal was the better way to retain power (*ibid.*, 29, 2).

Dio (LX, 31, 2) has a different version. According to him, Messalina and the freedmen had in the past (in his previous narrative he has mentioned several specific instances) jointly worked upon Claudius to further their own ends, but Messalina shortly before this had broken the alliance by procuring the death of Polybius, another leading freedman. The rest of the freedmen, feeling themselves endangered by Messalina's caprices, thereupon determined to get rid of her. The conspiracy, the worst features of which, Dio implies (*ibid.*, 31, 5), were merely the invention of Narcissus, served as the occasion. Tacitus' account, of course, is plainly preferable to Dio's. Assuming that Polybius was executed at the instigation of Messalina, neither we, nor Dio, nor his source, have any sure means of knowing the reaction of the other freedmen. On the other hand, their reaction to a change of Emperors as represented by Tacitus is inherently probable. And Tacitus' narrative of the conspiracy, with all its faults and difficulties, is preferable to Dio's; there seems no reason to doubt that the conspiracy was real.¹³ Finally, that the freedmen, particularly Narcissus, actually may have felt some loyalty and gratitude to Claudius should not lightly be disregarded as an additional motive.

For only Narcissus was bold enough to take action. The three are said originally to have debated whether they should warn Messalina to desist from her affair with Silius without revealing that they knew about the conspiracy against Claudius (*cuncta alia dissimulantes*). This plan was discarded as too dangerous as it obviously was. Naturally a wife would have greater influence with her husband than his freedmen. Cal-

¹³ Dio's source, ascribing the fall of Messalina to her execution of Polybius, almost had to impugn the story of a conspiracy; a real conspiracy would have been too pat an opportunity for the vengeance of the freedmen. On the relationship between Dio's and Tacitus' accounts of Claudius, see A. Momigliano, "Osservazioni sulle fonti per la storia di Caligola, Claudio, Nerone," *Rendiconti Lincei*, 6th ser., VIII (1932), pp. 293-336, at 308-9.

listus considered discretion the better part of valor, and Pallas was too cowardly to act—which is to say the same thing in a more unfriendly fashion (*Ann.*, XI, 29, 1-2). Narcissus, acting alone, then determined to warn Claudius of the conspiracy. What the original source for the conversation among the three freedmen was, and, if it were one of the freedmen himself, whether the account was exact, it would be hard to say. It is certain, however, because it must have been public knowledge, that Narcissus acted without his colleagues, whether he also discussed his plan to reveal the plot to Claudius with them or not. It is well known that with the assistance of two of the Emperor's women he succeeded in convincing Claudius of the reality of the danger.¹⁴ Vengeance quickly overtook Messalina and Silius, together with their accomplices. Most of them were put to death; at the end, although Claudius may have had some tergiversations, Narcissus on his own responsibility ordered Messalina herself put out of the way, saying that this was the Emperor's will.¹⁵

Messalina perished in the autumn of 48¹⁶ and Claudius an-

¹⁴ Scramuzza, p. 87, quite correctly points out that Narcissus' need for the women to break this unpleasant news to Claudius disproves the picture in the sources of a Claudius who was a puppet in the hands of his freedmen. On the other hand, it is not proof of the opposite conclusion, that the Emperor was not influenced by his freedmen.

¹⁵ Tac., *Ann.*, XI, 37, 1-3. In the past much too much has been made of this episode as proof of Claudius' wavering and vacillating character. Tacitus is able to tell us even what Claudius and Narcissus were thinking when the one ordered that Messalina be told to plead her cause the next day, and the other notwithstanding informed the soldiers that the Emperor ordered her to be put to death. If we omit Tacitus' explanations and consider only what happened, together with the fact that Claudius said nothing when her death was announced (38, 2) and afterward permitted Narcissus to be richly rewarded (38, 5), it is at least as plausible to assume that Narcissus guessed his patron's real wishes, but that Claudius did not want to take the responsibility of arbitrarily ordering his wife's death. After all he, or Narcissus in his name, had promised the *Virgo Vestalis Maxima* that Messalina would not be condemned unheard (34, 5). One is reminded that Elizabeth I was unwilling to sign Mary Stuart's official death warrant, but she also tried to persuade Mary's warder, Paulet, to murder his charge; cf. Keith Feiling, *A History of England* (New York, 1948), p. 403.

¹⁶ Tac., *Ann.*, XI, 31, 4; probably in October, cf. Furneaux's note *ad loc.* (II, p. 45).

nounced that he would not marry again (Suet., *Claud.*, 26, 2). After all, he was fairly advanced in years, he had had a son and daughters by his marriages, and his various mistresses would provide him with any female company he might wish. Nevertheless he very soon reversed this decision. An Emperor of any age or degree of decrepitude is supposedly an important matrimonial catch; at any rate, there were not wanting candidates for the honor, but the principal contenders were three. Each one was favored by one of the three leading freedmen: Lollia Paulina, who had once been married to the Emperor Gaius was favored by Callistus; Aelia Paetina, who had been Claudius' second wife but had been divorced for trivial offences although she had borne him a daughter, was championed by Narcissus; Pallas urged the advantages of an alliance with Agrippina the Younger, Claudius' niece and the mother (by Domitius Ahenobarbus) of the future Emperor Nero (Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 1, 1-3).

Tacitus gives us no hint, however, why each freedman championed his particular candidate. A fairly adequate reason, however, suggests itself. As seen above, Messalina had regularly allied herself with the freedmen to bring influence to bear on the Emperor; the new Empress would presumably be grateful to the freedman who had successfully urged her claims on Claudius. Presumably, also, she would not be inclined to favor the freedmen who had supported her defeated rivals. The freedman who was successful in this intrigue, therefore, would have a fair chance of becoming the most important, trusted, and influential of all.¹⁷ C. Julius Callistus had been a trusted freedman of Gaius;¹⁸ he must have known Lollia Paulina and

¹⁷ Scramuzza, p. 87, argues that had Claudius been dominated by Messalina, his ministers would not have urged a new marriage. But there is no question of domination, it is a matter of bringing influence to bear. All three of these men had risen to the places they occupied as slaves and freedmen by pleasing their masters and patrons. One of the means of pleasing any superior is offering him acceptable suggestions; and a principal means of making suggestions acceptable in any similar situation is to have the suggestion's desirability corroborated by another person whose advice the superior also tends to heed. The more success one has in doing this, the more the chances for success in the future.

¹⁸ Cf. esp. Dio, LIX, 19, 6. His name (given in full by Scribonianus, *praef.*, 1) shows that Callistus had been Gaius' slave and had been emancipated later by the same Emperor.

have reasoned that she would be likely to co-operate with him if she became Empress. It is not absolutely certain that Narcissus had been Claudius' slave and had been later manumitted by him,¹⁹ but it is extremely likely that he was; his pre-eminence among the freedmen of Claudius in the first part of the reign is easily understood if he had had a long and intimate connection with his patron. The hypothesis also explains why, in a manner similar to Callistus, he championed Aelia Paetina as the new consort. He would have known her during her previous period as Claudius' wife. We have no hint as to Pallas' motives²⁰ other than the general considerations outlined above. His advocacy of Agrippina did prevail, and he was signally rewarded as long as she had the influence to see to it. Probably we shall not err very much if we suppose that Pallas had reason to believe in advance that Agrippina would be favorable to him if she won the prize.

Claudius was naturally soon offered arguments and suggestions by the freedmen, and quite likely by other persons as well. Tacitus says that he finally called the three together in a council (*Ann.*, XII, 1, 4). Since Claudius had already heard these arguments of his advisers the purpose of the council must have been to enable him to hear a debate in which each of the three would defend his own position and refute the arguments of the other two. Yet only one statement, of Callistus, is rebuttal. If this council actually took place and is not merely a literary device of Tacitus or his source to dramatize the issues, it seems likely that there was no detailed information about what occurred therein. Instead we have merely a formal statement of the three points of view, followed by a declaration that that of Pallas prevailed.

Narcissus stressed the fact that Aelia would not require any readjustments on Claudius' part, and she would not act the stepmother to Messalina's children, because they were so closely

¹⁹ Cf. Stein, s. v. "Narcissus" (1), *R.-E.*, XVI (1935), cols. 1701-5, at 1701. Gaius had a slave named Narcissus (Dessau, 191), but the name was common (cf. Dessau, *I. L. S.*, III, 1, p. 218).

²⁰ The assertion that he had been carrying on a notorious intrigue with Agrippina (cf. Schol. *ad Iuven.*, I, 109 [p. 11, Wessner]), an intrigue which was continued in later years (Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 25, 1; 65, 4; XIV, 2, 4), may be disregarded; any alliance between male and female in antiquity would be sure to receive this interpretation.

related to her own. Callistus' position was that Aelia would become difficult to get along with if she were taken back after her divorce, but that the childless Lollia would act as a mother to Claudius' children, since she would not be jealous for her own children's sake. The view of Pallas was of an entirely different order, political rather than personal. Agrippina would bring with her her son (the future Nero), a grandson of Germanicus, worthy of imperial fortune; Claudius should unite the Julian and Claudian families (cf. Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 2, 3, with adn. crit.). At the same time, Agrippina, Claudius' niece, intimately connected with the imperial family, the daughter of the revered and popular Germanicus (Claudius' own brother), might not through her marriage to another, transfer imperial claims to her husband, or to additional posterity (cf. XIII, 14, 5). Claudius agreed that Pallas had analyzed the situation most clearly and determined to follow his advice (XII, 2, 1-3, 1).

Very obviously, then, Claudius' last marriage was a political one;²¹ very likely it was undertaken contrary to the Emperor's own personal wishes.²² Pallas had won; the Emperor had fol-

²¹ So Scramuzza, p. 91, who shrewdly suggests that Claudius may well have hoped to end the feud in the imperial family that had begun with the quarrel between Tiberius and the elder Agrippina, the mother of the intended bride. There is no real evidence that Claudius was in love with Messalina. When her conspiracy with Silius was revealed to him, he displayed no reaction typical of the injured lover, and tradition would almost certainly have told us if he had so reacted, in order to emphasize his presumed uxoriousness. On the contrary, almost his sole care was for his safety and his throne (*Ann.*, XI, 31, 3), and he displayed absolute indifference to her death (38, 2-3). The suggestion obtrudes itself that this marriage too might have been largely a matter of politics (in typical Roman aristocratic fashion). Claudius' first two wives were persons of distinction, but not of the greatest distinction (Suet., *Claud.*, 26, 2); he married them at a time when he was being kept relatively in the background. But under Gaius he at last obtained a position of prominence suitable to his exalted connections (cf. J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius* [Oxford, 1934], pp. 41, 42), and at this time he married Messalina, descended on both sides from Octavia Minor, sister of Augustus; see G. Herzog-Hauser and F. Wotke, s. v. "Valerius" (403), *R.-E.*, VIII A, 1 (1955), cols. 246-58, at 246; Gaheis, s. v. "Claudius" (256), *ibid.*, III (1899), cols. 2778-2839, at 2790; E. F. Leon, "The Imbecillitas of the Emperor Claudius," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIX (1948), pp. 79-86, at 85.

²² Suet., *Claud.*, 26, 2. Since the marriage was political, and particu-

lowed his suggestion; henceforth his power would be assured, and he could hope soon to become the principal imperial freedman, and as such a man of great moment in the state. Narcissus, of course, was his most important rival, but Callistus was soon removed by death, presumably of natural causes.²³

The foregoing episode is of the utmost importance from another point of view. It is almost the sole detailed description of the interaction, under fairly normal conditions, of the personalities of Claudius and his principal freedmen that we have. For the most part the sources have only sweeping generalizations to the effect that he was a puppet who moved when the right string (usually fear) was pulled, or some dubious anecdotes (mainly in Dio). And notoriously this relationship is one of the principal cruxes in the reign of Claudius. If we discard the inevitable innuendoes of Tacitus, a convincing and natural picture emerges. Tacitus, as usual, has told the truth in spite of himself. On the one hand Claudius is revealed as having a mind of his own; it is he who decides. Pallas' arguments prevailed; obviously not with his rivals, but with Claudius. On the other hand he does consult with the freedmen; he listens to their suggestions; he follows the one which seems best to him. Significantly in this case he follows the suggestion of Pallas and rejects that of Narcissus despite the fact that all the evidence for the previous years of his reign points to the latter's occupying the position of highest trust and honor, and despite the fact that Narcissus had just preserved his life and throne. Claudius did have a mind of his own.

This amounts to saying that both the traditional picture, so long current, of Claudius the bumpkin, the buffoon, the puppet, and the more recent one of a Claudius who uses the freedmen as merely glorified secretaries and amanuenses are wrong, although

larly if Claudius were not very anxious to marry again, we may confidently throw out the story about Agrippina's having confirmed her victory by illicit blandishments of the Emperor (*Ann.*, XII, 3, 1). Once again, even if she did try something of the sort, how could Tacitus or his source read what went on in Claudius' mind? And Tacitus seems to imply that Claudius' decision preceded these presumed blandishments.

²³ About 50 or 51? Dio, LX, 33, 3a; cf. Zonaras, XI, 10; these passages are overlooked by Schumann, pp. 35-6, who thinks that Callistus was still alive in 54-55 and that nothing is known of his end; he is apparently followed by Momigliano, *C. A. H.*, X, p. 709.

the second interpretation is much closer to the truth than the first. "The fact that Claudius was the organizer of this ministry [of the freedmen] is proof enough that his personality dominated it."²⁴ But this is illogical. It assumes the totally unproven premise that this "ministry" was created by the Emperor. It is not even certain that anybody created these offices on a pre-conceived, or organized plan. Many institutions, bureaucratic and administrative ones in particular, "just grow."²⁵ That is to say, they result from the unplanned and unco-ordinated activity of functionaries intent only on increasing the efficiency of their own particular offices, or widening the sphere of their own authority. New Deal Washington saw the proliferation of government agencies in all directions, but nobody planned it, not even the vigorous and active personality of the President.

²⁴ Arnaldo Momigliano, *Claudius the Emperor and His Achievement* (Oxford, 1934), p. 43; echoed by Scramuzza, p. 87; and quoted with approval by D. McAlindon, "Senatorial Opposition to Claudius and Nero," *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 113-32, at 118. Since I disagree with Momigliano primarily on a point of emphasis, I should state that I think his book a most important contribution to the study of Roman imperial history. My principal criticism is that he neglects too much (of set purpose) the personal element (cf. pp. xii-xiii). For a general statement as to the value of this element, cf., among many, the presidential address of Dexter Perkins to the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, "We Shall Gladly Teach," *A. H. R.*, LXII (1957), pp. 291-309, at 301-2. More particularly, this element should never be underestimated in the history, not only of Republican Rome, as prosopographical studies have valuably demonstrated many times, but in that of Imperial Rome as well. In any human society there is, presumably, much truth in the principle commonly enunciated in the form, "It isn't what you know that counts, but whom." Roman society, however, was constructed on that principle. The letters of the younger Pliny, for example, differ in many respects from those of Cicero; yet both sets have in common their constant reference to the performance or asking of favors, and the making and asking of introductions. Claudius did not rule alone. Momigliano has proved that Claudius has been underrated; we should not go to the other extreme and attribute *en masse* every willed act of the imperial government to his will. See also the very timely admonitions of Kurt von Fritz, "Tacitus, Agricola, Domitian, and the Problem of the Principate," *C. P.*, LII (1957), pp. 73-97, at 80, anent the dangers of reasoning from the nature of the imperial administration of a given Emperor to conclusions about his personality.

²⁵ Cf. Scramuzza, pp. 4, 83.

Some of the offices which rose to such importance under Claudius have been shown to exist before his time; probably others did too.

It is important to realize that the modern portrait of Claudius mentioned above rests essentially on *a priori* grounds. Unimpeachable evidence, independent of the literary sources, clearly showed Claudius' government and policies to be of an able, statesmanlike stature, totally at variance with the traditional interpretation. Hence the traditional portrait was discarded and a new picture drawn to conform to the new evidence.²⁶ This was a great advance; but on the other hand, other unimpeachable evidence goes to support some aspects of the old view. This too should be taken into account.²⁷ The evidence points to the conclusion that the "bad" traits of Claudius, although exaggerated to a caricature in the traditional view, have some basis in fact. It is important to note, however, that Claudius' freedmen rose to great power by virtue of their "official" positions as *de facto* ministers of state. It has been pointed out²⁸ that freedmen who were powerful because they were chamberlains are not met with until the reign of Domitian. The administrative history of the Byzantine Empire is a long commentary on how those personally close to an autocrat can gradually transform their influence into overt, accepted political position. Hence we may infer that the power of Claudius' freedmen was a "proper" power (however odious to the Roman aristocracy), derived from their governmental positions, not from the suggestions they made when they assisted him out of bed, for example.

Unfortunately ancient historians were not interested in administrative history. We have the famous description of Claudius deliberating with his ministers, as summarized above, only be-

²⁶ Momigliano, *Claudius*, pp. xi-xii.

²⁷ For example: the "Acts of Isidore," propaganda based on fact, show that women were present at a legal proceeding before Claudius at Rome; the women must include the Empress, whether Messalina or Agrippina depends on the dating (H. A. Musurillo, *The Acts of the Pagan Martyrs* [Oxford, 1954], pp. 18-26, 118 ff., 275). Claudius' coins honor first Messalina, then Agrippina in an unprecedented fashion (Michael Grant, *Roman Imperial Money* [London, 1954], p. 142). Claudius' freedman Pallas was also honored in an unprecedented fashion (SC in Pliny, *Ep.*, VIII, 6). Pallas did end up a very wealthy man (see below, note 37).

²⁸ Duff, p. 146.

cause it had great political, not to say sensational, interest. But surely this can serve as a strong indication that matters of policy in running the government would be determined by Claudius, but frequently upon the suggestions and, it is likely, the initiative of his ministers.²⁹

Pallas, certainly after 48, and possibly for some time before, was Claudius' *a rationibus*, the head of the imperial *fiscus*, the Emperor's treasury. Obviously from the beginning there must have been imperial officials whose duty it was to look after the Emperor's accounts; ³⁰ under Pallas' direction the control of the various accounts was centralized ³¹ in a general bureau. This was not a unified treasury in the sense of storage of funds; the Emperor's funds were to be found in various *fisci* scattered over the Empire; rather this was a bureau of accounts (*rationes*).³² As head of the bureau, however, Pallas supervised the Prince's income from the whole Empire, and the corresponding expenditures from the Emperor's chests, with particular care for the needs of the army and the coinage.³³ The evidence clearly points to the reign of Claudius as the time when this centralized administration of the imperial funds was inaugurated.³⁴ The

²⁹ Cf. G. May, "L'activité juridique de l'Empereur Claude," *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, Ser. IV, XV (1936), pp. 55-97, 213-54, at 249.

³⁰ As Hugh Last, "The *Fiscus*: A Note," *J. R. S.*, XXXIV (1944), pp. 51-9, at 52, rightly points out, with the observation that Augustus could not have published his accounts (Suet., *Cal.*, 16, 1) without assistance of this sort.

³¹ Cf. Tac., *Ann.*, XIII, 14, 1; O. Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian* (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1905), pp. 3-4. Scramuzza, pp. 122 and 271, note 68, minimizes the importance of Pallas in this matter; he seems to have neglected the force of this passage (even allowing for exaggeration, and for the tendentious reference to *arbitrium regni*).

³² This may be regarded as established; the office did not handle actual money; the point was made by Hirschfeld, p. 30 with note 3, and is followed by all his successors, including Rostovtzeff, s. v. "*Fiscus*," *R.-E.*, VI (1909), cols. 2385-2405, at 2390.

³³ The *locus classicus* for the duties of this office is Stat., *Silv.*, III, 3, 86-105 (cf. the discussion in Duff, pp. 153-4, 163). Although this refers to Flavian times, it must hold generally true for the administration of Pallas.

³⁴ Cf. H. Dessau, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit*, II, 1 (Berlin,

reform was carried through, of course, in the name of the Emperor, but did Claudius initiate it, or did Pallas? The following cannot claim to be more than an opinion: The centralization of accounts for the Emperor's moneys in one agency would result in an increase in efficiency and, for the official concerned, in power. Claudius would have no particular interest in augmenting his servant's authority; for seventy years previous Emperors had managed without a central finance office; it is likely that the brunt of the extra work involved did not fall on the Emperor, but on his servants. It is a well-known maxim of management that suggestions for the improvement of routines are most likely to come from the persons who have to use them. Presumably Pallas served Claudius in finance before becoming a *rationibus*. Accordingly it seems that there is greater likelihood that the suggestion for the amalgamation of accounting procedures came from Pallas, rather than by the initiative of Claudius, who, of course, obviously approved the suggestion. This once accomplished, Pallas was free to use his new position as an instrument of power (Tac., *Ann.*, XIII, 14, 1). We know of some particular activities of the *fiscus* under Claudius; in the absence of definite evidence we should not presume to decide whether they were initiated by Claudius or by Pallas. The question should be left open.³⁵ There is reason to believe that Pallas managed the

1926), p. 161; Liebenam, s. v. "A *rationibus*," *R.-E.*, I A (1920), cols. 263-4, at 263; Rostovtzeff, *ibid.*, VI (1909), col. 2389; Hirschfeld, p. 30; etc. Most of these scholars unhesitatingly ascribe the change to Pallas rather than Claudius, since they by and large accept the view that Claudius was without a mind of his own.

³⁵ Notably the measure by which the procurators of the Emperor received judicial powers, Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 60; Suet., *Claud.*, 12, 1; cf. May, *Rev. hist. droit franç. et étr.*, Ser. IV, XV (1936), p. 82. Dessau, *Gesch.*, II, 1, p. 162, attributes this measure to Pallas. Unfortunately Tacitus (60, 1) seems to indicate that it was Claudius' own idea. It is well known that judicial matters were a principal interest of the Emperor. Cf. also the question of the Emperor's rights over lands in N. Italy (Charlesworth, *Documents*, 4 = Dessau, 206), and the cases discussed by Momigliano, *Claudius*, p. 46. Some of these last probably did not fall under the control of the *a rationibus*, but if Pallas could advise Claudius concerning his marriage, or concerning the marriages of slaves (see below), he certainly could have done so with respect to matters kindred to his own sphere of activity.

finances remarkably well, for Claudius personally had not been particularly wealthy and his expenses as Emperor were heavy.³⁶

Pallas' talents were also well employed in bettering his own financial position. He became tremendously wealthy, as a matter of fact; that his wealth became almost proverbial is probably as much related to its conspicuousness in the hands of a hated imperial freedman as to its actual size, which was very likely exaggerated out of all proportion to reality.³⁷ It is probable that the insinuations of the ancients are correct, that Pallas was able to amass a huge fortune by taking advantage of his position. On the other hand, obviously not only Claudius, but Nero and

³⁶ T. Frank, *Ec. Surv.*, V, p. 42.

³⁷ His wealth is proved by the existence of the Gardens of Pallas (Frontinus, *Aq.*, 19, 20, 69; *Not. Reg. Urb.*, 5, as well as by the assertions of sources which might otherwise be open to question. The "statistics" given on this subject, however, probably should not be trusted (as they seem to be by Frank, *Ec. Surv.*, V, p. 57). Notoriously the accuracy of the ancients is not to be trusted in the matter of large numbers. Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 53, 5 (cf. XIV, 65, 1; Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXIII, 134), says that Pallas owned "sestertii ter milies" (= HS 300,000,000), but Dio, LXII, 14, 3, credits him with a myriad myriads (of denarii/drachmas), or HS 400,000,000. If these are not to be understood merely as guesses, another way of saying merely that Pallas was vastly wealthy, the difference is colossal. Dio also says that Narcissus too had more than a myriad myriads (LX, 34, 4), while he puts Seneca's fortune at HS 300,000,000 (LXI, 10, 3). Seneca (*Ben.*, II, 27, 1) in turn says that Cn. Lentulus Augur (consul 14 B. C.) had a fortune of HS 400,000,000. These figures are particularly suspicious in the original forms. A "myriad myriads" is very obviously the Greek way of saying a huge number, as is Latin "ter milies." One suspects that wealth of HS 400,000,000 goes back to a Greek estimate, HS 300,000,000 to a Latin estimate. On Pallas' wealth as proverbial, cf. Juvenal, I, 108-9; and the *bon mot* about a penurious Claudius who could become prosperous by going into partnership with Pallas and Narcissus (Suet., *Claud.*, 28; *Ep. de Caes.*, 4, 9). Probably most of the narrative history of this period goes back to the lost account of the elder Pliny, friend and councillor of the Emperor Vespasian, who would have access to the records which dealt with these fortunes; such records would probably come into existence when the fortunes passed wholly or in part into the treasury. Nevertheless the fact that Pliny could have used these figures does not prove he did, and cannot remove the suspicion attaching to them from other causes. For Pliny's relation to the surviving sources, Momigliano, *Rend. Linc.*, 6th ser., VIII (1932), pp. 310 ff., 321-2, 327.

Seneca as we shall see, were convinced that he had not dipped his hands into the treasury in any excessive degree. Pallas undoubtedly possessed great financial acumen; he had some capital, at least, before Claudius came to the throne, and his position gave him unique opportunities to acquire information about economic conditions and opportunities throughout the whole Empire. The ancients had no such tender scruples about conflict of interests as we have; we may assume that Pallas as a capitalist and entrepreneur had business with Pallas the chief financial agent of the Emperor without overt dishonesty. Seneca and Narcissus, to mention but two examples, were able to grow hugely wealthy without dipping openly into the treasury. The dominant vice of the Romans was perhaps not cruelty, but greed, as Gilbert Highet has recently remarked;³⁸ in any case, these great fortunes were amassed with much less pain to others than was true of many great fortunes of Republican days.³⁹ Had Pallas been a member of the Roman ruling classes who enriched himself, there would have been much less objection, unless he also preached the Stoic philosophy, and perhaps not even then.

Pallas' activities, however, were not limited to managing the multifarious financial operations of the Roman Empire and of M. Antonius Pallas. In urging upon Claudius the merit of Agrippina he had stressed the advantage that she would bring with her into Claudius' home a worthy grandson of Germanicus (Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 2, 3), Nero-to-be, who was also a direct descendant of Augustus Caesar. That Pallas used this argument strengthens the suspicion that he had reached an understanding with Agrippina before supporting her candidacy. Accordingly Agrippina and Pallas continued to work together to promote her son's fortunes. Scarcely had Agrippina herself been married to Claudius, when her son betrothed Claudius' daughter Octavia (Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 9, 2). Although Claudius had a son by Messalina, Britannicus, Pallas now urged that he adopt his stepson, citing the example of Augustus and Tiberius in acquiring more than one heir. Claudius could not foresee the future; yet it is hard to understand that he should have adopted a son older than Britannicus. Nevertheless once again the advice of Pallas (with

³⁸ *Juvenal the Satirist* (Oxford, 1954), pp. 51, 53.

³⁹ On what the business ethics of the "best" Romans permitted, see S. I. Oost, *C. P.*, L (1955), pp. 105-7.

Agrippina's help) prevailed as the course of wisdom, and Nero became the brother of Britannicus, 25 February A. D. 50.⁴⁰ Hence we can truly say that Pallas changed the history of the Roman Empire, for through his advocacy of the marriage with Agrippina and the adoption of Nero, he was at least as much responsible for Nero's eventual accession as was Agrippina.⁴¹ Whatever else it entailed, the adoption of Nero clearly showed that Pallas was still the most important and influential freedman at court, and that his alliance with Agrippina was working well.

In January A. D. 52 the good and faithful servant reached the zenith of his career. Evidently Claudius had discussed with Pallas the question of the proper treatment to be meted out to free women who married slaves, and it appears that Pallas recommended that such women be considered slaves if they acted without the consent of their husband's master, but as freedwomen if they had obtained this permission. Claudius accepted the suggestion (another example of his relations with his freedmen),

⁴⁰ Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 25, 1-26, 1; *Acta Fr. Arv.*, Dessau, 229, line 58; cf. *Ann.*, XIII, 2, 3. On the legal technicalities of the adoption, see G. May, "Notes complémentaires sur les actes de l'Empereur Claude," *Rev. hist. droit franç. et étr.*, Ser. IV, XXII (1944), pp. 101-14, at 101-5. Dessau, *Geschichte*, II, 1, p. 167, hints that Claudius at the time of his marriage to Agrippina regarded Nero's being under his guardianship as a means of removing a danger to his throne and family, and this may be correct. In the end, although his will was suppressed, Claudius certainly designated Britannicus as his presumptive successor in it, perhaps together with Nero, cf. C. Jossierand, "Le testament de Claude," *Musée Belge*, XXXIV (1930-32), pp. 285-90. Scramuzza, p. 91, believes that it is wrong to think that the succession belonged to the unfortunate Britannicus, that this is not a Roman idea. But this is mere legalism; true, only M. Aurelius and Vespasian were succeeded by their sons during the first two centuries of the Empire, but they were the only men who had sons to succeed. The best that can be done to palliate Claudius' tragic error of judgment is to conclude that he really thought he was strengthening his throne as Augustus had. Suet., *Claud.*, 27, 2: *E generis Neronem adoptavit, Pompeium atque Silanum non recusavit modo, sed et interemit*, may be a hint that Claudius wanted to strengthen his position by adopting one among his sons-in-law. His fatal mistake lay in choosing his stepson for the purpose. Unfortunately the implication here may be entirely due to Suetonius' rhetoric.

⁴¹ Even Momigliano concedes this much to the effect of personalities on Claudius (*Claudius*, p. 76), although he seems to give Agrippina the full responsibility for Nero's accession.

and on his motion the Senate so decreed. The Senate was also informed by the Emperor of the origin of this suggestion (Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 53, 1-2), probably in remarks which praised Pallas highly, both for this suggestion and for his honest and diligent conduct of his office.⁴² It is very probable that Claudius also intimated that a grant of praetorian ornaments would be a fitting reward for the virtues and services of Pallas. Thereupon the consul-elect Borea Soranus moved that these honors be conferred upon Pallas together with HS 15,000,000, and Cornelius Scipio added that Pallas should be publicly thanked for unselfishly serving the Emperor despite his own descent from Arcadian kings. The latter statement, as remarked previously, was based merely on the identity of the minister's name with that of a mythological king of Arcadia (Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 53, 2-3). Soranus passed as a model of Stoic virtue (cf. *ibid.*, XVI, 21, 1; 23, 1), but as a consul designate he probably spoke first after the Emperor on this occasion, and could well do little else than follow the Emperor's wishes. Scipio's statement was certainly ironic (despite Pliny, *Ep.*, VIII, 6, 3); presumably Soranus' speech was also couched in fulsome irony and Scipio underlined it. Claudius appears to have said that he would consult Pallas to see whether the latter would accept, and the Senate, obviously in the same ironical spirit, urged him to compel Pallas if need be. Nevertheless, presumably at the next session, Claudius told the conscript fathers that Pallas was content with his poverty and would accept only the honor. Claudius too could be ironic; undoubtedly he had not suggested that the money grant be made (probably the SC in Pliny, *Ep.*, VIII, 6, 8, implies that Claudius made no mention of money); that had been Soranus' way of showing his contempt and ridicule.⁴³ According to Roman

⁴² Pliny, *Ep.*, VIII, 6, 13; and assuming that the general tenor of the SC given by Pliny echoes the sentiments expressed by the Emperor, cf. esp. 6, 5.

⁴³ SC in Pliny, *Ep.*, VIII, 6 (cf. VII, 29, 2) combined with Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 53. Cf. also Suet., *Claud.*, 28 (a general plural statement implying several instances, Suet.'s common habit of generalizing from one instance); *Ep. de Caes.*, 4, 9; Schol. *ad Iuven.*, I, 109 (p. 11, Wessner). Seramuzza, p. 23, is clearly mistaken in thinking that Tacitus implies that Pallas took the money (cf. XII, 53, 4-5). Probably the grant of these honors implied the grant of equestrian rank (cf. Pliny, VIII, 6, 4), and a fictitious transfer from the status of *libertus* to that of *ingenuus*

notions, as the Senate clearly thought, Pallas' reward was out of all proportion to his merits. For his Trojan service in the matter of the downfall of Messalina Narcissus had been awarded only the quaestorian insignia (Tac., *Ann.*, XI, 38, 5; cf. Suet., *Claud.*, 28). But this is precisely the point. The prime purpose of the award, as Pallas and Agrippina saw it, was that of overtly recognizing the freedman's triumph in the palace; Narcissus had been completely outdistanced. We do not require the explicit statement of the elder Pliny that the influence of Agrippina was instrumental in procuring this distinction for her ally Pallas.⁴⁴ Pallas was proud of his honor and of his refusal of the money; he had a brief statement of this episode inscribed on his tomb in the Via Tiburtina (Pliny, *Ep.*, VII, 29, 2; VIII, 6, 1). The proceeding in the Senate incidentally throws an interesting sidelight on the relations between that body and the Prince in Claudius' time, each using polite sarcasm on the other. It is doubtful that such an exchange could have occurred under Domitian, for example. It also shows that not all the Roman aristocracy was as devoid of a sense of humor as Tacitus was.

Pallas' influence with Claudius at this juncture is also demonstrated in other ways. He had at some time before this obtained the elevation of his brother, Felix, to equestrian rank and the governorship of Judaea as procurator.⁴⁵ Secure with this influence behind him, Felix was able to misrule his province with impunity, according to Tacitus (*Ann.*, XII, 54). Meanwhile Narcissus was somewhat in eclipse.⁴⁶ In this same year, 52, Claudius went south to open the newly completed tunnel con-

(Duff, pp. 85-6, 214-20), so the hesitations of A. Stein, *Der römische Ritterstand* (Munich, 1927), pp. 272-3, cf. 109-10, about Pallas' equestrian status are probably groundless.

⁴⁴ Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXV, 201. As implied in the text it is not necessary to assume that Agrippina brought influence to bear on Soranus (as Furneaux thought, *ad Ann.*, XII, 53, 2 [II, p. 127]); convincing the Emperor was amply sufficient.

⁴⁵ *Ann.*, XII, 54, 1; Josephus, *Bell. J.*, II, 247; *Ant. J.*, XX, 137; cf. Schumann, p. 42; Stein, *Ritterstand*, p. 114 and note 2.

⁴⁶ Despite the opinions of some scholars (e. g., Stein, *R.-E.*, XVI, cols. 1701-2; Herzog-Hauser and Wotke, *ibid.*, VIII A, col. 258), I think that Tacitus clearly shows that Pallas had surpassed Narcissus in influence in the latter part of Claudius' reign. Zonaras, XI, 10/Dio, LX, 33, 3a, is also clearly wrong when he says that Agrippina won over both Pallas and Narcissus.

necting the Liris with the Fucine Lake. The outcome was a partial fiasco and Agrippina seized the opportunity to blame Narcissus, who had been in charge. The latter, however, retaliated in kind, charging the Empress with unbridled ambition (*Ann.*, XII, 57, 4-5; Dio, LX, 33, 5). If Tacitus can be trusted, Narcissus appears to have been growing ever more suspicious of Agrippina's ambitions for herself and Nero. Yet he could not persuade Claudius to act, for in 54 he was unable to prevent the condemnation of Domitia Lepida, a judicial murder instigated by Agrippina, according to Tacitus (*Ann.*, XII, 65).

The reign of Claudius, however, was nearly over. Shortly after this, in the same year 54, he died, probably as the sources unanimously testify, poisoned by Agrippina, who suppressed the Emperor's will, relegated his son to obscurity, and placed her own Nero on the throne (13 October 54). Claudius, nevertheless, was deified, to legitimate Nero's own power. Narcissus too was done away with shortly after his master expired (*Sen.*, *Apoc.*, 13; Tac., *Ann.*, XIII, 1, 4; Dio, LX, 34, 4). Presumably Pallas, like Agrippina, looked forward to an indefinite extension of his own power and influence at the court of Nero. Tacitus says, however, that Nero was offended by the arrogant presumption of the ex-slave (*Ann.*, XIII, 2, 3-4); however that may be, both Pallas and Agrippina were to be speedily disillusioned.

The praetorian prefect, Burrus, and Seneca, Nero's tutor, were opposed to the influence of Agrippina (*ibid.*, 2, 1-3). Presumably Seneca was the real author of Nero's declaration of policy to the Senate; at any rate, the latter in effect declared that he was opposed to the undue influence of freedmen (*Ann.*, XIII, 4, 2). This, of course, is evidence only for the fact that the aristocracy considered that influence to have been undue under the late Emperor. Agrippina's influence with her son began to wane, and in her turn she was not slow to make known her resentment. Nero, or Seneca, chose Pallas as a victim to show Agrippina the dangers of excessive presumption, and that her influence and power existed solely at the Emperor's pleasure. Pallas was dismissed from his office *a rationibus* which he had administered so shrewdly and which he had perhaps created (January, A. D. 55).⁴⁷ Nevertheless he was allowed to depart

⁴⁷ Since it was before the birthday of Britannicus (Tac., *Ann.*, XIII, 14, 1; 15, 1) in February (Suet., *Claud.*, 27, 2).

with dignity; Nero and Seneca agreed that his books were not to be audited; that his accounts with the state (treasury) were to be regarded as balanced, i. e., that legal action against him be forbidden.⁴⁸ The vexed question of the legal relationship of the Emperor's *fiscus* to the state *aerarium* cannot be gone into here. This passage seems to me, however, to prove that the *fiscus* had legally to make an accounting to the *aerarium*, that therefore it was a legal part of the *aerarium*. Of course it was the Emperor who was responsible to the *aerarium*; legally Pallas was probably only his informal, domestic assistant. But, of course, in fact the Emperor controlled all of the funds of the state in various ways.⁴⁹ While he lived and reigned, however, it would be difficult to bring Caesar to an accounting save as he wished. His agents, like Pallas, by no means shared his immunity to attack—if the Emperor permitted. Pallas must have known how he was hated by numerous persons of power and influence. Hence he foresightedly obtained his guarantee. That he was able to get it confirms that his dismissal was really aimed not at him, but at Agrippina. It also shows that neither Nero, nor Seneca, nor Burrus, who had had a long career in the management of im-

⁴⁸ *Interrogaretur* is a technical legal term "used of the questions put by the accuser in opening the suit" (Furneaux, *ad Tac., Ann.*, XIII, 14, 2 [II, p. 169]). Hence Pallas' request of the Emperor was hardly an "impudent pretension," as G. G. Ramsay suggests, *ad Tac., Ann.*, XIII, 14, 2 (II [London, 1909], p. 129, note 4).

⁴⁹ In the matter of the relationship of *aerarium* and *fiscus*, I am convinced that the view of Hirschfeld, pp. 8, 7-13, as supported by A. H. M. Jones, "The Aerarium and the Fiscus," *J. R. S.*, XL (1950), pp. 22-9, and Last, *ibid.*, XXXIV, pp. 51-9, is correct, against Mommsen (*Str.*, II³, pp. 1000 ff.) and such recent interpretations as C. H. V. Sutherland, "*Aerarium* and *Fiscus* during the Early Empire," *A. J. P.*, LXVI (1945), pp. 151-70, esp. 159. I also fail to see how either the appointment of Pallas *a rationibus*, or the special indulgence exempting him from audit on this occasion (cf. Momigliano, *Claudius*, pp. 103-4) clearly indicate an end to the legal accountability of the *fiscus* to the *aerarium* (e.g., Sutherland, p. 163; Frank, *Ec. Surv.*, V, p. 40). *Pepigerat* is simply Tacitean language testifying to Pallas' arrogance. In fact, of course, Pallas obtained the indulgence of the Emperor. By so doing, it seems to me, he admitted, and the Emperor admitted, the ordinary accountability of *fiscus* to *aerarium*. On the general *de facto* control of all finance by the Emperor, see H. Mattingly, *The Imperial Civil Service of Rome* (Cambridge, 1910), p. 13; Mason Hammond, *The Augustan Principate* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1933), pp. 190, 317, note 9.

perial property⁵⁰ and presumably, therefore, viewed the matter as an expert, had any serious doubts as to Pallas' technical competence and honesty in office. When Pallas departed from the Palatine, he was accompanied by a huge multitude. Doubtless many of these were his friends, sycophants, and freedmen. It seems very probable, however, that some were his own slaves or freedmen, who had been used as assistants in the performance of his office. It is well known that slaves, as part of their *peculium*, could have other slaves, *vicarii*, to help with their duties.⁵¹ What would be more natural than that a freedman should use his own slaves and freedmen to assist him in performing his duties? These of course would leave when he did.

If Pallas hoped that his guarantee from Nero would shield him from his enemies, he was soon to be undeceived. An accusation was preferred against him and Burrus, charging them with a conspiracy to put Cornelius Sulla, husband of Claudius' daughter Antonia, on the throne. The trial was held before Nero and his *consilium*, not in the Senate, as is shown by the fact that Burrus, an *eques*, sat among the *iudices*, although he too was accused.⁵² In the course of the trial, Tacitus says, Pallas testified that he had never communicated with the members of his household save by gestures, or, if something complicated had to be conveyed, in writing; this to avoid the necessity of (having to demean himself by) speaking to them (*Ann.*, XIII, 23, 3). It is obvious that the principal purpose of Tacitus in describing this trial is to afford an example of the unbounded arrogance of Pallas in making this statement.⁵³ Moreover, as all his readers know, Tacitus is especially interested in trials for treason against

⁵⁰ See his *cursus honorum*, *C. I. L.*, XII, 5842 = Dessau, 1321; with the commentary of W. C. McDermott, "Sextus Afranius Burrus," *Latomus*, VIII (1949), pp. 229-54.

⁵¹ On *vicarii*, Duff, pp. 53-4.

⁵² Cf. John Crook, *Consilium Principis* (Cambridge, 1955), p. 47; Furneaux, *ad Tac.*, *Ann.*, XIII, 23, 4 (II, p. 182).

⁵³ On Tacitus' habit of slurring over trial details in which he was not interested, see especially, R. S. Rogers, "A Tacitean Pattern in Narrating Treason-Trials," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIII (1952), pp. 279-311. Cf. also, W. H. Alexander, "The Communiqué to the Senate on Agrippina's Death," *C. P.*, XLIX (1954), pp. 94-7, at 96: "What Tacitus has obviously left out in his *Annals* would produce another work of equal size."

the Emperor. Now this trial was obviously not taken seriously by Nero, as the presence of the accused Burrus among the judges amply shows. It was clearly an attempt to strike at Agrippina and Pallas, who had become, with reason, identified as the faithful servant of the Emperor's mother. Burrus, too, had been brought to power by her, as had Seneca, who also came under some sort of suspicion at this time, if the garbled account of Dio has any meaning (LXI, 10, 6). The easiest way to get at Pallas would naturally be in connection with his former position *a rationibus*. But a simple accusation of this sort was barred by Nero's own declaration. Yet Tacitus more than hints that this was the real subject matter of the trial. The accuser "of record" was a certain Paetus, who had gained ill-repute because he trafficked in bad debts to the *aerarium*, in a manner which is not quite clear.⁵⁴ Moreover, when his accusation signally failed and he was exiled, his account books, which contained records of old debts to the *aerarium*, were ordered burned. This action can logically be understood only on the assumption that these books had been offered as evidence; which means that the plot which Pallas and Burrus were alleged to have concocted was somehow connected with the *aerarium*, and therefore with Pallas' activities *a rationibus*. By bringing up a treason charge a method, supposedly, had been found to circumvent the Emperor's prohibition of malfeasance suits against Pallas (cf. also, Tac., *Ann.*, III, 38, 1). One might guess that Burrus was involved in connection with his past career in the management of imperial property as mentioned above. In any event, if this interpretation of the trial is correct, it also tends to reinforce the view that the *fiscus* was deemed legally part of, and responsible to, the *aerarium*.

There remains Pallas' almost incredible statement that he had not spoken ("respondit nihil umquam se . . . significasse") to the members of his household (*domi*). It is almost impossible to believe that this assertion was generally true, or that his auditors, or anyone, believed that it was true. His arrogance consisted in saying it. No certain answer to the problem can be found, but the following explanation is suggested as likely. The *res gestae* of the trial obviously relate to the time of Pallas' incumbency *a rationibus*. Note also the relative tenses of verb

⁵⁴ Cf. Furneaux, *ad Tac., Ann.*, XIII, 23, 2 (II, p. 182).

and infinitive above; if Tacitus has correctly represented what Pallas said, the latter was not making a general statement, but one referring to a specific circumstance, or series of circumstances, in the past. Dio (LXII, 14, 3) does not relate this statement of Pallas to his trial, and does make a general statement to the effect that Pallas refused to talk to his servants or freedmen. Dio, however, says nothing of gestures; he speaks only of matters transmitted in writing. It is clear that Dio, or his source, is generalizing from this one statement made at the trial. On the other hand, it is known that the ancients had a much more elaborate "language" of gestures than we do.⁵⁵ It was suggested above that Pallas used some members of his own household, freedmen and slaves, to assist in his office *a rationibus*. Hence, is it not possible that in making this remark about gestures he was describing certain fixed administrative routines that he had used in his office? He may also, of course, have made the statement stronger than truth warranted, in his eagerness to show that he could not have conspired with his freedmen; the malicious tongues of those who hated the powerful upstart would do the rest. And it is quite likely that even by non-Roman standards he was arrogant; it would be a natural human reaction for a man in his position. At any rate, on this occasion he was completely cleared of any imputation of treason, as was Burrus.⁵⁶

For the next five years nothing more is heard of Pallas; we may suppose that he was enjoying and increasing his great wealth. If he was not in high favor at court, at least he was not in disfavor, as was shown by events of the year 60. In that year the long term of office as procurator of Judaea, which Felix, Pallas' brother, had greatly misused according to the sources both Jewish and Roman, was ended when Porcius Festus was sent out by Nero to succeed him. The Jewish leaders of Caesarea promptly sent a deputation to Rome to accuse their late governor of gross malfeasance, but Pallas successfully interceded for his brother, who was let off scot-free by Nero. Josephus even says that Pallas was in high favor at the time, but this is probably the

⁵⁵ Cf. Philostr., *Apoll.*, I, 14-15, where this talent is greatly exaggerated, no doubt; but to have any effect on the readers of Philostratus, it must have rested on some actual possibility; also Quintil., *Inst.*, XI, 3, 66; 86-7; 117.

⁵⁶ The description of the trial is *Ann.*, XIII, 23.

historian's own conclusion from the acquittal of Felix (*Ant. J.*, XX, 182).

By this time Pallas was fairly well along in years, probably in his sixties, as argued above, and in 62 he died, presumably quite suddenly since Nero was credited with poisoning him in order to seize his wealth (*Tac., Ann.*, XIV, 65, 1; *Dio*, LXII, 14, 3; cf. *Suet., Nero*, 35, 5). This is not impossible, but Nero was so hated by the Roman historians, and sudden deaths were so frequently ascribed to poison by the ancients, that it seems rather improbable in the case of a man of Pallas' age. Nero did inherit a portion of the property of a freedman who had passed into his *clientela* from that of Claudius, as the law provided; but the rest went to Pallas' family, and provided the means whereby one of his descendants attained the consulship in 167.⁵⁷

Thus ended the long career of M. Antonius Pallas. One's reactions must necessarily be rather mixed. Probably in the middle of the twentieth century it is no longer necessary to acquit him of the crime of having started as a slave. As far as it goes, the evidence suggests that he was a faithful, trusted, and valued servant, not only of Antonia but of Claudius—until the end of the year 48. He then became involved in the plans and ambitions of Agrippina; how far he was an active participant in these schemes, beyond the mere adoption of Nero, is unknown (despite *Tac., Ann.*, XIII, 2, 3). But he must have had an even better realization than Narcissus of what Agrippina really intended. He owed much to Claudius and Antonia, and therefore to Britannicus; it is uncertain that even Narcissus and Pallas together would have been a match for Agrippina, but the latter did not even try to oppose her schemes. He was guilty of the basest ingratitude, and if Claudius was actually murdered, constructively much of the guilt attaches to Pallas. Perhaps it would have been better still for him to have continued to hold himself aloof as he did when Messalina fell, and not to have

⁵⁷ Inheritance of property: *C. I. L.*, VI, 8470 and 143 = Dessau, 1535 and 3896a (cf. Cagnat, *Cours d'épigraphie latine* [4th ed.; Paris, 1914], pp. 81, 87; Duff, p. 53; for the interpretation of the nomenclature involved); law of inheritance: Duff, p. 43; consul of 167: *P. I. R.*², A 859; Stein, *Ritterstand*, pp. 335-6. Hence Frank, *Ec. Surv.*, V, p. 57, is wrong when he says that the *fiscus* reclaimed (presumably all) the estate of Pallas.

tried to play in the dangerous game of the high politics of the Julio-Claudian family. Had he always believed, as he did for a moment in 48, that discretion is the better part of valor, he might have been able to pass his life as tranquilly and blamelessly in the office *a rationibus* as did the father of Claudius Etruscus, who held that position under the Flavian Emperors (Stat., *Silv.*, III, 3).

But had he done so, he would not have had the best documented career among the freedmen of Claudius, and we would not have the evidence, scanty as it is, which we do have, as a test case to try to solve one of the most important problems of the reign of Claudius: the relation between the Emperor and his freedmen councillors in the determination of policy.

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NUMISMATIC LIGHT ON THE GRACCHAN CRISIS.

Historians have long pored over the inadequate literary works on the Gracchan period and have assiduously probed all other sources of information in order to reconstruct more accurately the pattern of the times. The period is interesting, even intriguing, but far more than this, it is a focal point for all the history of the Republic. In this era Rome was changing socially from a chiefly agrarian state to one dominated by its urban population. All ranks of this new society were actuated by new high standards of living, new desires for wealth and luxury. Politically, the expansion into empire continued abroad while at home the old aristocratic senatorial clique battled dramatically with new popular leaders who bore some resemblance to the type of the Greek tyrant, each side courting the favors of the rising equestrian class, the moneyed group. The failure to achieve a compromise in this period—and again later in the years just before the Social War—led almost inevitably to a continuing intensification of the struggle and to the way of Marius and Sulla and Pompey and Caesar.

As for economics, the ancient authors stressed the agrarian problem. Ever-increasing hordes of slaves were employed in the new capitalistic farm operation, the *latifundium*, displacing the old, individual, barely subsistent farm operation, which sharply declined. Many peasants, for this and myriad other reasons, migrated to Rome, continuing a movement which went back at least to the Second Punic War. In the city they formed a growing proletariat, faring well enough, no doubt, in times of prosperity, but when times were bad, huddling miserably in their inadequate tenement houses or packing the assemblies, ready to follow whichever leader promised them most.

Aside from the agrarian crisis, however, not enough is known about the economic situation either of the state or of individuals, whether aristocrats, merchants, or laborers. It is with a view

* The writer wishes to express appreciation to the American Numismatic Society, whose grant for attendance of the Summer Seminar, 1956, made possible the numismatic basis of this work. Additionally, the paper was made possible, in part, through a research grant from Southern Illinois University.

to casting further light on the economic problems of the Roman state and of the city itself that this study of numismatics in the Gracchan period is presented.

The Roman coinage of the mid-second century, now becoming dominant in the Mediterranean world, was based largely on the silver *denarius*. The silver *sestertius* (one-fourth the *denarius*), issued for a time early in the century, had been discontinued, and the bronze *as* (one-tenth the *denarius*) was falling into disuse. The silver *victoriatus* (about two-thirds the *denarius*), still minted perhaps by the Italian cities, had limited circulation. The *denarii* were highly standardized. After a reduction in weight in the 160's or 170's their weight remained stable to the time of Nero. Types also varied little. Roma (or Bellona) regularly appears on the obverse, the Dioscuri, mounted, on the reverse (or Diana or Victory in a *biga*). The names of moneyers were beginning to be inscribed on the coins.

A great deal of work has been done in recent years on the second century coinage, especially on the chronology, but also on special problems. The work of Harold Mattingly, E. S. G. Robinson, E. A. Sydenham, and others¹ has resulted in a revision of the date of the initial issuance of the *denarius* from about 268 B. C. to about 187 B. C., and consequently in a readjustment of chronology for almost the whole century.

During the 140's and 130's there are various indications of far-reaching changes in the coinage. The uncial *as* was "withdrawn" from circulation; the *denarius* was revalued at sixteen instead of ten *asses*; plated *denarii* were issued; types were

¹ The basic article regarding the shift in chronology is Mattingly and Robinson, "The Date of the Roman Denarius and Other Landmarks in Early Roman Coinage," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, XVIII (London, 1933), pp. 3-58. It is available as a reprint. Among others see also Mattingly's "Some New Studies of the Roman Republican Coinage," *ibid.*, XXXIX (London, 1953), pp. 239-85; "The Various Styles of the Roman Republican Coinage," *Numismatic Chronicle*, Ser. 6, IX (1949), pp. 57 ff.; Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham, "The Retariffing of the Denarius at Sixteen Asses," *ibid.*, Ser. 5, XIV (1934), pp. 81 ff.; Sydenham, "Problems of the Early Roman Denarius," *Transactions of the International Numismatic Congress* (1936), pp. 262 ff.; Karl Pink, *The Triumviri Monetales and the Structure of the Coinage of the Roman Republic* (*Numismatic Studies*, No. 7, American Numismatic Society [New York, 1952]).

changed radically; apparently from this period dates the extensive use of the coinage for propaganda purposes; control of the coinage seems to have been in part or for a time wrested from the Senate. The need for money certainly was great in the latter part of the period, when Gaius Gracchus inaugurated his extensive program.

Without still more information, however, it is impossible to tie all these actions together into a coherent whole. This paper is an effort to fill one gap, by indicating in a general way the relative volume of coins struck in the years 145-110 B. C. The methods used are those established recently by Bengt Thordeman² in a study of seventeenth and eighteenth century hoards in Sweden. He had available for inspection both hoard coins and corresponding mint records. His work shows conclusively that, as one might have suspected, there is a close correlation between the numbers of coins found in hoards for a given year and the numbers of coins minted in that year. Variable factors of course make caution necessary. A hoard built up over a considerable period may not reflect the same figures as one hastily brought together; large hoards are likely to be most accurate, though a collection of information from small hoards seems to show a similar relationship.³ The application of Thordeman's methods to second century B. C. Roman coinage demands still greater caution and reservation, primarily because of chronological uncertainties. The results of this research seem, nevertheless, to suggest that such efforts may be highly rewarding in spite of the uncertainties.

This study is based on *denarii* from fourteen hoards found in Italy and Spain comprising, for this period (about 145 B. C. to about 110 B. C.), 5281 coins.⁴ Information obtained from

² Bengt Thordeman, "The Lohe Hoard; a Contribution to the Methodology of Numismatics," *Numismatic Chronicle*, Ser. 6, XVIII (1948), pp. 188 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 200 f. and p. 204.

⁴ Max Bahrfeldt, "Der Denarfund von Masera," *Zeitschrift für Numismatik*, XI (1884), pp. 202 ff. (the Riccia hoard is also described here); also "Le dépôt de deniers romains trouvé à Pieve-Quinta," *Revue de la Numismatique Belge*, XXXVIII (1882), pp. 18 ff.; also "Deux dépôts de deniers consulaires romains," *Revue Belge de Numismatique*, LVII (1901), pp. 5 ff. (Ossera hoard); L. Cesano, "Ripostiglio di monete familiari," *Notizie degli Scavi*, XII (1903), pp. 604 ff.

several other hoards was not used because the published accounts did not describe the hoard coins in enough detail, because the coins were not distributed over the whole period, because a portion of the hoard had been lost before publication, or because the number of coins was so small and the specimens so scattered as to indicate doubtful value to this study.

The tabulations of the various hoards exhibit a surprising and reassuring consistency. To illustrate: the tables indicate that the heaviest issues of the period were those of the moneyers L. Antestius Gragulus (314 coins), placed by Sydenham⁵ in the period 133-126 B. C., and M. Baebius Tampillus (301 coins), dated in the period 125-120 B. C. The coins of Gragulus are found in eleven of the fourteen hoards, and of these, ten indicate that the issue was relatively heavy. The coins of Tampillus are found in twelve of the fourteen hoards, and in ten the issue is relatively heavy. The same high correlation is evident throughout the tables. If, then, the coins can be placed in a chronologically correct position, we can with some confidence feel that the relative volume of coins struck will be accurately indicated. In this study the coins are arranged according to the most recent general work dealing with chronology (Sydenham, *C. R. R.*). For comparison the coins are also arranged in the order indicated by Mattingly's variant views expressed in Appendix H of Sydenham and in a more extended recent work, *Some New Studies of the Roman Republican Coinage*.⁶

(S. Gregorio di Sassola); also "Ripostiglio di Alba di Massa," *Rivista Italiana di Numismatica*, XXVI (1913), pp. 23 ff.; G. De Petra, "Notizia del ripostiglio di S. Giovanni Incarico," *ibid.*, VI (1893), pp. 99 ff.; E. Gabrici, "Tesoretto di monete repubblicane romane d'argento, scoperto a Taranto," *ibid.*, XI (1898), pp. 613 ff.; Mattingly, "Some Roman Hoards: Cordova," *Numismatic Chronicle*, Ser. 5, V (1925), pp. 395 ff.; Theodor Mommsen, "Römische Denarschätze," *Zeitschrift für Numismatik*, II (1875), pp. 32 ff. (Riccia and S. Miniato); G. Procopio, "S. Lorenzo del Vallo (Cosenza); Ripostiglio di denari repubblicani romani," *Notizie degli Scavi*, LXXVII (1952), pp. 177 ff.; H. Sandars, "Notes on a Hoard of Roman Denarii Found in the Sierra Morena in the South of Spain," *Numismatic Chronicle*, Ser. 5, I (1921), pp. 179 ff.; also "Trouvaille de monnaies républicaines à Santa Elena (Janv. 1903)," *Revue Numismatique*, Ser. 4, IX (1905), pp. 400 ff.

⁵ E. A. Sydenham, *The Coinage of the Roman Republic* (London, 1952), p. 52.

⁶ *Loc. cit.*

TABLE A


Note: straight lines show the annual average of coins struck in the various Sydenham periods. The curved lines are probability-curves.

Sydenham chronology; fourteen hoards: —————

Sydenham chronology; Masera and Riccia hoards:

Sydenham chronology with Mattingly's corrections (all hoards): - - - - -

Sydenham chronology; corrected for normal coin attrition
(all hoards): . — . — . —



Some results of the study are indicated on the graph (Table A). The solid, straight lines indicate the annual average of hoard coins from the various periods. It was necessary to use an annual average because the periods which Sydenham set up are not of equal length. The curved lines are probability-curves, with peaks placed to correspond with other evidence which will be presented later. The data on which the solid curved line is computed are drawn from all fourteen hoards. The dotted curved line is based on corresponding data for the two largest hoards (Masera and Riccia) only. As has been indicated, Thordeman feels that the largest hoards are most reliable; how-

TABLE B

This table shows the average amount of coinage remaining in circulation in a given year, using Thordeman's figure of two per cent per year loss.

1. 100%	10. 83.38	19. 69.51	28. 57.95
2. 98	11. 81.71	20. 68.12	29. 56.79
3. 96.04	12. 80.08	21. 66.76	30. 55.65
4. 94.12	13. 78.48	22. 65.42	31. 54.54
5. 92.24	14. 76.91	23. 64.11	32. 53.45
6. 90.40	15. 75.37	24. 62.83	33. 52.38
7. 88.59	16. 73.86	25. 61.57	34. 51.33
8. 86.82	17. 72.38	26. 60.34	35. 50.30
9. 85.08	18. 70.93	27. 59.13	

ever, there is little variation and the similarity of the curves is striking. Even more important is the curve (dot-dash line) which is based on the same chronology but corrected for normal coin loss. It probably presents the most reliable picture. The loss of coinage through normal attrition is estimated by Thordeman, on the basis of his researches, to be about two per cent per year, the figure used here.⁷ The fourth curve (line of dashes) is based on the data computed on the basis of Mattingly's chronology for the period. The wide divergence of this curve from the others after about 133 B. C. will be immediately noted. The depression of Mattingly's curve in the 130's is much deeper than that indicated by the Sydenham chronology, the recovery in the late 130's is much less noticeable, and the curve rises to dizzy heights in the late 120's. It should be mentioned that since

⁷ Thordeman, p. 199. See Table B above.

Mattingly did not change the Sydenham chronology for the years 145 to 138 B. C., a curve corrected for coin loss would parallel the corrected Sydenham curve (dot-dash line) for the early period.

Fully as significant as the average computation is a comparison of the size of the individual issues in each period. They are full and continuous during 145 to 138, but more erratic in the second period. Of sixteen moneyers listed by Sydenham for the first period, four are represented in the hoard group by more than one hundred coins (an anonymous issue is also of this magnitude) and twelve of the moneyers are represented by more than sixty coins. In the following period, 137 to 134, two of the eight moneyers listed are in the one-hundred-plus category, only four in the sixty-plus group. That is, whereas three quarters of the moneyers in the earlier period are represented in the hoards by sixty or more coins, only half of those in the next period are similarly represented. Moreover, two of those in the sixty-plus class in the second period are by Mattingly placed after 133 B. C. It is interesting that only three of the eight moneyers Sydenham lists for 137-134 are included in the two largest hoards. It seems evident, then, that money was struck in an even, full flow during the first period, while in the second period a couple of large issues are interspersed with several quite small ones.

The issues of the subsequent periods, when arranged according to the Sydenham chronology, show fairly even, medium-sized issues. Of twenty-five moneyers listed for 135-126, eleven are represented in the hoards by more than sixty coins; the similar proportion for 125-120 is three of eleven; in 119-110, ten of fourteen. Mattingly, it will be recalled from the graph, draws the heaviest issues from the 135-126 coins and places them with the 125-120 group. Mattingly's higher average for the period after 119 B. C. results from his view that issues which Sydenham dates to as late as 110 B. C. must be placed before about 117 B. C.

Information obtained from such a study as this must, of course, be correlated with other available evidence in order to permit the best possible interpretation. The first ten years of the period will be first considered. Here all the graph curves show a similar tendency: it is indicated that large quantities of money were struck in the 140's, falling off rapidly to a low point in the mid-130's.

In 145 B. C. Rome had just concluded wars with Carthage, Macedonia, and the Achaean League (culminating in the looting and destruction of Corinth) which brought in large amounts of booty to the treasury. Unfortunately the literary sources do not give very specific information as to value. Pliny (*N. H.*, XXXIII, 141) says that Aemilianus displayed 4370 pounds of silver in his triumph over Carthage, and there must have been much more booty of various types. Corinth was a rich city and must have yielded rich spoils. In Macedonia, the very efficient Roman pillagers surely found much loot to "liberate," despite earlier wars and plundering.

The booty did not lie idle in the treasury. A rapidly growing Rome required an extensive building program, the most expensive item of which was the Marcian aqueduct, built in the period 144-140 B. C.⁸ During the same years two other aqueducts, the Appia and the Anio Vetus, were refurbished. Large sums were spent in 146 for building the Temples of Jupiter Stator and Juno Regina by Q. Metellus Macedonicus,⁹ who had also constructed the Porticus Metelli to enclose the area in the preceding year. Between 145 and 142 L. Mummius built a temple to Hercules Victor. Also in 142 the wooden arches of the Pons Aemilius were constructed, the Janiculum was fortified, and the Capitoline temple ceiling was gilded, the first such ceiling in Rome, according to Pliny (*N. H.*, XXXIII, 57).

Such large expenditure, 180,000,000 *sestertii* for the work on the Marcian aqueduct alone,¹⁰ together with private building outlay, must have brought prosperity and an inflationary spiral in its wake. In spite of the growing use of slave labor, employment surely was plentiful. Returned soldiers stayed to swell the city population even more and to contribute to its prosperity as they spent the booty they had acquired. Still, it is likely in this inflationary period, continuing a trend that quite possibly was

⁸ For the building program of this period, see T. Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, I: *Rome and Italy of the Republic* (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 226 ff.

⁹ For information on additional building mentioned in this paragraph, see Samuel B. Platner and Thomas Ashby, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (London, 1929), pp. 304 f., 424, 256 f., 397 f., 272 f., 298.

¹⁰ Frank, *Ec. Surv.*, I, p. 226.

typical of much of the century to this point, that prices tended to outrun wages and that the lowest classes were unable to make any provision for periods of unemployment or illness.

The expenditure of the booty from the wars ending in 146, then, seems adequate explanation for the peak coinage of the period of the late 140's, as indicated in the statistical study. So far the curve seems accurate and entirely plausible. But what of the very low point which follows?

Most of the evidence is negative for the 130's, but significant, nevertheless. There were no profitable wars in this period. The comparatively minor struggle against the Numantines (*ca.* 143-133 B. C.) in Spain can have produced little booty; it is likely that since normal tribute from that province was reduced, the operations produced a net loss. Probably less bullion from the mines in the disturbed areas reached Rome, although the most productive ones were no doubt unaffected.¹¹ In Macedonia, a raid of the Scordisci in 135¹² probably lessened the collectible tribute there; possibly silver mines there produced less in this period.¹³ Of greatest significance was the Sicilian Slave War of about 139 to 131 B. C. This revolt reached its height about 135, when Eunus assumed leadership. Diodorus (XXXVI, 1) and Florus (II, 7) speak of tremendous destruction in this important province. The grain tithe, so vital to Rome, could not possibly be collected under these circumstances, and Sicilian mines were no doubt affected as well. Since Sicily produced about a tenth of all provincial income even in Cicero's day,¹⁴ it is evident that this meant a serious reduction in income for Rome, more acute because direct taxes had not been levied in Italy since 167 B. C. If Rome had in the temple of Saturn a reserve of precious metals such as she was reported to have accumulated by 156 B. C.,¹⁵ there is no evidence that she was

¹¹ Oliver Davies, *Roman Mines in Europe* (Oxford, 1935), p. 94, feels that because of unrest these mines produced little in the second century.

¹² M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (3 vols., Oxford, 1941), II, pp. 756 f. and 807 f.

¹³ These mines, once closed because unprofitable, had been re-opened in 158; they did not yield much, however. See Frank, *Ec. Surv.*, I, p. 256.

¹⁴ T. Frank, *An Economic History of Rome* (second ed., Baltimore, 1927), p. 192.

¹⁵ Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXIII, 55, reports the treasury held, at that date,

spending more than was required for necessary civil and military costs. After the building of the temple of Mars in the Circus Flaminius in 138 by D. Junius Callaicus,¹⁶ there is no record of any further major construction project until the building of the relatively small Tepulan aqueduct in 125.¹⁷

These gleanings from other sources, then, seem fully to vindicate the statistical evidence presented here for a drop in the volume of the coinage in the 130's prior to the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus. The consequences of these years of deflation, following as they did hard on the heels of a free-spending, inflationary period, are certainly of greatest importance and require a new look at the Gracchan crisis. The author intends to explore this crisis more fully in a forthcoming paper.

After 133-122 B. C. the income from troubled provinces was restored with the conclusion of the Slave War in Sicily and the victorious end of the Spanish war. Not much booty was turned into the treasury,¹⁸ but the drain of public funds to support the armies lessened. The largest single accession to the *aerarium* of which we are aware came about 132 B. C. when the treasury of Attalus III of Pergamum came to Rome by bequest and his personal effects were brought to Rome and sold. In speaking of the wild bidding for Attalus' personal property at the auction, Pliny remarks (*N. H.*, XXXIII, 149), *verecundia exempta est*. Although subsequent military operations required to put down Andronicus, the pretender to the Pergamene throne, may have cost a great deal, the immediate effect of the large windfall may have been considerable. If Tiberius Gracchus was able to carry through his proposal that the Attalid treasury be used to stock the small farms he was attempting to create,¹⁹ much of it may have been coined immediately, for the land commission distributing small farms from the *ager publicus* continued to work after Tiberius' death. A passage from Florus (II, 15), however, has Gaius Gracchus promising to use this same Attalid treasure to

17,419 lbs. of gold, 22,070 lbs. of silver, and 6,135,400 pieces (*numerato: asses?*) of coined money.

¹⁶ Platner and Ashby, p. 328.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁸ Aemilianus gave only seven *denarii* each to his troops after the destruction of Numantia. Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXIII, 141.

¹⁹ Plut., *T. Gracchus*, 14.

buy grain for the people. It has already been shown that there is no evidence for much public building in these years. It seems likely, therefore, that the coinage for 133-126 can have been no more than moderate, and that Sydenham's chronology places too many issues in this period and not enough in the following years. The curve based on Mattingly's ideas may here be nearer the actual facts.

The tremendous divergence of the curves after 125 B. C. requires some thought. First it should be said that the effort of Mattingly to establish a precise chronology for the years 125-118 B. C.²⁰ led him to place moneyers in this period which, for a study such as this, he might well have decided to place a year or two prior to 125 or a year or two after 118. However, it is not unfair to use his work as it is used in this paper, for he says that the coinage of this period "can be arranged with a precision that does not again become possible under the Republic till the days of Julius Caesar."²¹ While he is not so positive of the years 125-124, he feels the rest of the period is "firmly dated." He identifies certain issues with the founding of the colony Narbo Martius, and others with the first year of Gaius Gracchus' tribunate. The remaining issues he relates to these and ranges between those terminal dates.

A careful analysis of the numbers of issues involved creates a strong doubt as to the validity of the specific dates applied, though perhaps not of the general dating. Pointing out that two separate series of *denarii* are evident for the period after about 137 B. C., Mattingly thereupon assumes, without saying so, that there are two colleges of *tresviri* for each year—one for each series. He therefore concentrates a large number of moneyers in a relatively short period. Sydenham lists forty-five moneyers for the eighteen years 137-120 B. C. Mattingly includes twenty of these, along with three others, in a table²² which is intended as a complete list of the moneyers in the six-year period 125-120. Then, somewhat absently, in an appendix, he assigns six more moneyers either specifically or generally to the same period. His total for these six years therefore reaches thirty-two including (with those added from the appendix) twenty-nine of the

²⁰ In "New Studies," pp. 239-52.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 240 ff.

forty-five moneyers which Sydenham distributes over a period three times as long. It is curious that Mattingly notes that the same moneyer (C. Valerius Flaccus) appears in both series of *denarii*, but he is not aware that this seems to destroy his theory of two separate colleges of *tresviri* for these years.

Still, there is no doubt that the spending in the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus was relatively heavy. He furnished clothing free to the soldiery; subsidized grain for the poor; sent out colonies; constructed many miles of roads, carefully and expensively graded, and built granaries to insure a constant grain supply. He was, according to Plutarch,²³ "closely attended by a throng of contractors, artificers, ambassadors, magistrates, soldiers, and literary men" Additionally, Gracchus' opponent, Livius Drusus, proposed twelve colonies, with the approval of the Senate, some of which were probably established²⁴ and required the expenditure of additional money by the state. Moreover, in 121 B. C., after Gaius' death, the consul Opimius built a basilica and restored the temple of Concord, while Q. Fabius Allobrogicus built the first of the great arches to stand in and about the forum.²⁵

A curve, however, which shows the increase in state spending rising more than five times in three or four years is suspect, and while we may conclude that Sydenham was wrong to place so many issues in the 133-126 period, we must also feel that Mattingly placed too many large issues in the 125-120 period. A curve somewhere between the two would surely be more accurate.

One is, of course, open to some criticism when he uses a certain chronology to compile a statistical study like this one and then uses the study in turn to criticize the chronology, for to a degree he argues in a circle. Nevertheless such interaction of information is not only valid but usual and necessary. The numismatic experts who endeavor to establish chronology will in turn no doubt find statistics such as these valuable in determining whether their work dovetails with all other known economic circumstances.

²³ *C. Gracchus*, 6 and 7.

²⁴ See my article, "Livius Drusus, *t. p.* 122, and his Anti-Gracchan Program," *C. J.*, LII (October, 1956), p. 31.

²⁵ Platner and Ashby, pp. 81 f. and 211.

No effort will here be made to evaluate the period beyond 120 B. C., nor will the author presume to present a complete picture which resolves all the numismatic puzzles of the times. Nevertheless, some suggestions are in order. First, with regard to what Sydenham called the "withdrawal" of the *as*,²⁶ it may be noted that there was a considerable inflationary trend throughout much of the second century, with an emphatically inflationary period just before this "withdrawal." May it not therefore be conjectured that instead of withdrawal the bronze money simply was falling into disuse? For all trade except the small retail selling in the market-places, there was increasing use of silver, so that the bronze already in circulation or minted but not yet circulated was entirely adequate. Therefore for several years no new bronze was minted. The same sort of situation seems to have obtained in the middle part of the next century when very little bronze and also very little silver in the smaller denominations were issued.²⁷

Another of the problems mentioned earlier is the revaluing of the *denarius* at sixteen instead of ten *asses*. The importance of this reform must depend on the formal relationship of the *as* to the *denarius*. An investigation of the literary sources seems to show that the *as* was in this period still the standard unit of account or money of account. Legal use of the terms point particularly to this conclusion. Cicero, in *De Re Publica* (III, 17), has one of his characters, L. Furius Philus, consul in 136, say, speaking of the Voconian Law of the 160's or 170's which limited women's rights of inheritance, "Why . . . should the daughter of P. Crassus . . . be permitted by law to have a hundred million *aeris* . . . ?" Lucilius²⁸ mentions a decree of the Senate in the consulship of C. Fannius and M. Valerius Messala (161 B. C.) which limited expenditure on meals to one hundred *asses* a day during festival days, to thirty *asses* on ten additional days each month, and to ten *asses* on other days. Gellius²⁹ mentions the Licinian Law, thought to be of about 101 B. C., which raised the limit of expenditure permitted on meals for special occasions from one hundred to two hundred

²⁶ *C. R. R.*, p. 50 and note, also p. 69, note.

²⁷ G. F. Hill, *Historical Roman Coins* (London, 1909), pp. 90 f.

²⁸ Quoted by A. Gellius, *Att. Noct.*, II, 24.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

asses (*aeris*). In the same passage, Gellius uses the term "sesterces" of a similar law of Sulla. The passage in Pliny (*N. H.*, XXXIII, 45 and 46) which relates the revaluing of the *denarius* also indicates that the *as* was the official unit of account.³⁰ Soldiers continued after the reform, he says, to receive as pay a *denarius* for each ten *asses*; this pay revision would have been necessary only if military pay was reckoned in *asses* and paid in *denarii*.

Since the *as* was the money of account at the date of the reform, it is necessary to conclude that it was of no minor significance. One cannot argue that this was merely an adjustment of a cheapening silver to bronze, for the bronze had long been fiduciary coinage. It may be expected that the reform would help the debtor class (no doubt mostly the senatorial aristocracy who had not been able to keep up with the equestrian *nouveaux riches*). It is perhaps conceivable, connecting this reform with the "withdrawal" of the *as*, that there was too much bronze in circulation and the adjustment merely reflected the policy set by the money-changers in the market place. But since the *as* was the unit of account, while silver was the chief medium of exchange, this explanation does not seem likely. The move in any case would have been inflationary and debtors would have gained. Of course, if any equestrian creditor had on hand much silver money, he might benefit also. It is even possible that the ordinary laborer might benefit if, as is possible, his wage was about a *denarius* per day. Interpretation of this reform remains difficult, and exact placement in time is even more uncertain.

Sydenham placed the revaluation in 133 B. C. to correspond with the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus. He says:

The date of the reform is uncertain and the choice lies between 133 and 122 B. C. Of these the earlier date seems preferable for the following reasons: (i) the policy of Tiberius Gracchus (133 B. C.) supplies the conditions which might account for a monetary change of this kind, and (ii) if the *denarii* with the mark of value XVI were not issued until 122 B. C., there would be an abnormally large

³⁰ Although Pliny states this happened in 217 B. C., it is now generally agreed that the passage refers to the actual change in the Gracchan period. I am indebted to Professor Theodore C. Buttrey of Yale for pointing out the implications of this statement.

number of moneyers to be crowded into the last twenty years of the second century.³¹

But Mattingly assigns the change to 122;³² his reasoning will be mentioned presently.

This statistical study of the hoards can reflect on this problem one very significant ray of light: it indicates approximately the proportional size of the issues of the various moneyers. The importance of this additional information will be immediately recognized when it is noted that the six issues of the coins marked XVI, which initiated the reform, were not large ones. Relatively, these issues are well below the median, some quite small.³³ Since the years of Gaius Gracchus' tribunate were years of heavy spending, it necessarily seems to follow that the XVI coins cannot be assigned to 123 or 122, nor, consequently, to Gracchus himself. Although the effect of the issues was inflationary, they were not issued to aid in a heavy spending program.

Mattingly's argument for attributing these coins to Gaius Gracchus³⁴ is primarily derived from a remark of Statius (*Silvae*, IV, 9). Writing probably in Domitian's reign, two centuries after the Gracchi, Statius complains of his patron, who for a nice new book of his own which cost him a "*decussis*" has sent in return an old law book of Brutus not worth an "*asse Gaiano*." Mattingly deduces that the two terms, derived from the old law book, refer to money of Brutus' time (soon after Gracchus), since the terms are meaningless in Statius' day. But "*decussis*" may easily have remained a slang term for the *denarius* long after it ceased to be worth ten *asses*, and a worn *as* of the Emperor Gaius, forty-odd years before, might easily be the "*asse Gaiano*." Also, there were no *asses* issued in Gaius Gracchus' time so that there could not have been an issue of actual,

³¹ *C. R. R.*, pp. xxviii f.

³² In Appendix H of Sydenham, *C. R. R.*, pp. 222 ff. See also "New Studies," pp. 242 f.

³³ The size of the XVI issues in the hoards are as follows: L. Julius, 38 coins; C. Titinus, 10; L. Atilius Nomentanus, 3; M. Aufidius Rusticus, 2; C. Valerius Flaccus, 75—for both X and XVI issues (the hoards were not always listed in enough detail to permit a distinction); and A. Spurius, also for both X and XVI issues, 32. Compare these figures with those given on p. 146.

³⁴ "New Studies," pp. 242 f.

depreciated *asses*. Surely, therefore, Mattingly's arguments will not be considered overwhelming. Probably the XVI reform, which would chiefly have benefited the senatorial aristocracy, should be assigned to the period between the Gracchi. It is probable that too much of importance in the 133-122 B. C. period is assigned to the brothers Gracchi.

Several of the following issues of coins, marked ✕, are shown by the statistics to be quite large. To list a few, there are those of L. Antestius Gragulus (314 coins), assigned by Mattingly to 122 B. C. and by Sydenham to before 126 B. C., M. Vargus (120 coins), T. Cloulius (78 coins), Cn. Domitius (71 coins), C. Cassius (105 coins), and others, all assigned within the period 125-120 by Mattingly but after 119 B. C. by Sydenham. Some or all of these moneyers may represent the two years in office for Gaius Gracchus. In any case it is evident that when trying to place moneyers the relative size of their issues cannot be ignored if there is also evidence indicating the amount of spending.

This study, then, demonstrates that the methods of Thordeman have a limited but potentially very valuable application in the ancient period, both for the historian and for the numismatist. The evidence here presented and confirmed by other sources shows a wide latitude in the spending of the Roman state that undoubtedly had a strong impact on the economy especially of the city of Rome itself, where much of the money was spent. By inference, therefore, it emphasizes the urban nature of the problem which the Gracchi faced, and underlines the fact that Tiberius Gracchus came to power in a time of deflation, of drastically lowered government spending, for those affected hardly distinguishable from a depression. It appears, then, that the ancient emphasis on the agrarian problem (and a continuing modern emphasis, it must be added) was overdone, primarily because Tiberius' solution to the problem of what to do with the ranks of the unemployed in Rome was to get them out on old-style farms. It is probable that the program of Gaius Gracchus was in response to a continuing similar situation and that a considerable rise in government spending as the result (along with the program of Drusus and the initiating of other government projects) at least temporarily corrected the depression.

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THE PHAEDRUS AND REINCARNATION.

"In the *Phaedrus*," writes Professor Hackforth (*Plato's Phaedrus*, p. 87), "all souls regain their wings after 10,000 years." I am not here concerned with the souls of incorrigible sinners, which according to *Gorgias* 525C and *Republic* 615C sq. stay for ever in Hades, though the *Phaedrus* makes no mention of eternal punishment; nor am I concerned with those souls which, according to *Phaedrus* 249A, regain their wings and escape, apparently, from the κύκλος γενέσεως after three thousand years, through having chosen a philosophic life three times over. It is usually assumed, and rightly in my opinion, that the general rule according to Plato is that souls make their way to the celestial region at the end of ten thousand years. Although εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅθεν ἦκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκάστη οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων (248E), taken by itself, *might* mean that the period mentioned was simply a minimum period, the reference at 256E-257A to nine thousand years of floating περὶ γῆν καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς seems to be a reference to "the sum of the periods between successive earthly lives" (Hackforth, *op. cit.*, p. 110, n. 1) and to prove that there is a fixed cycle of lives lasting for ten thousand years all told, after which the soul inevitably ascends to the celestial region. The question with which I am concerned is, does it ever return here again after that? On this point scholars are usually silent, but the general assumption seems to be that the answer should be No. This may be inferred from such remarks as those of M. Frutiger (*Les Mythes de Platon*, p. 255, n. 2) that in the *Phaedrus* "Platon imagine une période d'évolution complète des ames d'une durée de 10,000 ans" (*italics mine*). If this is so, the description in the myth of what happens when a soul "falls" is a description of what is, for each soul, its *original* fall. Hackforth is rightly cautious when he observes (*op. cit.*, p. 87) that "to the questions how long they [souls that have regained their wings] remain winged, and whether the attempt to follow the procession is repeated immediately, the myth has no answer, nor should we seek to supply one." But I think it is important to emphasize that such souls do *not* necessarily remain winged *for ever*; and I shall argue both that it is essential to Plato's doctrine of caring for the soul that a journey to the celestial region after

a ten-thousand-year cycle should not imply immunity from any further reincarnation, and that the "falls" described in the myth are not meant to be "original" falls. Let us consider first the myth itself.

We must not press too far the statements of a myth, and in any case we are concerned with what Plato believed to be likely rather than with what he would have claimed to be able to prove. But we are told that after ten thousand years (I now assume this to be the meaning of 248E) a soul returns *εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ὅθεν ἦκει*, that is to say, to the celestial region where it previously followed in the train of a god. Without asking whether it will attempt to follow the procession again immediately or not, we must surely assume that it will do so some time. What else could it do? All gods and *δαίμονες* process; and the *Phaedo* stresses the fact that the soul's deepest desire is once more to contemplate directly the truth (the Forms) that it beheld before its birth. If it now attempts to reach the *πεδῖον ἀληθείας*, it must, unless it is perfect, experience difficulty; and only if it is perfect, and able to reach the outer region not for one revolution only but always, will it remain unharmed (248C). Now there is no reason to suppose that at the end of a ten-thousand-year cycle the soul will be perfect. I shall amplify this point in a moment, but for the present would merely observe that we are certainly not told that a return at the end of ten thousand years is conditional upon the making of satisfactory moral progress, or upon the nature of the last incarnation.¹ The other point in the myth to which I would draw attention is the talk at 247B of the charioteer whose horse is "not well trained" (*μὴ καλῶς τεθραμμένος*). If, as *Republic* X tells us, a soul in its truest nature is not at variance with itself, why should any horse be suffering from bad training, if it has never been on earth and spoilt its nature here? Does it

¹ The words at 249C, *δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια*, cannot mean that a soul will not return at the end of ten thousand years unless it is philosophic, for at 249E-249A we are told that no soul, *except* the soul of a true philosopher, grows wings in less than ten thousand years. It is clearly implied that all souls after an appropriate lapse of time (*viz.* at the end of 10,000 years, as I have argued above) have wings. These words simply mean that only a philosophic soul grows wings in 3,000 years: Plato is "giving the ground for his assertion that the philosopher alone can shorten the period of *πτέρωσις*" (Hackforth, *op. cit.*, p. 86, p. 2).

not seem that the "fall" which results from this discord is not, in fact, an *original* "fall"—that the soul in question has led an impure life on earth, some of the effects of which still remain with it? It is true that at 248C we read that a soul may become filled with forgetfulness and evil, and so grow heavy and fall, *τινι συντυχία χρησαμένη*, but it may well be that here as elsewhere Plato "is not thinking of chance but of a *τύχη* which has some sort of compulsion with it."² The compulsion in the present instance would be due to the load of forgetfulness and sin that the soul has accumulated. Furthermore, this mention of "being filled" with forgetfulness and evil, and the passage at 247B about the horse of evil nature being heavy and weighing the chariot down, remind us of passages in the *Phaedo*. At *Phaedo* 81A-D we read of souls which, on quitting the body, are still weighed down by heavy earthiness, and are seen as ghosts haunting monuments and tombs; and at 83D we read about the somewhat better soul which is still *τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα . . . ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σῶμα*. May not the "fall" of a soul even from the celestial region³ be due to this sort of cause? And is it not possible that the "fall" described in this myth is not meant to be an original fall, but one which is due to bad training in a previous incarnation?

I now return to the question whether we can expect the soul to be perfect after a cycle of ten thousand years. It may be suggested that there is a hope that this will be the case, though it is not a certainty. But such an argument will not preclude the

² E. G. Berry, *The History and Development of the Concept of θεία μοῖρα and θεία τύχη down to and including Plato* (Chicago, 1940), p. 71, discussing *Rep.* 499B. E. Seymer Thompson (ed. *Meno*, p. 294) quotes *Phaedrus* 250A, which is concerned with souls that have fallen to earth and *ἐδυστύχησαν*, ὥστε ὑπὸ τινων ὁμιλιῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδικον τραπόμεναι λήθην ὧν τότε εἶδον ἱερῶν ἔχειν, and remarks, "Not merely as regards the previous state but in regard to *this* life the *Phaedrus* seems to recognize an element of fate or chance." But to suggest that evil associations are the result of pure chance would be to contradict Plato's undoubted belief both in divine providence and in free-will and the responsibility of the individual for the conditions of his life (*Rep.* 617E). At 250A *ἐδυστύχησαν* probably refers to a lack of ἀρετή: they "missed the mark."

³ In this passage of the *Phaedo* there is no question of a distinction between the waiting-place where souls abide between incarnations and the final abode of the pure. The soul loaded with evil is simply *οἷα μηδέποτε εἰς Ἄιδου καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι*.

possibility of a fall from heaven after one cycle of lives has been lived, so long as we admit that the soul goes there inevitably after ten thousand years; and that, as we have seen, must be accepted in view of 256E-257A. The only way to avoid the conclusion that a subsequent fall will sometimes occur would be to show that after such a cycle the soul *must* be pure and perfect, with the capabilities described at 248C. But can it be shown that it must be perfect? There are, it is true, the rewards and punishments that are meted out after each life on earth, and the *Gorgias* (525B) speaks of the "benefit" to be derived from punishment "both here and in Hades"; but it seems that in spite of such benefit the habits of one's former life may have a lasting effect upon the soul (*Rep.* 620A, cf. *Phaedo* 81E sq.), and that rewards may make us careless (*Rep.* 619B-D). The man who is "virtuous from habit" will actually escape punishment, and he has not attained the purity of the true φιλόσοφος. In fact, rewards and punishments as aids to morality have severe limitations, and it is clear that they alone are not supposed to make us perfect. But where the individual will is concerned, Plato cannot have imagined that everyone would achieve the same result in the same period of time.

There is, then, no guarantee that souls will be philosophic after ten thousand years; at 249A it is apparently assumed that they will not be—οὐ γὰρ πτεροῦται [ἡ ψυχὴ] πρὸ τοσούτου χρόνου, πλὴν ἢ τοῦ φιλοσοφῆσαντος ἀδόλως κτλ.; and yet all souls will inevitably go to the celestial region after that period. What then are we to make of the various exhortations to philosophic virtue that we find in Plato? Why do we need it? These exhortations can hardly be aimed only at those who may be able to obtain release in the shorter period of three millennia. One might indeed suppose from the *Gorgias*, taken by itself, that the only reason for practising virtue is the reckoning after death—the fear of punishment and the hope of reward. But that cannot be what Plato meant, for in the *Republic* he introduces the question of rewards and punishments only after first recommending the practice of virtue without reference to them. Good deeds are those which subject the brute in us to that which is divine (τὸ θεῖον, 589D), and if a man is not so constituted that the divine in him is in the ascendant, it is better for him that he should be under the guidance of one who is (590C-D). In

short, our happiness depends on the free functioning of our divine reason. This is the reply to Thrasymachus' contention that injustice pays when it goes unpunished; and whether we regard the reply as it stands as satisfactory or not, it is clear that Plato did not regard rewards (at any rate of a non-spiritual kind) and punishments as the sole or important reason for practising virtue. Nor can the aim be simply a tranquil, contemplative life enjoyed here on earth, for at *Meno* 81B we read: *φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον . . . δεῖν δὲ διὰ ταῦτα* (i. e. because the soul lasts for ever) *ὥς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον*. Although in the verses that Socrates goes on to quote from Pindar, Pindar represents an exalted final life on earth (prior to eternal bliss) as one of the rewards of virtue, the fact that Plato nowhere else mentions such a reward, together with the sentences that I have quoted and the evidence of the *Republic*, shows that the aim in his view was simply spiritual bliss for ever. Confirmation of this is provided by the *Phaedo*, where philosophic purity is said to be an essential requirement for one who would dwell with the gods (82B-C). We may suppose that only in such a state of purity would a soul be capable of reaching the outer region and beholding truth whenever it needed to (248C). Any soul can grow wings after ten thousand years (249A), but only the philosopher becomes perfect (*τέλειος*, 249C).

The conclusion, then, is inescapable. If we assume that all souls go up to the celestial region at the end of a ten-thousand-year cycle, and admit that there is no guarantee that all such souls will be perfect when they go there, some souls will be liable to "fall" and undergo, presumably, a further cycle of lives. Further, since the object of trying to attain to philosophic virtue is in fact eternal bliss, it is clear that only when such virtue has been attained can one hope for complete *immunity* from any further fall. How long it takes to achieve that will depend upon individual effort, and will not be fixed at all. The return every ten thousand years to the celestial region will simply give the soul a chance to refresh its memory, until such time as it attains to perfect purity; and the "falls" described in the *Phaedrus* myth will be falls of souls that in the course of the cycles of lives which they last completed did not manage to "train" their baser instincts sufficiently well.

In support of this conclusion, I would cite *Timaeus* 42B-D,

where we find that a man "should have no rest from the travail of these [metempsychotic] changes, until letting the revolution of the Same and uniform within himself draw into its train all that turmoil of fire and water and earth that had later grown about it, he should control its irrational turbulence by discourse of reason and return once more to the form of his first and best condition" (trans. Cornford). There is no mention here of a fixed period of time. On the contrary, salvation depends upon the supremacy of reason (the attainment of which, as we saw, was the main reason for practising justice according to the *Republic*), and there is apparently no knowing how long that may take. It looks as though the number of lives lived may easily exceed ten in number, and the number of years spent in wandering far exceed ten thousand.

Such a conclusion does not necessarily conflict with the Pindar fragment quoted in the *Meno* (81B-C), since, although that suggests that Persephone's acceptance of a soul's *ποινά* will be followed by release for ever, we are not told that she will accept such a *ποινά* the first time it is offered;⁴ rather the reverse is implied. Nor does it necessarily conflict with what Empedocles says in fragment 146 (Diels-Kranz), for we are not told that the final apotheosis which he describes will always take place at the

⁴ Professor Rose (in *Greek Poetry and Life, Essays presented to Gilbert Murray* [1936], p. 91) goes so far as to say: "We may guess that the general run of mankind do not satisfy Persephone." The *ποινά* no doubt includes an enneateris of servitude in Hades for original sin (Rohde, *Psyche*, Eng. trans. pp. 444-5; Rose, *loc. cit.*, pp. 89 sq.), but it must include something more than punishment—viz. moral virtue exhibited during life—or Plato could not quote the fragment as a reason for living *ὡς ὀσιώτατα*; even Pindar himself cannot have meant that acceptance of the *ποινά* depends simply on the behaviour of the soul during the enneateris, or the amount of penance done during that period, for Persephone could presumably control both. It is possible that if the enneateris which our souls undergo corresponds, as Rose and Rohde say, to that undergone, according to Hesiod, *Theog.* 793 sq., by a god who forswears himself, the 10,000-year cycle of lives was thought to correspond to the *μέγας ἐνιαυτός* of unconsciousness that Hesiod also mentions as part of the appropriate punishment. Pindar (frag. 131 Bergk⁴) represents the soul as asleep during the active life of man. We may also note that Apollo's atonement for the slaying of Python seems to have included *πλάναι* as well as the *λατρεία* (cf. Plutarch, *De Def. Orac.* 15).

end of one of his cycles of "thrice ten thousand seasons." Indeed in fragment 129 we have explicit mention of more than ten lives:

ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς . . .
 ῥεῖ' ὃ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον
 καί τε δέκ' ἀνθρώπων καί τ' ἔκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν.⁵

But Empedocles, of course, may not have contemplated an interval of 900 years between lives. We need not deny the existence of some differences between the eschatologies of these writers, even if we want to find a common Orphic or other substrate underlying them all. But the only certain difference of any importance between Plato on the one hand and Pindar in this fragment and Empedocles on the other is that the two latter envisage a final life of happiness on earth as a reward, prior to the final release, whereas Plato does not—or at any rate he does not regard the matter in quite the same way. Even according to Plato, of course, on my view, the last life would be happy, inasmuch as it would be philosophic. But Pindar and Empedocles are thinking in terms of an earthly reward, whereas Plato is not; and he has his own view, moreover, of what constitutes a happy life. Plato, then, refines and improves upon such accounts of the soul's fate as those to be found in Pindar and Empedocles, by making the practice of the highest kind of virtue independent of all thought of punishment or of what might generally be regarded as a reward. But some may think it an advantage of my view that it brings Plato into line with Pindar and Empedocles to this extent, that the final life on earth will be rather special.

My contention that a ten-thousand-year cycle does not, for Plato, necessarily constitute the whole period of a soul's wanderings does not, of course, explain its original "fall"—if, according to Plato, it had one. If Proclus and Cornford (*Plato's*

⁵ It may be mentioned incidentally that Herodotus (II, 123), who speaks of a doctrine that the soul, human at first, *must* for a long period of time be reincarnated in the bodies of animals, does not say that 3000 years (the length of his "cycle") will constitute the whole of a soul's wanderings; and that since, according to him, the soul "goes the round of all creatures of land or sea or air," we almost certainly have here again more than ten incarnations—although Herodotus clearly did not contemplate some nine hundred years of reckoning after each life.

Cosmology, p. 145) are right, and Plato regarded mankind and the universe as having had no beginning in time, he may have supposed that such souls as have neither been damned (if he really believed in eternal damnation) nor obtained final release have been undergoing cycles of reincarnation from all eternity. If, as others believe, the creation of man by the created gods at *Timaeus* 42D is meant to suggest a beginning in time, he may have supposed that all such souls have been undergoing reincarnation since then—or at any rate since the time when they were severally confined by the created gods within human bodies. The *Timaeus* does not describe anything that might reasonably be called a "fall": it does not suggest that our souls originally enjoyed a state of bliss which they could have continued to enjoy, but lost through some weakness or fault on their part. The suggestion is rather that God intended that there should be mortal creatures, so that the All might be complete (41B-C), and that our souls were made *especially to be incarnated* (42D, 69C), though as a reward for virtue a soul can win a return—whether to wait temporarily or to abide for ever is not made clear—to that "consort star" in which it was once *temporarily* set, prior to incarnation, for the purpose of being shown the laws of destiny (41E-42B). From this point of view the first incarnation of a soul, if there was a "first" incarnation, could not be regarded as a "fall." In the *Phaedo*, of course, Plato treats incarnation as a sort of imprisonment (82E), which may suggest that it might be punishment for something, and looks like a reflection of Orphic doctrine, though the curious fact that in an earlier passage (62B) he represents the application of the same body-prison idea to the question of suicide as "difficult to grasp" perhaps indicates that he was not necessarily prepared to accept the idea literally, with all its implications. If we like, we can regard the mythical description of the making of our souls (*Timaeus* 42D, 69C-D) as a "transposition," in M. Diès' sense of that word, of the account of original sin contained in the legend of the origin of mankind from the Titans.⁶ But the fact

⁶ Tannery (*Rév. de Phil.*, XXII, pp. 126 sq.) and Rose (*loc. cit.*) have claimed that this legend was in Pindar's mind when he wrote the verses quoted in the *Meno*; Rose (*Harvard Theol. Rev.*, XXXVI, pp. 247 sq.) answers objections of Linforth (*The Arts of Orpheus*, p. 349); and Professor Dodds argues for the antiquity of the legend in *The Greeks and the Irrational*, pp. 155-6.

remains that Plato does not commit himself to a doctrine of an original "fall." He may be suggesting, rather, that the human soul may aspire to *promotion* which would enable it to enjoy such happiness as it has never known before.

But these matters are obscure, and of little importance to my contention that a ten-thousand-year cycle does not, for Plato, necessarily constitute the whole period of a soul's wanderings, and that the "falls" described in the *Phaedrus* are not meant to be original "falls." What that contention explains, I submit, is how Plato could suggest that a soul will inevitably go to the celestial region at the end of a ten-thousand-year cycle, while at the same time insisting on the necessity of philosophic virtue for the attainment of eternal bliss. Further, it squares the *Phaedrus* with *Timaeus* 42B-D; and it also brings Plato into line with Empedocles by abolishing any limit to the total number of lives lived, and with both Empedocles and Pindar by giving a special importance to the last life on earth. It also incidentally explains why the "falls" described in the *Phaedrus* are described as they are, as due to "bad training," by the most important part of a soul, of some other part.

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ΝΥΚΤΟΣ ΑΜΟΛΓΩΙ.

The publication in 1950 of Leumann's *Homerische Wörter* showed that many linguistic features included in the "Homeric" poems, are best regarded as coming from the imitation of a passage that had been misunderstood.¹ I hope to add one rather different example; one in which there is misunderstanding not so much, perhaps, of the language used, as of the significance of the thing talked about.

The etymology is clear: ἀμολγός is a nomen actionis to ἀμέλω 'to milk,' cf. Risch, *Wortbildung d. hom. Sprache*, p. 181. Leumann, p. 164, n. 13, says: "Etymologisch muss ἀμολγός das Melken bedeuten, aber ein 'Melken der Nacht' ist bis jetzt nicht einleuchtend erklärt." It is known that in Homer this noun is used always in the phrase (ἐν) νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ, and that in the *Iliad* this phrase is found only in similes.

The latter fact is not a peculiarity of the phrase nor of its head ἀμολγός. Such unexpected distribution is shared by a number of semantically connected words. These are ones used in talking about a certain human activity, and the poets of the *Iliad* have chosen to tell a story in the mainstream of which this activity plays practically no part. The words may be said to come from the vocabulary of the dairy. Even so, there are by-ways in which these words may occasionally find entrance to the poem.

The chief one is by use in similes. Thus ἀμέλω 'to milk' Δ 434, γάλα 'milk' Δ 434, E 902; γλάβος 'milk' B 471, Π 643; περιγλαγής 'overflowing with milk' Π 642; πέλλα 'milk-pail' Π 642; ἄγγος 'milk-pail' B 471, Π 643; ὀπός 'fig-juice,' used as rennet E 902 are found only in similes. Very occasionally a minor episode may call for one of these words: Zeus turns his eyes to a distant people Ἰππημολγῶν γλακτοφάγων N 5-6; a captive grates cheese in preparing her owner's drink Λ 639, but τυρός is not found elsewhere in the *Iliad*.

Another way is opened when the poets wish to tell the time of day at which something happened. They feel this wish often enough to reserve ἥμος 'when' for use on such occasions.² Their

¹ Compare *Language*, XXVII (1951), pp. 68-80.

² The fact is noted by Brandt, *Griech. Temporalpartikeln* (1908), p.

clock is ordinarily the moving of the firmament—dawn, high noon, sunset. Occasionally they use instead a regularly recurring human activity. That activity may figure little, if at all, in the main story. Only in Π 779 ἥμος δ' ἥελιος μετενίσσεται βουλυτόνδε does βουλυτόνδε appear in the *Iliad*. It was not one of the things its poets chose to talk of often. Felling of trees figures in their story only in one episode—the preparations for Patroclus' funeral. We might expect to find in it δρυτόμος, but we would be disappointed. A synonym ἰλοτόμοι was given in Ψ 123 by the medieval MSS; but has now been set aside because of the discovery of a Ptolemaic papyrus.³ Δρυτόμος is used Ψ 315 by Nestor in a list of activities, success in which he ascribes to μῆτις. It is found also in a simile Π 633, and in the clocking usage Λ 86 ἥμος δὲ δρυτόμος περ ἀνὴρ ὠπλίσσατο δείπνον. The ἥμος construction was not the only way of performing the timing operation. We find ἥμος δ' ἡριγένεια φάνη ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἥως Λ 477, β 1, and 18 other places in the *Odyssey*; but also ἄμ' ἡοῖ (φαινομένηφιν). I shall suggest that (ἐν) ἀμολγῶ 'at milking time' is another such usage.

The poets of the *Odyssey* chose a story of a different sort. It matters little that Odysseus in his wanderings came across a sorceress who used, κ 234, τυρός 'cheese' in preparing a vehicle for her drugs. That could be regarded as merely comparable with the mention of cheese in Λ 639. It is quite different, when another of the hero's adventures revolves about his being kept prisoner for hours in a cave by a giant dairy-farmer. Three times ι 244-50, 308-10, 341-3, we are told how the dairy-farmer morning and evening performed τὰ ἀ ἔργα 'his chores'—milking and what goes with it; also dairy products and utensils are lying around. Words that get into the *Iliad* only through by-paths are here used in a matter-of-fact way. To be noted are: ἀμέλγω 'to milk' ι 223, 238, 244, 308, 341; γάλα 'milk' ι 246, 297; ἄγγος 'milk-pail' ι 222, 248, used also as containers of ship provisions (β 289), and by a swineherd (π 13) in mixing a drink (uses not mentioned in the *Iliad*); τυρός 'cheese' ι 219,

37; Hermann, *Nebensätze* (1912), p. 307 looks like a possible misprint: "Homer gebraucht es <nur> zur Angabe von Tageszeiten." Then apparently forgetfulness, cf. Cunliffe, LSJ, Chantraine, II, p. 254. Leumann, p. 313 is the exception.

³ Cf. Pasquali, *Storia*, p. 242.

225, 232—also mentioned, υ 69, as part of the food given by Aphrodite to the daughters of Pandareus; and along with γάλα 'milk' in Menelaos' description of Libya (δ 88-9).

A number of words are used in this adventure with the Cyclops, but occur infrequently elsewhere; ὀρός 'whey' ι 222, mentioned also as food ρ 225; τρέφω 'to curdle' ι 249; οὔθαρ 'udder' ι 440, and in a marginal meaning οὔθαρ ἀρούρης I 141 = 283; ἀνήμελκτος 'unmilked' ι 439; ἔμβρυον 'young of an animal' ι 245, 309, 342. Names of animals: τράγος 'he-goat' ι 239; κριός 'ram' ι 447, 461; ἀρνείος 'ram' ι 239, 432, 444, 463, 550; used as sacrifices α 25, κ 527, 572, λ 131, ψ 278, B 550; Priam compares Odysseus to one Γ 197; ⁴ αἶξ ranges widely but μηκάδες αἶγες is found only ι 124, 244, 341, Λ 383, Ψ 31, cf. A. J. P., LXXVII (1956), pp. 286-7; πρόγονοι 'firstlings' ι 221; μέτασσαι 'midlings' ι 221; ἔρσαι 'youngest' ι 222. Dairy appliances: γανλοί some kind of vessel ι 223; σκαφίδες another kind ι 223; ταρσοί 'cheese-holders' ι 219, but of the flat of the foot Λ 377, 388; τάλαρος 'basket' for cheese ι 247, Helen's work-basket δ 125, 131, and in the vintage scene Σ [568]; σηκός 'pen' ι 219, 227, 319, 439, in a simile κ 412, and in a description of a sheep farm, as part of the decoration on Achilles' shield Σ [589].

Under these circumstances the *Odyssey* has no need of by-paths and has made little use of them. In addition to what has been already told I may note that the mention of cheese and milk (δ 88-9) is in Menelaos' account of the riches of distant Libya. No simile comes from the dairy except κ 410-16 which compares the joy of his comrades at Odysseus' return to that of calves bursting from their pens to greet their mothers returning from pasture. A comparison equates the flower of the plant moly and milk: γάλακτι δὲ εἶκελον ἄνθος κ 304. No use of dairy vocabulary is made in the clocking operation except for νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ (δ 841). This is not a simile as are similar examples of the phrase in the *Iliad*.

Fluctuation in the frequency of lexical units is a factor often present when changes in language occur. Copious records are needed for a satisfactory study of it at any period; and those we

⁴In Γ 196 the comparison is to a κτίλος 'ram' which recurs only in N 492 (a simile). Fick is said (Ameis-Hentze, Anhang I, p. 184) to have rejected Γ 197-8—an idea that could be right, if 'rejected' is properly defined.

have for Homeric times are far from showing with completeness all we should like to know. Much of this fluctuation is—as Bloomfield says (*Language*, p. 277)—simply superficial, that is due to extralinguistic circumstances. I have mentioned many—perhaps too many—examples, partly because of interest in the topic, but also from a wish to forestall an overvaluation of the odd distribution of (έν) νυκτός ἀμολγῶ.

Among us milking is normally done about sunup and about sundown. It and what goes with it are the two big chores of a dairy-farmer's life. If no evidence were at hand, we would probably assume that such was the custom in Homeric times. However we are told that the Cyclops did his chores (τὰ ἄ ἔργα) at these times; and there is no other evidence. I suggest that the phrase (έν) νυκτός ἀμολγῶ—used only in the clocking operation—distinguishes the evening from the morning chore.⁵

This introduces another oddity of distribution. Why does the opposite phrase 'morning milking' never appear in our records? I think we can see why the poets have chosen to speak of the one, and not of the other. At the time of the evening milking the herd is most vulnerable to attack by wild beasts. The animals must be brought in from the pasture. Some will want to linger, others will want to rush to the milk pails. They will straggle in a long line, and the farmer cannot be everywhere to protect them. Besides the wild beast will be fresh from his lair and ravenously hungry. In the morning conditions are quite different. Time taken for the milking chore and for breakfasting permits the day to brighten. The wild beasts will have holed up in their lairs. Besides the farmer, freed from anxiety about the rear by the wall of the αὐλή, can walk in front and keep the herd bunched up. It is the time when danger of attack is least, and consequently the time of least interest to the poets.

On linguistic evidence the earliest of the four Iliadic passages involved is A 172-6, where it is said of the Trojans fleeing from Agamemnon:

οἱ δ' ἔτι καὶ μέσσον πεδίον φοβέοντο βόες ὧς,
 ἄς τε λέων ἐφόβησε μολῶν έν νυκτός ἀμολγῶ
 πάσας· τῇ δέ τ' ἰὴ ἀναφαίνεται αἰπὺς ὄλεθρος·
 τῆς δ' ἐξ αὐχέν' ἔαξε λαβὼν κρατεροῖσιν ὁδοῦσιν
 πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δέ θ' αἶμα καὶ ἔγκατα πάντα λαφύσσει·

⁵ Here 'milking' will not mean the time between the first and last pull on a teat, but will include all the attendant actions.

This is a clearly drawn, realistic picture of an attack on the herd as it comes straggling back to the milk-pails 'at the time of the evening milking.'

Linguistic evidence does not fix the order of the other three passages. I shall mention next two similes from the *Ἑκτορος Ἀναίρεσις* that compare the flash of Achilles' armament to the gleam of stars.

The simpler of the two is X 317-19:

οἶος δ' ἀστὴρ εἴσι μετ' ἀστράσι νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ
ἔσπερος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν οὐρανῷ ἵσταται ἀστὴρ,
ὥς αἰχμῆς ἀπέλαμπ' εὐήκεος - - -

This is a good picture of the sky at the time of the evening milking. It is of course no proof that νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ has for this poet the same meaning as was intended in A 173. All that can be said is that a shift of meaning is 'not proven.'

X 26-32 is more elaborate. Priam was the first to see Achilles:

παμφαίνονθ' ὥς τ' ἀστέρ' ἐπεσσύμενον πεδίοιο,
ὃς ῥα τ' ὀπωρῆς εἴσιν, ἀρίζηλοι δέ οἱ αὐγαὶ
φαίνονται πολλοῖσι μετ' ἀστράσι νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ.
ὄν τε κύν' Ὀαρίωνος ἐπὶ κλησιν καλέουσιν.
λαμπρότατος μὲν ὃ γ' ἐστί, κακὸν δέ τε σῆμα τέτυκται,
καί τε φέρει πολλὸν πυρετὸν μερόπεσσι βροτοῖσιν.
ὥς τοῦ χαλκὸς ἔλαμπε περὶ στήθεσσι θέοντος.

The poet has here made two statements about Sirius: (a) he 'comes' ὀπωρῆς; (b) his rays shine bright νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ. It may be doubted whether he intended them to be taken as synchronous.

If he did not intend them to be so taken, there is no problem. No change from the meaning of νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ as used in A 173 is 'proven.'

If he intended them to be synchronous, and νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ to be used as in A 173, he has blundered in his astronomy. That need trouble none except those who believe in an inerrant poet. However his blunder could be transferred from astronomy to syntax. A star is not visible on the day of its true cosmic rising but a few days later "there will come a day on which the star rises so early that it is visible in the morning twilight immediately before the sun appears."⁶ This is the heliacal rising, and is what the poet means by the 'coming' of the star. The

⁶ Nilsson, *Primitive Time-reckoning*, p. 6.

time a star anticipates sunrise increases by nearly four minutes each day. The poet may intend to speak of what can be seen as the visibility of Sirius is thus prolonged; and believes νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ to mean 'in the night,' at milking time.⁷

The remaining simile O 323-6 deals with the rout of the Achaeans by Hector and Apollo:

οἱ δ' ὥς τ' ἡὲ βοῶν ἀγέλην ἢ πῶῦ μέγ' οἴων
θῆρε δύω κλονέωσι μελαίνης νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ,
ἐλθόντ' ἐξαπίνης σημάντορος οὐ παρεόντος,
ὥς ἐφόβηθεν Ἀχαιοὶ ἀναλκίδες.

In comparison with the simile of Λ the striking thing is the lack of clearness in the picture. The herds attacked are cattle or sheep; the attackers are any two wild beasts. From the simile of Λ, or others like it, the poet has derived his νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ / ἐλθόντ' ἐξαπίνης, and combined it with σημάντορος οὐ παρεόντος suggested by K 485-7 or its like. He does not see that, unless his understanding of νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ has shifted from that of his model, the combination is impossible. Originally νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ indicated the one time when the herdsman would certainly be present. Here it is just a phrase of high prestige, but with no definite meaning.

The simile is dated as late by οἴων, cf. Bechtel, *Vocalcontraction*, pp. 269 f. I may note also that it is the only example in the Epos in which an adjective is added to νυκτὸς in this phrase.

The only example in the *Odyssey*, δ 840-1, is not in a simile, but in an account of a supernatural vision sent by Athena to console Penelope. When it departed, she awoke φίλον δέ οἱ ἦτορ ἰάνθη / ὥς οἱ ἐναργὲς ὄνειρον ἐπέσσυτο νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ.

Nilsson, *op. cit.*, p. 36 comments: "It is a well known fact that we dream for the most part shortly before waking," and seems later to believe that Penelope slept through the night and woke at the time of the morning milking. I believe that, if it were worth a try, a fair case could be made for the evening milking. But in so late a passage I think it much more probable that its author attached no definite meaning to νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ, but feels that its sound and prestige will make a splendid ending for an episode.⁸

⁷ Night lasts until sunup.

⁸ In δ 785-6 the suitors picked for the ambush moor their ship in deep

In the Hymns we have only the account (IV, 6-9 = XVIII, 6-9) of the begetting of Hermes: Maia was dwelling in a cave,

ἐνθα Κρονίων

νύμφη ἐνπλοκάμῳ μισγέσκετο νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ,
ὄφρα κατὰ γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἔχοι λευκώλενον Ἥρην,
λήθων ἀθανάτους τε θεοὺς θνητούς τ' ἀνθρώπους.

A paraphrase: "there the son of Cronos used to wrap in his arms at the time of the evening milking the fair-tressed nymph, while Hera was asleep" would make sense as a combination of English words. But no poet could reasonably be suspected of wishing to say any such thing—that the amorousness of the god and the sleepiness of his wife had been clocked and found to coincide "at the time of the evening milking." Again νυκτὸς ἀμολγῶ is a phrase of great prestige to which no definite meaning is attached.

The phrase disappears from literature except for *ιερᾶς νυκτὸς ἀμολγόν* (the acc. is new) in Aesch., fr. 69, 6. *Ἀμολγός* alone is found as a v. l. in Eur., fr. 781, 6, and in Orph. H., 34, 12. In Eur., fr. 104 it seems to function as an adjective. Leumann, p. 164, gives an explanation of the shift of category. However, it may be better to join Wecklein, *Sitzb. Bayer. Akad.*, 1911, No. 3, p. 22, in approval of Döderlein's slight correction of Hesychius who has saved the fragment.

There is no need to discuss ancient interpretations. Wecklein (*op. cit.*, p. 21) well says: "Sie dienen nur zum Beweis der Unzuverlässigkeit alter Grammatikererklärung." He and Leumann, p. 274, say what is needed about equating *ἀμολγός* with *ἀκμή*. Wecklein is also right in seeing that Hesychius' *ἀμολγάξει· μεσημβρίζει* is based on a single literary passage. I should, however, render *ἀμολγάξει* not by "Es dunkelt" but by "It's milking-time." A herdsman is about to refresh himself (or a visitor) with a cup of milk, and the context shows it is about noon.

Paula Warmann, *Glotta*, XIII (1924), pp. 98-101, gave as Modern Greek continuants: *ἀρμεργός* 'die Stunde des Melkens' (Kos), *ἀμουργός* 'Jahreszeit in der gemolken wird' (Telos). The

water, go ashore, take a meal, and wait for the coming of evening. In δ 787 Penelope is in bed, and asleep by δ 794. Athena takes action δ 795-839. Penelope wakes δ 839-41. Suitors set sail δ 842. How far these scenes are successive, how far simultaneous may be open to debate. So also is the amount of time a goddess needs to implement her will.

absence from the literature is probably in part superficial fluctuation, in part due to our fragmentary knowledge.

POSTSCRIPT: I draw attention to the fact that *έν* is found in *Α* 173, the earliest example, but in none of the five later passages. This seems understandable.

In *Α* 173, as I interpret it, *νυκτός* is a modifier of *άμολγῶ*; and the phrase is of the pattern PMA, a pattern quite common in relation-axis constructions. An unpublished monograph on the prepositions of the *Iliad* finds under *έν* alone 64 examples of this pattern. But when *νυκτός* is understood to be in some other construction—one such is suggested above (pp. 169-70)—it ceases to be a modifier of *άμολγῶ*. Then, if *έν* were retained, we would have a relation-axis construction interrupted by a weighty word-pattern P()A. Such patterns are found: *ἀπ' ἔχωρ χειρὸς δμόργνυ* E 416; *έν δὲ βίην ὤμοισι καὶ έν γούνεσσιν ἔθηκεν* P 569; *έκ μὲν Κεβριόνην βελέων ἥρωα ἔρυσσαν* II 781. They are not frequent, say about 100 among over 4000 relation-axis constructions. This unusual pattern could be avoided by simply dropping *έν*. Once this was done, it would be imitated.

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TERENCE, *ANDRIA*, 560-5.

SI. . . . spero consuetudine et
coniugio liberali devinctum, Chreme,
dehinc facile ex illis sese emersurum malis.

CH. Tibi ita hoc videtur; at ego non posse arbitror
neque illum hanc perpetuo habere neque me perpeti.

SI. Qui seis ergo istuc, nisi periculum feceris?

The foregoing passage has troubled commentators from Donatus¹ down. In a recent study of "A Terentian Pattern of Negation," P. R. Murphy attempts to throw light upon it by calling attention to Terence's fondness for a particular negative pattern.² In the course of his discussion, Murphy summarizes the previous interpretations of the passage. It is the purpose of this note to challenge these interpretations, including the one which he adopts, and to advance a new one which, if accepted, would remove the passage entirely from the sphere of Murphy's discussion.

Our passage is part of a dialogue in which Simo attempts to secure as a bride for his son Pamphilus the daughter of Chremes, Philumena. Chremes, who had once sought the match, is now opposed to it because of Pamphilus' recently discovered attachment to the courtesan Glycerium.

The difficulty is centered in Chremes' words *Tibi ita hoc videtur: at ego non posse arbitror / neque illum hanc perpetuo habere neque me perpeti*. Their general sense is clear: Simo regards the marriage for which he pleads as a panacea for Pamphilus' troubles; Chremes, on the other hand, sees ahead a difficult situation both for his daughter and for himself. But exactly how do Chremes' words *at ego—perpeti* convey this attitude of his?

I. The interpretation generally favored supplies *illum sese emergere* with *posse*, and another *posse* with *habere* and *perpeti*: in Copley's translation, ". . . he'll easily pull himself out of the bad habits he's developed. CH. That's what you think.

¹ *Ad And.* 564 *NEQUE ILLUM HANC PERPETUO: amphiboliam de industria posuit. Aut utrumque significavit.* (Cf. n. 6, below.)

² *C. W.*, XLVIII (1954-55), pp. 203-5; cf. *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 396-407.

But I don't think he can—and he can't go on keeping that woman, nor would I stand for it.”³ Murphy rejects this “principally in view of Terence's liking for what I may call the quasi afterthought negative pattern.” Now Murphy's total count of Terence's use of this negative pattern numbers seven instances, including the present occurrence;⁴ of these seven, he counts only four as having clear syntax. He considers this preponderance of four out of seven as a sure enough guide to enable him, in our present passage, to reject both the interpretation which we are discussing (for despite the limiting word “principally” he raises no other objection) and that of Sturtevant (see III, below), and also to determine meaning or text in the other two disputed passages.⁵ Surely it is stretching the validity of stylistic statistics too far to extrapolate from four instances to cover the remaining three of an aggregate of seven.

I suggest that there are sounder grounds for rejecting the interpretation under discussion. One lies in the inconcinnity of the meanings assigned to *posse* in the three semantic roles which in this view the word would have to play. The kind of inability implied in *non posse illum emergere* is quite different from that meant in the words *non posse me perpeti*: the one implies moral weakness and deep involvement, the other paternal concern and strong moral indignation. As for the words *neque posse illum hanc perpetuo habere*, there are two ways in which they may be taken: that Pamphilus can't go on keeping Glycerium (so Spengel, Fairclough, Ashmore, Chambry, Copley, and Shipp⁶) or that Philumena can't keep Pamphilus as a husband

³ Frank O. Copley, *The Woman of Andros by Terence* (New York, 1949), p. 30. Cf. also *ad loc.* A. Spengel, *Die Comödien des P. Terentius*, I (Berlin, 1875); C. E. Freeman and A. Sloman, *P. Terenti Andria* (Oxford, 1885); H. R. Fairclough, *P. Terenti Afri Andria* (Boston, 1901); S. G. Ashmore, *The Comedies of Terence*² (New York, 1910); E. Chambry, *Térence, Comédies*, I (Paris, n.d. [1932]); G. P. Shipp, *The Andria of Terence* (Melbourne, 1938). The name of the author of the last-named item is erroneously given as “Pipp” in *C. W.*, XLVIII (1954-55), p. 204.

⁴ *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 397 (and n. 9), 404.

⁵ *C. W.*, XLVIII (1954-55), pp. 203-4 (and n. 2).

⁶ Cf. n. 3, above. It is the ambiguity in the subject-object relationship of *illum* and *hanc* to which Donatus refers by the word *amphibolia* (cf. n. 1, above).

(so, by implication, Freeman and Sloman,⁷ Sargeaunt,⁸ and Murphy, and, explicitly, Marouzeau⁹). In either case, *posse* would be meant in a sense different from that which it bears in the other two uses: in the first, Pamphilus can't continue to keep this woman because, if he marries my daughter, I won't let him; in the second, either Philumena can't keep on having Pamphilus as a husband because I won't let her continue to live with a man of such habits, or she can't in the sense that she won't be able to hold her husband—an idea which, I submit, is somewhat foreign to the Graeco-Roman concept of the relationship between husband and wife.¹⁰ At any rate, the rapid shifts in the meanings which the hearer would be required to attribute to the word *posse* within the compass of verses 563-4 render strongly suspect any interpretation which involves first taking *posse* with the idea of *emergere* and then supplying it with *habere* and *perpeti*.

There is, however, a stronger objection. This arises from a consideration of Simo's reply, *Qui scis ergo istuc, nisi periculum feceris?* The interpretation under discussion not only makes *me perpeti posse* parallel to *posse illum sese emergere*, but places the clause with *perpeti* directly before the word *istuc*. In other words, to Chremes' statement "I don't think I could stand it (i. e. Pamphilus' dalliance)," Simo is made to say, "How do you know you can't stand it unless you make a try at it?"

⁷ Cf. n. 3, above.

⁸ John Sargeaunt, *Terence*, I ("Loeb Classical Library," London, 1912), p. 61.

⁹ "... ni qu'à la longue elle le garde," J. Marouzeau, *Térence*, I (Paris, 1942), p. 165. Marouzeau follows the *interpretatio* of the editions in *usum Delphini*, e. g. *Pub. Terentii Afri Comoediae Sex* (London, Valpy, 1824), p. 337: *neque filiam meam perpetuo habere conjugem*.

¹⁰ It may be significant that, of the 35 other instances in which Terence uses the word *habeo* of the relationship between a man and a woman, in 33 the man is the subject of the verb: *Ad.* 44, 179, 389, 622, 750, 997; *And.* 85, 145-6, 273, 649 *bis*, 881, 889; *Eun.* 424; *Heaut.* 104, 225-6; *Hec.* 100 *bis*, 148-9, 541, 644, 678, 745, 819; *Phor.* 169, 295-6, 433-5 *bis*, 744, 754, 756-7, 941-2, 1041. The two remaining cases are apparent rather than real exceptions: *Ad.* 291 (Sostrata speaks) *miseram me! neminem habeo, solae sumus: Geta autem hic non adest*, and *Hec.* 752 (Bacchis speaks) *me segregatum habuisse, uxorem ut duxit, a me Pamphilum*. Cf. Edgar B. Jenkins, *Index Verborum Terentianus* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1932), s. v. *habeo*.

Even for a man of Simo's "designing optimism," as Murphy aptly calls it, this would be going a bit too far. Even more unsuitable is this rejoinder to the words *neque posse illum hanc perpetuo habere*, however understood. The interpretation which calls for *posse* with *emergere* and then with *habere* and *perpeti* may thus, I suggest, be definitely discarded.

II. In the interpretations¹¹ of Sargeaunt and of Marouzeau, *habere* and *perpeti* alone are made subordinate to *posse*: "... I can't think it possible for him to show lasting fidelity or for me to tolerate anything less"; "... je ne crois pas possible ni qu'à la longue elle le garde ni moi que je supporte . . ." (the points of suspension after *supporte* are Marouzeau's own). Murphy adopts a view similar to these two, but complicates the situation somewhat by first calling *non posse* absolute, and by then stating that it is not absolute "in the strictest sense, for its subjects and complementary infinitives follow it."¹² He translates: "But I think it's no go—that he can't be faithful to her [Philumena] and that I can't stand for it." But this interpretation, which avoids some of the mental gymnastics which I criticized in I above, still brings *me perpeti* into strong focus before Simo's *istuc*, and therefore again has him asking, "How do you know you can't stand for it if you don't try?"

III. Sturtevant's interpretation,¹³ which Murphy rejects on the sole ground of its non-conformity with his negative pattern,¹⁴ would have much to commend it if the grammatical construction on which Sturtevant bases it could be convincingly documented. Sturtevant takes *non possum neque . . . neque* as equivalent to *non possum non*, "can't not do," i. e. "can't help," and translates "but I think he can't help keeping this woman for good and all, and I can't help allowing it." This not only makes good and appropriate sense, but does not clash with Simo's *istuc*: "CH. He can't avoid keeping her as his regular mistress, and I can't avoid having to put up with it. SI. How do you know

¹¹ See nn. 8 and 9, above.

¹² Cf. C. W., XLVIII (1954-55), p. 204, n. 4. In this way he brings it within his "quasi afterthought negative pattern."

¹³ Edgar H. Sturtevant, *P. Terenti Afri Andria* (New York, 1914), p. 129.

¹⁴ C. W., XLVIII (1954-55), p. 204, n. 3.

this situation which you fear is unavoidable unless you make a try at it?" However selfish this retort is, it has the merit of not suggesting to Simo that he try his hand at condoning concubinage; it merely pleads that he try to find out whether there will be any necessity of condoning it. The difficulty, as I have pointed out, lies in the Latin construction suggested: *non possum neque . . . neque* as equivalent to *non possum non*. But Sturtevant cites only Cic., *Fam.*, IX, 14, 1: *non possum non confiteri*, and I have been unable to find an instance of *non possum neque . . . neque* with similar force.

IV. The interpretation which I shall suggest has been partly anticipated in one of its aspects by Copley and in another by Marouzeau. Immediately following the passage quoted in I, above, Copley has Simo say, "How do you know he can't, if you don't give him a chance?" Now Chremes has just said, "But I don't think he can [pull himself out of . . . bad habits]—and he can't go on keeping that woman. . . ." Therefore, when Simo is made to say, "How do you know he can't . . . ?" Copley obviously intends him to mean "can't pull himself out . . .," not "can't go on keeping. . . ." In other words, Copley has Simo disregard the words *neque illum hanc perpetuo habere neque me perpeti*, and has him use the word *istuc* to refer only to Chremes' pessimistic *at ego non posse arbitror*. This in itself yields excellent sense, but it decidedly weakens the case for continuing the force of *posse* to cover *habere*, as Copley does. Had Chremes' words been spoken in such a way as to bring *habere* into close relation with *posse*, it would have been very difficult for Simo convincingly to focus on the first of the verbs governed by *posse* to the exclusion of the second, particularly when the first verb (*emergere* supplied from *emersurum*) is only implicit, while the second (*habere*) is actually uttered.

Marouzeau, as we have seen in II, above, regards Chremes' speech as an incomplete utterance; the points of suspension which we have seen after the word *supporte* also appear after *perpeti* in his Latin text. In other words, Marouzeau represents Chremes as on the point of elaborating further on the situation, but as interrupted by Simo.¹⁵

¹⁵ On the interruption of one character by another in Terence, cf. Andreas Thierfelder, *P. Terentius Afer: Andria* (Heidelberg, 1951), pp. 48-9.

Let us try combining these two ideas and using them somewhat differently. Let us put a full stop after *arbitror*, and understand Chremes to mean *at ego non posse illum sese emergere arbitror*. Let us then have him start a new thought, which, had he been allowed to complete it, would have run something like *Neque illum hanc perpetuo habere neque me perpeti / test aequom postulare*.¹⁶ But he is interrupted by Simo, whose attention has been riveted by the words *non posse arbitror*, which he cannot leave unchallenged. It is to these words and to these alone to which he refers his *istuc*, for he has stopped listening after *arbitror*.

I would punctuate and translate as follows:

CH. Tibi ita hoc videtur; at ego non posse arbitror.
Neque illum hanc perpetuo habere neque me perpeti . . .
SI. Qui scis ergo istuc, nisi periculum feceris?

"CH. That's what you think; but I don't think he *can* extricate himself. And for him to go on keeping that woman, and for me to allow (my daughter to marry him under these circumstances), isn't . . . SI. How do you know he can't, if you don't make a try at it?"

In this way, I suggest, the difficulties of previous interpretations may be avoided, and we may arrive at a sense which is satisfactory from the standpoint both of Latinity and of dramatic appropriateness.¹⁷

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¹⁶ For two coordinate *neque* clauses dependent upon an affirmative verb, cf. *Eun.* 244-5: *at ego infelix neque ridiculus esse neque plagas pati / possum*; *Ad.* 611: *ut neque quid me faciam nec quid agam certum sit*; also *Heaut.* 964; *Eun.* 199-200; *Phor.* 181, 507; *Ad.* 485-6. That Chremes regards the situation as one in which he is being asked to condone Pamphilus' dalliance and consent to the marriage despite it is shown by his own words later in the play: *And.* 828-32: *perpulisti me, ut homini adolescentulo / in alio occupato amore, abhorrenti ab re uxoria, / filiam ut darem in seditionem atque in incertas nuptias, / . . . / impetrasti*.

¹⁷ As I remarked at the outset, this interpretation, if accepted, would render the passage irrelevant to Murphy's discussion of the negative pattern *non . . . neque . . . neque*, since it would distribute these words between two different sentences.

EPICUREAN ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ.

In a detailed study of ἐπιλογίζομαι and related words in Epicurean texts,¹ G. Arrighetti maintains that these terms refer to an immediate awareness—intuition or consciousness—rather than to a kind of reasoning. Acknowledging that λογισμός means calculation, he nevertheless contends that the prefix ἐπι-, expressing immediacy, restricts the application of the compound to non-inferential forms of knowledge. He accordingly rejects the view that ἐπιλογισμός is used by the Epicureans of inductive inference.²

Prominent among his arguments is that from the occurrence of ἐπιλογισμός in ethical contexts. Epicurus several times uses the phrase, ὁ τοῦ τέλους ἐπιλογισμός (*Main Tenets*, 20, 22; *Letter to Menoeceus*, 133; and fragments from *On Nature*, edited by C. Diano, *Epicuri Ethica* [Florence, 1946], pp. 29 and 47); but he denies that the acceptance of pleasure as the good requires reasoning: *negat opus esse ratione* (Cic., *De Fin.*, I, 30). Arrighetti concludes, therefore, that ἐπιλογισμός is not a form of reasoning.

Yet Cicero's formulation by no means eliminates logical operations from the identification and pursuit of the highest good. The immediate experience of pleasure as a good is, to be sure, a πάθος,³ and cannot be identified with ἐπιλογισμός;⁴ but the very generalization that there is no end other than pleasure requires a certain amount of attention to a variety of experiences (*mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem*) and implies that the principle thus established is valid even of actions which lie outside the limits of our experience.⁵ More important, however,

¹ *La Parola del Passato*, VII (1952), pp. 119-44.

² The term was thus interpreted by P. and E. De Lacy, *Philodemus, On Methods of Inference* (Philadelphia, 1941). On pp. 137-44 Arrighetti presents his objections to our view.

³ *Letter to Menoeceus*, 129; cf. Cic., *De Fin.*, I, 30 (*sentiri*).

⁴ Cf. Philod., *Rhet.*, Vol. I, p. 254, 33-5 Sudhaus: [μ]ῆ παθητικῶς μόνον ἀλλ' [ἐ]πιλογ[ι]στικῶς.

⁵ Cicero, *De Fin.*, I, 30, expresses its universality in the form of a question: *ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et dolorem?*

is the fact that sensation does not of itself instruct us how to discriminate among pleasures. The τέλος does not include all pleasures (cf. *Letter to Menoeceus*, 131), but only those that add up to a pleasant life (*iucunde vivere*, *De Fin.*, I, 42). Sensation finds all pleasures good, whereas the discernment of the proper limits of pleasure is a peculiar achievement of the philosopher, who thus escapes the unhappiness to which the majority of mankind is subject (*De Fin.*, I, 32-3). The role of ἐπιλογισμός in ethics corresponds exactly to this situation. It is a faculty that not all men use (Epicurus, frag. 68 Usener), it is concerned with the discovery of limits (*Main Tenets*, 20; cf. *Sent. Vat.*, 63), and it is one of the characteristic activities of the good Epicurean (*Letter to Menoeceus*, 133).⁶

The logical operations required by Epicurean ethics are empirical. It is by turning our attention to sensations and perceptions that we discover and eliminate the causes of fear and distress (*Letter to Herodotus*, 82). Cicero's phrase, *mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem*, is in keeping with this empirical emphasis, and his rejection of *argumentum conclusionemque rationis* (*De Fin.*, I, 30) further emphasizes the view that experience provides all the necessary data for the discovery of the good.

Other Epicurean uses of ἐπιλογισμός may readily be interpreted as referring to principles or generalizations derived from accumulated experience. Several times it is linked with memory, which is one of the empiricists' chief sources of data.⁷ There is also recognition of the need to examine *all* the pertinent evidence in a systematic way.⁸ Again, ἐπιλογισμός is associated with the

⁶ It is difficult for most men (Diog. Oen., frag. XXXVIII, col. I, 8-9) and is not employed by animals (Philod., *De Diis*, I, col. XIII, 1-2). Plutarch (*Mor.* 611 A) gives ἐπιλογισμός its Epicurean meaning, and in a non-Epicurean context (*Mor.* 1045 A) denies it to animals and small children.

⁷ Epicurus, *On Nature*, p. 29 Diano; frag. 423 (p. 283, 20 f.) Usener; Philod. in P. Herc. 1005, col. IV (p. 87) Sbordone. For the importance attached to memory by the empirical physicians see K. Deichgräber, *Die griechische Empirikerschule* (Berlin, 1930), Wortindex, s. v. μνήμη. Compare also Sextus Empiricus' use of ὑπόμνησις, e. g., *Pyrr. Hyp.*, II, 100, and Cicero's *admonitio* (*De Fin.*, I, 30).

⁸ *Main Tenets*, 22, and the conjectural restoration of Philod., *De Sign.*, frag. IV, 1-5. Sometimes ἐπιλογισμός is joined with such terms as *συνορᾶν*

confirmation or refutation of an opinion.⁹ Even in those passages where it may be translated "reflection," it refers to the examination of past experience (e. g., *Sent. Vat.*, 35). Related to this last usage are perhaps the *ἐπιλογισμοί* employed in moral treatises to combat the vices.¹⁰

That *ἐπιλογισμός* has something to do with the organization and systematization of experience Arrighetti recognizes (p. 144), though he would make this systematization immediate and intuitional, rather than logical. Hence his difficulty in explaining such passages as those found on pages 49 and 51 of Diano's *Epicuri Ethica*, where Epicurus speaks of things which caused us to "hunt for" (*θηρεύειν*) the criterion, and led us to the *ἐπιλογισμός* of the criterion, from which, in turn, we made further *ἐπιλογίσεις*. That all this could be in any sense immediate seems quite incredible; it is entirely consistent, however, with Epicurus' basic empiricism.¹¹

The opposition of *ἐπιλογισμός* to *ἀπόδειξις* in *Letter to Herodotus*, 73, does not mean that the former is not a form of reasoning, but only that the problem under investigation, the nature of time, can be solved empirically. Presumably Epicurus has in mind such non-empirical approaches to time as the paradoxes of

(Epic., *On Nature*, XXVIII, frag. I, col. IV) and *περιοδεύειν* (Philod., *De Sign.*, col. XVII, 32-3; P. Herc. 1003, ed. W. Crönert, *Hermes*, XXXVI [1901], p. 573), which indicate comprehensive and systematic inquiry. In Philod., *Rhet.*, Vol. II, p. 47, 12-14 Sudhaus, Philodemus seems to regard it as a kind of *ὁδός*.

⁹ Epic., *On Nature*, XXVIII, frag. V, col. VII; Philod., *De Sign.*, col. XXIII, 5-6. It provides a kind of proof in Epic., frag. 45 Usener and Philod., *De Lib. Dic.*, frag. 28, 1-2. Cf. also Philod., *De Poem.*, II, frag. 48, p. 261 Hausrath; *Rhet.*, Vol. I, p. 218, 12-13; Vol. II, p. 45, 4 Sudhaus.

¹⁰ E. g., Philod., *De Ira*, cols. XLIV, 38; XLVI, 17-18. This usage is not peculiarly Epicurean; cf. Plut., *Mor.*, 30 F, 92 F, 471 C, 476 B, 532 D.

¹¹ Arrighetti (pp. 130 f.) grants that *ἐπιλόγισις* is a process, more complex than *ἐπιλογισμός*, but no less immediate. The need for this difficult distinction disappears when the process is stripped of its immediacy. Arrighetti is also unconvincing (p. 127) when he infers from the fragment at the top of p. 29 Diano that *ἐπαίσθημα* is a species of *ἐπιλογισμός*. At most the passage implies that philosophical reasoning requires "perception of itself." Of course the Epicureans claim to establish empirically the validity of their empirical method; cf. Philod., *De Sign.*, col. XXVIII.

Zeno or the Platonic opposition between time and eternity. Similarly, the rejection of *ratio* and *disputatio* in *De Fin.*, I, 30, is doubtless aimed at the Platonic approach to the Good. Such antitheses do not rob empiricism of its logical method, but merely contrast it with the method of the rationalists.

Sometimes it seems that the Epicureans associate *ἐπιλογισμός* primarily with the process of extracting truths from experience, while the extension of these truths to things outside experience rests on analogy. So Philodemus (*De Sign.*, col. XXXVII, 27-9), says that inference may be made to things *λόγῳ θεωρητὰ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀναλογοῦντα*, and in one of his letters Epicurus alludes to men who cannot see *τὴν ἀναλογίαν τὴν κατὰ τὰ φαινόμεν[α] ἐν τοῖς ἀοράτοις ο[ὕς]αν*;¹² to these may be contrasted such phrases as *τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐπιλογιστικῆς θεωρίας*¹³ and *δεῖ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν ἐπιλογίσασθαι τοῦ κακοῦ*.¹⁴ Some such distinction may underlie Diogenes of Oenoanda, frag. XXXVIII, col. III, 10-14 and P. Herc. 1003.¹⁵ Yet it would be more correct to say that any inference from similar to similar is an analogy,¹⁶ and that *ἐπιλογισμός* is a means of establishing the character of the unseen.¹⁷ They are but aspects of what must be considered a single empirical method.

Finally, Epicurean *ἐπιλογισμός*, if interpreted in terms of empirical method, becomes comparable to the use of the term in the Empirical School of Medicine, where it is clearly the name of a method;¹⁸ to Sextus Empiricus' characterization of his anti-dogmatic arguments as *ἐπιλογισμοί*;¹⁹ and to the occurrences

¹² Frag. 212 Usener; for a better text see C. Diano, *Lettere di Epicuro e dei Suoi* (Florence, 1946), p. 15. Cf. also Philod., *De Sign.*, col. XXIV, 22-7.

¹³ Philod., *Rhet.*, Vol. II, p. 47, 12-13 Sudhaus.

¹⁴ Philod., *De Ira*, col. VII, 16-18. Cf. also P. Herc. 831, col. XIV, 3 Körte; Philod., *De Sign.*, cols. VIII, 32-6; XIII, 30-2; XXII, 37-9; XIV, 1-5.

¹⁵ W. Crönert, *Hermes*, XXXVI (1901), pp. 573 ff.

¹⁶ Cf. Philod., *De Sign.*, cols. XXVI, 21-3; XXXVII, 14-16; *Letter to Herodotus*, 72.

¹⁷ Philod., *De Sign.*, col. XXIII, 1-6; according to col. XXVII, 18-23, it tells us something about gods and atoms. (Arrighetti cites this latter passage on p. 142; the text, however, is far too uncertain to carry any weight.)

¹⁸ See Deichgräber, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

¹⁹ For references see the Index Verborum in Sextus Empiricus, Vol. III, ed. Mau-Janáček (Leipzig, 1954).

of the term in the Pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* (365 B, D, 369 E), a work generally considered to contain echoes of Epicurean doctrine.²⁰

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LUCAN, I, 280-285.

- 280 dum trepidant nullo firmatae robore partes,
tolle moras: semper nocuit differre paratis.
par labor atque metus pretio maiore petuntur.
bellantem geminis tenuit te Gallia lustris,
pars quota terrarum! facili si proelia pauca
285 gesseris eventu, tibi Roma subegerit orbem.

Curio, whom Lucan presents as a skilful and persuasive speaker, is urging Caesar to press the advance on Rome. He is here stressing two points: (1) the opposition is fearful and unready; prompt action promises speedy victory, in which (2) Caesar's long warfare in Gaul is to receive its reward. The chief problem in the passage is to make vs. 282 fit into the course of this argument.

The scholia make no attempt to do this. In defiance of *facili* (284) they interpret, as the plain sense of the Latin dictates, "in this war you must face as much toil and fear as in the Gallic wars, but for a greater reward." This will not do. Curio is summoning Caesar not to a ten-year campaign, but to *proelia pauca facili eventu*. Editors have attempted a number of reparations.

Bentley, offended by the nonsense, as he thought it, of saying *labor et metus petuntur*, proposed to substitute *merebunt* for *petuntur*. Markland (for whose note here I am indebted to W. C. Helmbold) found the passage unintelligible, and suggested that *tali* might be read for *facili* (284) and the line *par labor*, etc. put after 285. Van Jever objects, to those who accept the scholiasts' interpretation, that they ought to read *pretio hic maiore*, i. e. *in hoc bello*; even so, they would ascribe to the poet

²⁰ At several points the argument of this article has profited from the discerning comments of Professor Ludwig Edelstein.

not only an inept tautology, but an open contradiction. He therefore, with no little exultation, proposes to read *pretio hoc maiora petuntur*. He explains *par labor atque metus* as signifying *idem labor est superare et metuere pericula*. By *hoc pretio* he understands *audacia* implied in *tolle moras*. His confidence in this ingenious reconstruction has, to my knowledge, been shared by no editor since; but perhaps he was not far from the right track. Burman, citing I, 34: *magno aeterna parantur regna*, mentions, without approving, the variant readings *parantur* and *petentur*. Cortius attaches the explanation of vs. 282 to the preceding verse, claiming that it shows how, in general, *noceat differre paratis*, and expounding *pretio maiore* as *maiore tuo malo aut damno in sumptibus belli sustinendis*. He attempts to justify the expression *petere laborem*, but not *petere metum*, which bothered Bentley much more. Francken substantially accepts this interpretation, but applies it to the particular occasion; he is still uneasy about it, and suggests reading *parili* for *facili* (284). Housman, following Guyet, would strike out vs. 282, as contradicting 283-5. H. C. Nutting (*Calif. Publ. Class. Phil.*, XI, p. 254) defends the use of *par* and *petuntur* as not, he thinks, without parallel, stressing X, 382 where *par* clearly implies "not greater." R. J. Getty, in his edition of Book I (Cambridge, 1940) would justify the line as exhibiting the rhetorical figures *e sequentibus praecedentia* and *hypallage*. The meaning of *par* must be understood from the subsequent *proelia pauca* (284) to be not so much "equal" as "no greater" (Duff), i. e. "probably less." The whole line is equivalent, by hypallage, to *pari labore atque metu maius petitur praemium*.

The ambivalent nature of the idea in *pretium* (observable also in the uses of *mutare*) makes hypallage easier than it would be with other words. Yet a hypallage too violent for Bentley and Housman is not readily acceptable unless there is no other reasonable explanation. Nor is this the only difficulty. In the customary rhetoric of Latin, and perhaps of any language, "equal" may, according to the context, imply "at least equal," "exactly equal," or "at most equal." In Lucan's use of the word *par*, though the commonest sense is "exactly equal," sometimes it is hardly more than "like," once it is "at most equal, if not rather less," and five times "at least equal, if not rather

greater."¹ The context determines the shade of meaning, whether "exactly equal" or "about equal." But there is still a great difference between "at most equal" and "much less." Curio has just insisted on the ten years of struggle in Gaul. As encouragement to march on Rome, a prophecy of "perhaps less," or even "rather less" is not good enough.

The device of *e sequentibus praecedentia* is indeed relevant to the interpretation of the passage. But not with this order of presentation.

Curio's argument, without vs. 282; runs: "Your opponents are fearful and unprepared; waste no time. It is a mistake to wait when you are ready. You were kept ten years fighting in Gaul, a relatively small area. Success in a few battles will make you master of the Roman world." If vs. 282 is to be retained, it must fall into this context. It must mean "the task before you now is comparatively light, the reward enormous." But it need not mean these things in this order.

If we presume that Curio was developing a persuasive and consecutive argument, vs. 281 is effectively followed by 283: "Waste no time; Gaul has already taken you ten years." But *pars quota terrarum* leads on less well to *facili*, etc. than it would to the contrasting and complementary idea, *pretio maiora petuntur*, where *pretio* means "as reward (for those ten years of fighting)." *Par labor atque metus*, freed from *petuntur*, need not be coupled and set against some other toil and fear. The statement is complete in itself; the *labor* and the *metus* are equal to one another. "The magnitude of the task is measured by the magnitude of the fear," whether this be the fear felt by or inspired by the Senatorial party; reference has just been made both to their fear and to their weakness. This sense, recalling and utilising the argument of vs. 280, is further assured by the immediately following *facili*; indeed, we have at once *e praeced. seq.* and *e seq. praeced.* We should therefore read:

dum trepidant nullo firmatae robore partes,
tolle moras: semper nocuit differre paratis.

¹ *par* "equal": I, 126, 129; IV, 4, 482, 620, 636; V, 3, 706; VII, 385; VIII, 467; IX, 256, 536, 1102; X, 227. *par* "like": I, 7; III, 380; VII, 28 (perhaps III, 525). *par* "at most equal, if not rather less": X, 382. *par* "at least equal, if not rather greater": II, 415; IV, 124; VII, 426, 457; IX, 893.

bellantem geminis tenuit te Gallia lustris,
 pars quota terrarum! pretio maiora petuntur.
 par labor atque metus; facili si proelia pauca
 gesseris eventu, tibi Roma subegerit orbem.

A case might be made for reading *petantur*, or perhaps better, in the light of vs. 285, *petentur*, as one inferior manuscript (Hosius' F = Vaticanus 3284), perhaps through carelessness or conjecture, does read. But no change is necessary, and the present indicative, as more confident and justificatory, is perhaps better retained.

It is still necessary to ask, however, whether this treatment of the passage, however satisfactory it may be in sense, is acceptable in form. Lucan's usual construction in a comparison with *par* is the dative. He has no other examples of *par atque*. This idiom, though well enough attested in prose, is rare in poetry. Plautus (*Miles* 1251) has *si parem sapientiam habet ac formam*, and Silius Italicus (XIV, 128) writes: *Instabat ductor, cui tarde vincere Graias / par erat ac vinci turmas*, but the infinitives in this line make it hardly relevant in the present connection. I have found no other examples of *par atque* in Latin hexameters of the Golden or Silver Age. On the other hand, if Lucan wanted to say what it is suggested above that he did, how else was he to say it? *Par labor est metui* would not be unmetrical, but might be avoided as inelegant and lacking clarity, since it offers an at least initial ambiguity. "It is an equal task to inspire fear" may be nonsense, but not such nonsense that no one would have defended it if the opportunity had arisen. *Par labor iste metu* would also be metrically possible, but if, as is here maintained, it would be followed immediately by *facili*, which is far removed from its noun *eventu*, the same consideration of clarity might be urged against it.

Furthermore, here again we appear to run up against a question of poetic usage. *Metus* in the dative seems to have been avoided by the poets. Lucan has the word 37 times, never in the dative, though *timor*, occurring 23 times in all, appears seven times in the dative. Lucretius uses *metus* 18 times, Horace 11 times, Ovid 122, Statius 65, Silius 44; none of these is in the dative. The argument must be used with caution, since things are much less likely than persons to appear in the dative

case anyway; but the unanimity is impressive. Virgil has 41 occurrences of *metus*; one is in the dative, *parce metu* (*Aen.*, I, 257). It is perhaps not without significance that this one example should belong to that group of expressions in which the customary *dativus commodi* with *parcere* resembles rather an ablative in sense, and is indistinguishable from an ablative in form.² Thus the apparent improbability of the obvious alternative expression for "toil and fear are equal" seems to cancel out the rarity of the *par atque* construction, and leave the interpretation to be estimated on the basis of logical sequence and rhetorical force.

It is not difficult to account for the presumed corruption. It may be supposed that a scribe wrote *pars quota terrarum*, then, deceived by the *par* of the next verse, jumped to *facili si proelia pauca*. The missing hemistichs, inserted in the margin by the corrector, unfortunately made a line, though a meaningless one, for the next copyist. They were then inserted, as a line, with *maiora* assimilated to *pretio*, in the only place in the passage where a whole line could go without disrupting sense or syntax intolerably. After the *partes* and *paratis* at the end of vss. 280, 281, a scribe might excusably be confused. Should it be regarded as a deliberate affectation of elegance that the *partes*—*paratis* at the end of succeeding verses find themselves balanced by a *pars*—*par* at the beginning of succeeding verses, with a one-verse interval? It is at least more elegant than the distribution in the manuscript order. Whether or not this effect is deliberate, the relocation of the hemistichs appears to do more justice to the rhetorical competence both of Curio and of Lucan.

Minime obscurus aut difficilis est Noster, nisi ubi librarii caliginem offuderunt, ut in his verbis (Bentley, *ad loc.*).

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² Cf. *parcebant flatibus Euri* (*Geo.*, II, 339); *parce puer bello* (*Aen.*, IX, 656) *parcere lamentis* (*Livy*, VI, 3, 4); *sumptu ne parcas* (*Cic.*, *Fam.*, XVI, 4, 2); and indeed of *Aen.*, I, 257 we are told *Alii metu pro metui accipiunt, ablativum pro dativo* (*Serv. Dan. ad loc.*).

THUCYDIDES, II, 13, 3.

In the Panathenaic Oration, p. 262, 6 Dindorf (= p. 160 Jebb), Aelius Aristides, referring to the hardships which Athens encountered after the Sicilian Expedition, uses the phrase *κεκενωμένης μὲν τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ταλάντων ὀλίγου δεῖν μυρίων*. Where did he get this information?

Isocrates, XV, 234 says that Pericles brought not less than 10,000 talents to the Acropolis (*εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν οὐκ ἐλάττω μυρίων ταλάντων ἀνήνεγκεν*); hence Isocrates cannot be the source, because Aristides claims it *was* less than 10,000 talents. Demosthenes, III, 24, using almost the same words as Isocrates, says the Athenians brought more than 10,000 talents to the Acropolis (*πλείω δ' ἢ μύρια τάλαντ' εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἀνήγαγον*); hence Demosthenes cannot be the source either. Diodorus, XII, 54, 3 speaks of more than 10,000 talents; hence neither Diodorus nor, I suppose, Ephorus, from whom Diodorus seems to depend, can be the source. Accordingly, we are thrown back on the book texts of Thucydides, II, 13, 3, *ὑπαρχόντων δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ἔτι τότε ἀργυρίου ἐπισήμου ἑξακισχιλίων ταλάντων*—*τὰ γὰρ πλείστα τριακοσίων ἀποδέοντα μύρια ἐγένετο*. Pericles was pointing out that in 431 B. C. Athens still had 6,000 talents on the Acropolis, and in his "footnote" Thucydides explains (*γάρ*) that the talents in reserve had reached their most (*πλείστα ἐγένετο*) at 10,000 minus 300.

Two distinguished classicists, B. D. Meritt and A. W. Gomme, have been engaged in a debate ¹ on the proper text of Thucydides

¹ B. D. Meritt *et alii*, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, III (Princeton, The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1950), pp. 118-32, Ch. V, "Thucydides II, 13, 2-9 (T 117)"; A. W. Gomme, "Thucydides ii 13, 3," *Historia*, II (1953), pp. 1-21; B. D. Meritt's address as President of the American Philological Association in New York December 1953, published with alterations and additions as "Indirect Tradition in Thucydides," *Hesperia*, XXIII (1954), pp. 185-231; A. W. Gomme, "Thucydides ii 13.3: An Answer to Professor Meritt," *Historia*, III (1955), pp. 333-8; A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, II (Oxford, 1956), pp. 26-33, "The Text of 13.3"; H. T. Wade-Gery and B. D. Meritt, "Athenian Resources in 449 and 431 B.C.," *Hesperia*, XXVI (1957), pp. 163-97, particularly pp. 188-97, Part II, "The Best Text of Thucydides."

at this point. Meritt has wished to "restore" περιεγένετο (so a scholiast of Aristophanes, *Plutus*, 1193) instead of μύρια ἐγένετο (the reading of the book texts of Thucydides). Gomme has condemned this restoration.

The corruption in our manuscripts of Thucydides, if it really is a corruption, must have crept in before the time of Aelius Aristides. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XXIII (1954), pp. 218-19, thinks that the change περιεγένετο to μύρια ἐγένετο was made between 200 B. C. and 100 A. D. by someone who knew either Ephorus or Isocrates. The alleged corruption could indeed have occurred at the date Meritt postulates, but since the version of the book texts and of Aristides contradicts Ephorus and Isocrates, Meritt has not succeeded in explaining why it would have occurred.

Furthermore, in the passage from the book texts of Thucydides, II, 13, 3, τὰ γὰρ πλείστα τριακοσίων ἀποδέοντα μύρια ἐγένετο, it seems to me possible to find a survival of the old substantive use of the article as in *Iliad*, I, 12, ὁ γὰρ ἦλθε, or Herodotus, V, 92δ, τὰ ² δὴ καὶ ἐγένετο, or Thucydides, III, 17, ἐν τοῖς πρώτῃ ἐγένετο, or Demosthenes, II, 68, εἶδει γὰρ τὸ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ποιῆσαι. In that case πλείστα would not be construed as with τὰ but as a predicate adjective after ἐγένετο. A parallel for the use of the superlative with γίγνομαι occurs in Thucydides, I, 1, 2, κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο.

As I read the book texts, Thucydides states that the talents were most when they were 9,700. The historian's "footnote" reads in full, τὰ γὰρ πλείστα τριακοσίων ἀποδέοντα μύρια ἐγένετο, ἀφ' ὧν ἔς τε τὰ προπύλαια τῆς ἀκροπόλεως καὶ τὰλλα οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἐς Ποτεΐδαιαν ἀπανηλώθη. It is Meritt's contention that the antecedent of the pronoun in the phrase ἀφ' ὧν is the implied whole of which τὰ πλείστα is the greater part. Gomme denies that the Greek will bear this strain. Since I do not connect πλείστα so closely with τὰ, the question does not arise for me. Naturally I cannot accept Meritt's argument here. On the other hand, I find no difficulty in taking the sum of 9700 talents as the

² The Greek-English Lexicon, s. v. ὁ, ἡ, τό, A, cites for the demonstrative use of the article in Herodotus other passages but not this. In my opinion, however, even this pronoun is not the relative but the demonstrative as in *Iliad*, XVIII, 549, τὸ δὴ περὶ θαῦμα τέτυκτο, or *Odyssey*, IV, 819, τοῦ δὴ ἐγὼ καὶ μᾶλλον ὀδύρομαι.

antecedent. Meritt argues persuasively that τὰ πλεῖστα cannot mean "the maximum," but with my interpretation that we have here the substantive use of τὰ, an interpretation not proposed by Gomme and not envisaged by Meritt, there is no such phrase. The idiom here is πλεῖστα ἐγένετο ("reached their most"), not τὰ πλεῖστα.

Since the old substantive use of the article looks less like a corruption of the first century B. C. than does the faulty syntax of the scholiast, I find it easier to abide by the book texts.

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REVIEWS.

F. W. WALBANK. A Historical Commentary on Polybius, Volume I. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957. Pp. xxvii + 776. \$13.45.

Incredible though it is, no historical commentary on the whole of Polybius would appear to have ever been produced. Schweighaueser, it is true, did produce an edition of Polybius in the 18th century, his being the last one before the present work to deal with the complete text, but it concerned itself primarily with philological matters. Consequently the appearance of the present volume, the first of two, must surely be regarded as a major event in the world of classical scholarship. And a keenly anticipated event as well, since it had been fairly common knowledge for some time that Walbank was engaged on the task and manifestly his demonstrated mastery of the history of the Eastern Mediterranean in the 3rd and 2nd centuries B. C. meant that he was peculiarly fitted to undertake it. Indeed the appearance of some preliminary studies by him (e.g. "The Geography of Polybius" in *Classica et Mediaevalia*, IX [1948], pp. 155-82 and "Some Reflections on Hannibal's Pass" in *J.R.S.*, XLVI [1956], pp. 37-45) had already whetted academic appetites for the major work to come; and now that it has begun its appearance it is sure of an enthusiastic welcome.

Let it be said at once: Walbank's is no ordinary achievement. It is a magnificent piece of scholarship which all historians will find uncommonly useful: in a laudable attempt to increase its usefulness Walbank has taken the trouble to point out the errors and imperfections in those works which he assumes, quite correctly, English-speaking students are likely to have at their elbows, viz. Paton's Loeb edition of Polybius, the revised Liddell and Scott, etc. Henceforth no Roman historian will be able to get along without his Walbank.

This first volume consists of a general introduction, a commentary on each of the first six books of Polybius (each of which gets its fair share of the space available), and some thirty pages of accurate and valuable indexes. Thirteen maps and plans, mostly of battles, are included, as well as fourteen closely printed pages of bibliography. Formidable though the latter is, it hardly begins to tell the tale since practically every page of the commentary cites additional articles, reviews, discussions and the like which were of too specialized a nature to be included in the general bibliography. Virtually nothing has escaped Walbank's net, and if there is no mention of Gelzer's *Über die Arbeitsweise des Polybios* (*Sitzb. Heidelb. Akad.*, 1956) and on p. 393 no reference to Thouvenot's note on Polybius' visit to the River Senegal (*Revue des Études Latines*, XXXIV [1956], pp. 88-92) or on p. 182 to Zennari's opusculum on Vercellae (*Athenaeum Cremonense*, IV, fasc. 3 [1956], pp. 1-78), the explanation is simply that these items had not appeared when Walbank's MS went to press. One minor criticism can be advanced: Walbank, presumably in order to save space and expense, usually cites learned periodicals by their date and page and not by volume number as well.

The five sections into which the general introduction is subdivided deal respectively with: Polybius' life, his views on historiography, his conception of Tyche, his sources, and his chronology. Brief though they are, these sections are refreshingly lucid, contain everything that is essential and are regularly supplemented by more detailed notes throughout the commentary wherever such would seem to be necessary. This reviewer was left with the impression that Walbank's own chief interest is in Polybius' views on historiography and on Tyche, although he also devotes not a little attention to the thorny problem of Polybius' chronology, without however being able to reach any definite conclusion except that Mommsen (*Röm. Forsch.*, II, p. 360) is wrong (see p. 235). Somewhat surprisingly Walbank does not allude to, much less seek to explain, the astonishing statement of Cicero (*De Re Pub.*, II, 14, 27) that Polybius took more care about dates than any other historian: *quo nemo fuit in exquirendis temporibus diligentior*; but perhaps Walbank is reserving a discussion of this for his second volume (see his note 7 on p. 36).

The commentary proper, even though it contains occasional notes of a grammatical or literary nature (e. g. on pp. 335, 461), is just what its title page proclaims it to be, viz., a "historical" one. And few people will cavil at this: as Shuckburgh pointed out almost three quarters of a century ago, "Polybius is not an author likely to be studied for the sake of his Greek." If we judge Walbank's notes by Polybian standards (see Polyb., VI, 11), in other words if we judge him by what he says and not by what he leaves unsaid and if we ask whether what he says is strictly relevant to the matter under discussion, we find that they are entirely admirable. Succinct and sensible, they burke no difficulties and they underscore all probabilities (although it should be added that Walbank always sets forth with full and scrupulous impartiality the rival views on disputed points). Wherever Polybius' text touches on matters of greater importance or interest, there is a longer, well-balanced note which is to all intents and purposes a short excursus; and this makes the commentary invaluable. To cite a few instances at random: the Ebro Treaty and the Saguntine Alliance (pp. 168-72, 356), the chronology of Rome's Gallic Wars (pp. 184-6), the muster roll of 225 B. C. (pp. 196-9), the number of legions in 218 B. C. (pp. 375-7), the Cannae campaign (pp. 435-50), the topography of Aetolia (pp. 543-5), of Laconia (pp. 555-6) and of Coele Syria (pp. 592-3), the "anacyclosis" (pp. 643-8), the "archaeologia" of Rome (pp. 663-73). Cross references are abundant and they reveal an enviable familiarity with Polybius' text (and, as a matter of fact, with other ancient texts as well: e. g. the *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*).

No commentary, needless to say, will please all of its users all of the time on all points. Every reader will find some notes that strike him as either inadequate or unnecessary. As examples of notes that might fairly be regarded as requiring expansion the present reviewer would list: that on p. 92 where the reader is left with the impression that soldiers in a manipulus served beneath a *vexillum* rather than a *signum*; that on p. 212 where the road from Arretium to Bononia is called the Via Flaminia (a Flaminius did build it, it is true, in 187 B. C., but Livy, XXXIX, 2, 6, our only source, calls it simply *via*); that on pp. 375-7 where cross references to pp. 677, 701 or,

better still, an explanation of Polybius' assertion that the Roman consuls were instructed (by the People apparently) to enrol additional legions from the Italian allies, would be in order; that on p. 433 where mention of two towns named Bovianum is likely to confuse the average reader; and those on pp. 488, 495, 497 where the reader should be told respectively what is the exact circumference of the Black Sea, the narrowest part of the Bosphorus and the length of the Golden Horn. The content of other notes might well be described as arguable rather than inadequate: e. g., is Polybius exaggerating the threat to Italy which Carthaginian occupation of Messana represented (p. 57)? Is the annalistic tradition which Livy reproduces probably later than that used by Diodorus (p. 185)? Did the Nomen Latinum in 225 B. C. include more than the Latin Colonies (p. 201)? Is the silence of Polybius and Diodorus relevant to the authenticity of the story that Claudius threw the sacred chickens into the sea at Drepana (p. 113) (as Walbank admits, Polybius and Diodorus here both derive in the main from a Punic source, and a Punic source would scarcely have mentioned Claudius' alleged impiety)? Some notes, on the other hand, might appear perhaps superfluous: e. g., those on p. 335 (the use of the imperfect in Greek), p. 475 (Phoebeidas' seizure of the Cadmeia), and p. 573 (the "false" Smerdis), all of which are surely very elementary in a work of this kind. Nor would it appear necessary to keep on reminding readers that the model for some of the more dramatic episodes in Polybius is Thucydides' description of the battle in the harbor at Syracuse. All these, however, are mere matters of opinion on which other readers than the present reviewer may well feel differently. Positive slips and mistakes are very few. The most conspicuous is the repeated assertion (pp. 127, 499, 512) that a talent of silver weighing 25.8 kilos is equivalent to ca. £230 if gold is $15\frac{1}{2}$ times more valuable than silver. Walbank adds that the calculation takes no account of relative purchasing power. Unfortunately it also takes no account of the fluctuations in the gold value of the pound sterling since 1939, and in fact all such equations between ancient and modern currencies would be better omitted. A few *corrigenda* can be suggested for future editions. On p. 48, and throughout, the name *Bruttium* is used: as Walbank undoubtedly knows, there is no ancient authority for it, and the reader should be warned accordingly. *Faleria* (p. 131) for *Falerii* and *Silurus* (p. 201) for *Silarus* may be mere misprints. *Cales* in Umbria (p. 204) is better spelt *Calles*, and to some readers it will seem less than exact to speak of the "Latin League of Ferentina" (p. 345) (Livy, I, 50; I, 51 has *lucus Ferentinae* or *caput aquae Ferentinae* and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, III, 51 has ἡ ἐν Φερεντίῳ ἀγορά). Nor will all readers agree that Ps. Scylax describes the Samnite League as stretching from sea to sea ca. 350 B. C. (p. 49): Scylax, 15 may be corrupt but it clearly says that it was the *ethnos* not the *symmachia* of the Samnites that extended from the Tyrrhenian to the Adriatic. N. S. De Witt (p. 382) should be N. J. De Witt, and it is at least doubtful whether the name of the goddess should be spelt *Minerua* in English (p. 208). Map No. 11 on p. 554 shows Amyclae as too far from Sparta (cf. Walbank's own statement on p. 553) and Map No. 12 on p. 602 appears to misplace Ilium. Misprints on pp. 102, 121, 373, 384, 389, 510, 552, 553, 572

should also be eliminated in any future reprinting, although it must be unhesitatingly emphasized that on the whole the Clarendon Press has done its usual competent job of bookmaking.

In appearance and in other ways this Historical Commentary on Polybius is very similar to that other fine product of twentieth century British scholarship, Gomme's *Commentary on Thucydides*. Walbank, no less than Gomme, has placed all of us deeply in his debt. Would it, however, be ungracious or impatient to express the hope that his work will not be as slow as Gomme's in reaching its conclusion?

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FRANK O. COPLEY. *Exclusus Amator: A Study in Latin Love Poetry*. American Philological Association, 1956. Pp. ix + 176. \$5.00. (*Philological Monographs*, XVII.)

This is one of the best studies of a literary *motif* which I have seen. Copley has here gone far beyond the usual collection of instances and tracing of influences to genuine literary-critical analysis: his brief book thus opens paths in many directions. First of all, it will long remain indispensable to future students of Latin amatory poetry since, far more than any predecessor, it directly engages the problem of the *originality* of such poetry. But, more than this, it illuminates much wider aspects of Latin civilization. To me at least, it casts beams of light on a variety of questions: the origin of Latin amatory elegy, the originality of Latin verse, the literary assessment of such individual poets as Plautus, Horace, Catullus beside, of course, the amatory elegists themselves. Copley keeps to his subject with admirable tenacity—the work is a model of conciseness—but the reader will find his mind excited by a great number of enticing *aperçus* and suggestions which ultimately lead through the whole field of the classical literatures. In this review I shall *first* recapitulate the gist of his argument, *second* advance a few specific criticisms, and *thirdly* comment on its broader implications.

The book contains eight chapters. The first defines the *paraclausithyron* as the "song sung by the lover at his mistress' door after he has been refused admission to her house" (p. 1). But Copley (see our comment below) thereafter interprets the word in a somewhat broader sense as any poem or episode (of e. g. a comedy) which deals with the closed-door motif. He sees its origin in the *kômos* or "rout or revel which sometimes followed the symposium" (p. 4). The lover is usually drunk: he sings a drinking or *kômos* song in which, as Copley interprets the ancient evidence, the *paraclausithyron* began. The second chapter (The Literary Development of the Greek *Paraclausithyron*) traces its evolution from the "boisterous ballad of the streets" to the "conventional gesture of a sentimentalized and completely unrealistic lover" (p. 27). The *paraclausithyra* of the *Palatine Anthology* are mostly of this latter sort: they are lovers' laments and are essentially *non-dramatic* in char-

acter: it is to this "non-dramatic tradition of the paraclausithyron that we owe the familiar figure of the *exclusus amator*" (p. 17).

In Chapter III Copley turns to the Roman paraclausithyron. Here he analyzes the paraclausithyron incident of Plautus' *Curculio*. It is of course modeled on a similar incident in Greek New Comedy. But he finds in it *three* new un-Greek or Roman characteristics: the *personification* of the door (it is treated as a "living being" and a "magical," door-opening song is sung to it); the association of the door with the theme of stolen love (*furtivus amor*); the fact that the girl has a *custos* whom she must evade (hence the furtiveness). These differences are chiefly important, according to Copley, because they involve a great change in the girl's position. "In Greek paraclausithyra if the door was not opened it was the girl herself who was to blame. She was hardhearted, unjust, deceitful, stubborn, unfeeling. Her moral position, from the point of view of the peculiar morality of love, is wicked and indefensible. But in Plautus' version the girl is not to blame" (pp. 39-40). The woman is thus "idealized" in the Roman version: the attitude toward love is "romantic" (p. 40). Nevertheless Copley recognizes that the older boisterous paraclausithyron reappears in the *Persa*.

Chapter IV (Lucretius, Catullus and Horace) deals with the Roman paraclausithyron between Plautus and the Elegists. Copley sees in Lucretius (IV, 1177-9) evidence that songs about the excluded lover still were current in his time. (He also sees Lucretius as evidence that lovers actually sang such songs before their ladies' doors.) Furthermore he thinks he can see at least two of his "Roman" characteristics in Lucretius' three lines: the personified door and the furtiveness of the amour. In Catullus he finds quite new elements—namely the use of the personified door as a lampoon or *diffamatio* (in 67 a lampoon on the cuckolded husband and unfaithful wife) and what he aptly calls the "*lupanar* song" (like Catullus 32), an appeal to some *meretrix* to open or keep open her door. In Horace he finds new elements as well as a combination of the *diffamatio* and "*lupanar* song" with the "conventional" paraclausithyron. He recognizes in *Epode* 11 a combination of the "real and the conventional" (Horace's own "actual experience expressed in terms of a conventional poetic form," pp. 52-3) as well as a new addition to the paraclausithyron: the "rich rival" or *dives amator*. In *Odes* III, 26 Horace relates the door incident as part of a militant amatory past (this reflective viewpoint is new). *Odes* I, 25 is really a combination of the "*lupanar* song" with the paraclausithyron. Again in *Ser.*, I, 2, 64-7 Horace combines it with a *diffamatio*. *Odes* III, 10 and 7 make the lady's *custos* her husband: the love involved is frankly adulterous and the union of paraclausithyron and *diffamatio* and "*lupanar* song") come together. Copley thus sees in particular problem of morality, but the stock theme is given a more interesting and complicated setting.

Thus in Horace "two lines of development, the literary and the sub-literary" (i. e. the conventional paraclausithyron and the *diffamatio* and "*lupanar* song") come together. Copley thus sees in Horace a true source of the later elegiac paraclausithyron.

Chapters V-VIII deal with Elegy. Copley thinks that the elegiac poets found the *exclusus amator* to be the primary "vehicle for the

expression of the totality of love" (p. 70). He thinks, e.g., the *vigilatio ad clausas fores* "dominated Propertius' concept of love"; that it was to Tibullus the "essence" and "symbol" of his love; and epitomized for Ovid the "activities and experiences" of the lover. The elegists' actual full-length paraclausithyra (i.e., whole poems devoted to this topic), however, are to Copley a somewhat less significant aspect of their work. He assumes that they base such poems on Horace's amalgamation of the conventional paraclausithyron with the *diffamatio*. "It is," he says, "on this foundation that the elegists now proceed to build" (p. 91). He sees Tibullus as attempting a top-heavy syncretism of all aspects of his love with the closed-door motif. He reduces the theme to "a position of pure formality so that it no longer constitutes the *raison d'être* of the poem but is only its immediate cause" and he uses it as a vehicle for discussing "the whole complex nature of the literary love affair." Propertius, on the other hand, in his one paraclausithyron (I, 16, which Copley deems the "best of all that have survived from antiquity") marks a "sharp return to realism," to the true paraclausithyron where, as in Catullus 67, the door is speaker throughout. Thus Propertius "made the paraclausithyron a door song once more." But it is still for him, as Copley thinks, a "striking and effective symbol of the totality of elegiac love" (p. 122). In Ovid, Copley sees the decadence of the paraclausithyron: the door no longer has "real personality" and the whole concept has become "frigid, stereotyped and artificial." Though we can trace a few later remnants of the paraclausithyron, "for all practical purposes, the theme died with Ovid."

This *résumé* of course does scant justice to Copley's detailed and at times brilliant analysis. I hope it encourages the reader to read the book and follow the argument in all its rich elaboration. I can only touch here on a few specific points and on one more general consideration. As for specific criticisms, the following queries seem to me at least worth raising:

(1) I am not fully satisfied by Copley's rather loose use of the term, *paraclausithyron*. Is it, in short, a motif, story, theme, or the actual *song*? He says it is the song, but he also insists (rightly, I think) that it is *essentially* a "motif, theme or story rather than a form" (p. 1), like, e.g., pastoral, comedy, lyric, elegy, epigram, etc. The term, in this usage, occurs only once—in Plutarch's *Ἐρωτικός* (*Moralia* 753B). There it obviously means the song (*ᾄδειν τὸ παρακλαυσίθυρον*), and the etymology seems clearly to indicate a *lament beside or before a door*. Certainly the *exclusus amator* becomes a stock-in-trade of the Hellenistic and Roman *sermo amatorius*, but Plutarch probably meant by paraclausithyron something much narrower than a *motif* or a general episode. There may well have been, in other words, a true "door song" and perhaps the so-called *Alexandrian Erotic Fragment* is one. But, in this strict sense, the door scenes in comedy or in epigram are not true paraclausithyra. I do not ascribe undue importance to this point, but I think a more precise exegesis of Plutarch (Copley merely refers to him in a note, without further comment) would have been helpful both to the reader and to himself.

(2) In general I find myself in agreement with Copley's analysis

of the *Curculio*. The main point here is how Roman the song to the door (i. e. the personification of the door) is. We actually have, as Copley admits, a poem of Strato (*A. P.*, XII, 252) where the door is distinctly addressed in one phrase. Clearly this is different from the long and explicit address to the door in the *Curculio*. But the difference, it seems to me, is obviously not in the fact of address to an inanimate object but in its elaboration and feeling: the door is not merely apostrophized but treated as a person. The apostrophe is not *per se* specifically Roman: the personalization of the door is.

(3) In discussing Lucretius, Copley seems to me again right in seeing a Roman personification of the door, but I can hardly follow his reading of *furtive love* into the three-line passage on the ground that Lucretius' lover anoints the doors with unguent. This seems to me nothing but another expression of the lover's extravagance (he also kisses the door and covers it with garlands). I cannot but think it far-fetched to suggest, as Copley does, that he is oiling the door to keep it from squeaking—on the chance that the girl may try to beat a stealthy escape from her sleeping *custos*. But this is a very small point: essentially Copley is right. More important is his categorical certainty ("It may be concluded with complete assurance," etc., p. 46) that Lucretius is describing actual scenes from real life, that the "*exclusus amator*, with all his canonical antics, was a familiar figure in the streets of Rome." Here it seems to me that Copley gravely underrates the very wide gap between the conventions of literature (low or high) and the actuality of human existence. Can we, for example, take the Romance of the Rose or the novels of Augusta Evans Wilson or, for that matter, the songs of Elvis Presley as accurate descriptions of lovers' normal behavior in their respective periods? And can a critic (even if he be a philosopher) not satirize such literature without "making himself ridiculous"? Must we believe that Lucretius believed that Roman lovers habitually slobbered over doorposts? In fact, this whole section of Lucretius' fourth book seems to me to be clearly dealing with a literary or popular convention about love, and not with what love really is. His main point seems to me to be that such conventions cover up the deadly reality: all this pretense disappears at one whiff of an actual girl:

1180 quem si, iam admissum, venientem offenderit aura
 una modo, causas abeundi quaerat honestas.

The important thing here is not whether some lovers did or did not indulge in such "canonical antics" but that Lucretius is describing a conventional and artificial code which reality contradicts. The *paraclausithyron* is to him very much what the "rock and roll" songs of Presley are to some of us.

(4) Copley seems very certain that Horace influenced Tibullus and his successors (pp. 69, 70, 91) and that Propertius reacted in turn against Tibullus (p. 116). It is certainly possible that Horace was an influence (Copley's case seems to me well made) but it is, I think, quite uncertain that Propertius I, 16 was definitely posterior to, e.g. Tibullus I, 2 and I, 5. Butler and Barber at least hold with a good deal of justice that Propertius' *Monobiblos* was published in about 29 B. C. and was thus definitely prior to any book of Tibullus' elegies. To be sure, Ovid recognizes a definite

priority of Tibullus to Propertius, and it may well be that Propertius was consciously making "a sharp return to realism" (p. 116) from the "long, discursive, contemplative paraclausithyron" of Tibullus. But the chronology is decidedly uncertain (to say the least) and I do not see any reason why we cannot assume the priority of Propertius I, 16 to Tibullus I, 2 or I, 5.

But let us come to more important things. As I see it the great interest of Copley's book lies in its well-marshalled evidence that the paraclausithyron took on a distinct Roman coloring when used by Roman poets. No one before him has done this with anything approaching his mastery of detail and synthesis. This is therefore a contribution to our understanding of Roman elegy (I must add also of Horace and Plautus) which must be taken account of in all future work on the subject. It is, I think, a major contribution. But I am not altogether sure that Copley has seen the whole significance of his own work. For his study of the excluded lover is surely bound to have repercussions on all the accepted views about Roman elegy. The paraclausithyron, as I see it, is certainly a major ingredient of the traditional *sermo amatorius*. Now the "problem" of Roman elegy really lies in the curious mixture of the *sermo amatorius* which it so faithfully follows (even though, as Copley shows, a Romanized *sermo amatorius*) with the *personal* or *actual* love affair that it also treats. Ovid's Corinna is no doubt a fiction but Delia, Nemesis, and Cynthia are actual girls to at least some degree. Nevertheless the gap between Lesbia and even Cynthia is immense: Catullus' love for Lesbia is the real thing; the *sermo amatorius* as such plays an insignificant rôle in it. But Tibullus and Propertius have so interlarded the personal amour with conventional amatory *topoi* that we get only glimpses of an actual love. In fact Propertius in his *Monobiblos* seems as much concerned with Gallus, Tullus, and Ponticus as with Cynthia: he is upholding against Gallus' wild promiscuity, Ponticus' disparagement of elegy in favor of epic, and Tullus' preference of a military to an amatory career, the theme of his *servitium* to one love. This *servitium* seems obviously a kind of pose or convention—partly literary and partly perhaps personal. But it seems at least as much of an attitude towards life and literature as a genuine passion for Cynthia. She is obviously a *libertina* whose unfaithfulness is deplored but accepted as part of her nature or position and a proof of the poet's true *servitium* or devotion. I, 16 (the door's lament) is part of a triad (16, 17, 18) where the poet complains to inanimate objects and/or (as in 16) is addressed by them. He addresses the sea-birds in 17 and a lonely grove in 18 (where he writes Cynthia's name on the trees). This triad in its turn fits into the plan (of the whole *Monobiblos*) that may be summarily described thus:

- (a). 1: Introductory: a warning to Tullus against unrequited love (the poet's harsh *servitium*).
- (b). 2, 3: Cynthia's beauty and innocence.
- (c). 4, 5, 6: the fruitless attempts of the three friends to separate Propertius from Cynthia.
- (d). 7, 8, 9: the advantages of amatory elegy.
- (e). 10-14: The contrast between Gallus' and Propertius' love.

Gallus must learn the lesson of constancy in love's *servitium*. For Tullus he contrasts the superiority of love to riches (14).

(f). 15: the perfidy of Cynthia.

(g). 16-18: the appeal to inanimate nature for consolation.

16, the *paraclausithyron*, is thus set in the context of Propertius' *servitium*: there is no clear indication in it that Cynthia is the girl involved; but this, I think, is not so much because Cynthia is not meant as because Propertius is concerned primarily with the theme of love's *servitium* rather than his own passion. In short, Propertius' elegy is concerned with love and love-poetry in the abstract (as an *attitude*, so to speak): he is the *Lover* with a capital L, and Cynthia is merely the *object* of his *servitium* to Love (with a capital L). The very fact that the *door* speaks is an illustration of this: what concerns Propertius is his *servitium* itself far more than its personal object. Thus he can lament to inanimate objects almost as well as to Cynthia herself.

It is therefore, I believe, an error to magnify Propertius' *passion* for Cynthia as if it were really like Catullus' passion for Lesbia. He has in fact evolved a peculiarly Roman (in part uniquely personal) version of the *sermo amatorius*. Copley has, I think, given us real insight into its Roman character and its novelty even within the Roman context. Above all he has here indicated a most fruitful field of research: to describe the true nature of this Roman and Propertian *sermo amatorius*. But I do not think he has sufficiently recognized its *conventional* character: he tries, in other words, to make the *paraclausithyron* a key to a personal amour whereas it is really only a personal version of a convention. Propertius I, 16, in other words, is not a "return to *realism*" [my italics]. It is rather an adaptation of the Catullan *diffamatio* (67) to Propertius' own conception of the love-convention.

Tibullus is more obviously conventional and Ovid is really parodying the convention (though his one *paraclausithyron* is not the best instance of his parody). The whole genre was too artificial to last long: Ovid's humor was its death-blow. But the great point, as I see it, of Copley's work is to illuminate the general Roman transformation of the Hellenistic convention and to suggest at least the peculiar problem of the greatest elegist, Propertius—that enigmatic presence of great poetry in so very artificial a setting.

But Copley's work also illuminates that old chestnut, the *origin* of Roman elegy. For long, as is well known, scholars have disputed whether the Roman elegists had or had not a ready-made "model": a real Greek equivalent of the Lesbia, Delia, or Cynthia-cycles. Now that Copley has given us so much more insight into the Roman transformation of the *paraclausithyron* and through it of the Roman *sermo amatorius* (clearly also the whole concept of the lover's *servitium* is really Roman¹) we can I think begin to see much more

¹ Copley has ably discussed the Roman character of *servitium amoris* in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVIII (1947), pp. 285-300. But I do not think that Copley here or in his book has done justice to Ovid. Ovid, in fact, burlesques the Propertian *servitium*. This point has been fully discussed by E. Reitzenstein (*Rhein. Mus.*, LXXXIV [1935], pp. 62 f.) and by myself (*T. A. P. A.*, LXIX [1938], pp. 197-9).

clearly what Gallus—the founder of the genre—really did. He found in Catullus and very likely also in similar collections of short amatory poems by Calvus, Tigidas, Cinna, and Varro Atacinus (possibly others) the idea of a connected cycle of poems to an actual girl. But he innovated by reducing his own collected *amores* to one (the *elegiac*) meter and, above all, by putting his own *amor* into the conventional *sermo amatorius* which he found partly in Hellenistic epigram and elegy and partly in Roman poems (such as, e. g., those of Horace but, more likely, somewhat earlier paraclausithyra and other amatory poems,—poems which, as Copley indicates, were common in Lucretius' day and doubtless went back much earlier: there is no reason not to attribute such verse to early first-century poets like Aedituus, Q. Lutatius Catulus, and, above all, Laevius). We can actually see in Horace's *Epode* 11 a *fusion* of personal and conventional amatory themes. Thus the odd amalgam of a personal amour with a conventional pattern and language of love was established. Then the harsh (Quintilian's phrase is *durior*) Gallus was refined by Tibullus and given a new, more personal twist by Propertius. But the genre was quite too artificial to last: Ovid, by burlesquing it, killed it. The death was delightful and well-timed, for the genre had by then exhausted all its possibilities.

The great point is that the Romans alone were able to give this kind of personal freshness to old convention. The elegists did not thereby recapture anything like the realism and passion of Catullus, but they did for a moment galvanize the conventional lover into some semblance of personal life. Copley has—in my view quite unfortunately—failed to see this as clearly as he might because he still seems inclined to take the *sermo amatorius* and its stock episodes as a reflection of actual amatory behavior. He thus misses the significance of the tremendous gap between Catullus and the Elegists. But it is only by appreciating this gap that we can grasp the *uniqueness* of Elegy—its very Roman *personification* or *subjectivization* of convention. This did not turn a Cynthia into a Lesbia, but it gave new life to the threadbare *sermo amatorius*. The speaking doors and listening sea-birds of Propertius are surely artificial, but they have also an odd vitality.

Copley says a good deal about the "conflict between the code of love and the moral code of society" in Roman elegy. The problem is muted in Horace because such poems as *Odes* III, 10 and 7 are obviously artificial and unreal: it is also muted in the Elegists because Cynthia, Delia, etc. are *meretrices* or *libertinae*, not truly married matrons. Here I think Copley is clearly right but I think also he tends to overlook the *conventionality* of the whole genre. To be brief: no one took it very seriously because its artificiality was obvious from the start. Messalla and Maecenas patronized elegy with an apparently clear conscience. Horace I think tended to disparage elegy but more on literary grounds: it was, to him, a diversion of poetic energy from serious matters into mere *jeu d'esprit*. In moderation, it was all right. As the poet's sole occupation, it was quite another thing. Ovid got into trouble because his frivolity and real contempt for Augustan pretence were a little too plain: the *Ars Amatoria* went beyond convention to a defense of the "gay life" as he conceived it. Even so his poetry would not have been condemned if he had not proved his attitude by some overt act.

All in all Copley has written a seminal book. He has given us a lead toward the reassessment of many problems—a genuine new insight into the nature of Roman elegy and, more than that, the nature of all Roman poetry. His chief weakness I feel lies in a failure to distinguish clearly enough the conventional-literary from the real aspects of Elegy and the *paraclausithyron*. Connected with this also is a certain over-rating of the literary value of the *paraclausithyron*. It is after all a very artificial thing: it is not the stuff of great poetry. But it is a key instance of how Romans could rework a Greek tradition into something quite different. Copley's book on it, therefore, marks a significant step forward in our understanding of the whole problem of Roman poetry.

BROOKS OTIS.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT.

MICHAEL VENTRIS and JOHN CHADWICK. Documents in Mycenaean Greek. Three hundred selected tablets from Knossos, Pylos and Mycenae with commentary and vocabulary. (With a foreword by ALAN J. B. WACE.) Cambridge, University Press, 1956. Pp. xxxi + 452; 26 figs.; 3 pls. \$15.00.

In well-developed fields of scholarly endeavor, progress toward wider and deeper knowledge is normally attained by painstaking, tedious work on the clarification of details and the constant re-interpretation of one's premises and one's results in the light of newly obtained data. It is a rare event indeed that a single discovery will cause something on the order of a revolution for an entire field of study, and even rarer is the case that such a revolution can take place without serious resistance because the facts discovered are so overwhelming that no attempts to reject them have any promise of success.

In the field of Classical studies, such an event occurred only a few years ago. In 1953, M. Ventris and J. Chadwick published an article of twenty pages, entitled "Evidence for Greek dialect in the Mycenaean archives" (*J. H. S.*, LXXIII, pp. 84-103), in which they claimed that the language of the Linear-B texts found in the Peloponnese and on Crete was indeed Greek. This first publication suffered somewhat from its brevity, even in essential points, which led to dissent in some quarters (for example, see A. J. Beattie, *J. H. S.*, LXXVI [1956], pp. 1-17, whose article displays, though, a basic misunderstanding of reasoning in terms of probability); on the whole, however, the essentials of the new decipherment were accepted within a very short time by scholars actively engaged in research in the field.

The work under review supersedes the authors' earlier contributions and presents now, at full book length, method, results, and implications of Ventris' decipherment of Linear B. Though, in the authors' intention, still of a preliminary character, the book easily takes a high-ranking place among the now numerous studies in the field of Mycenaean; for the reader desiring only an introduction and

a comprehensive survey, it will certainly be the first choice, the more so since it represents, after the tragic death of Michael Ventris, the discoverer's legacy to the scholarly world.

The book, attractively bound and splendidly printed on first-rate paper, devotes the major part of its space to the edition of 300 selected tablets from Knossos and the Mainland, arranged according to their contents. The selection, small as it may seem, is highly representative of the variety of texts found to this date; it serves well the authors' purpose of furnishing us relevant illustrations of historical and linguistic features revealed by the tablets. The texts and commentaries, some of which have the scope of separate articles, are preceded by a systematic survey of "Script, language and culture," subdivided into chapters on "Discovery and decipherment," "The Mycenaean writing system," "The Mycenaean language," "The personal names," and "The evidence of the tablets" ("Evidence" here in the sense of non-linguistic, historical, sociological, and general cultural information derived from the texts). The volume is introduced by a Foreword by A. J. B. Wace, in which he discusses some of the historical problems connected with the new discovery; valuable indices (providing, in the case of the vocabulary and the list of proper names, even for data not drawn from the texts printed in this book) and a selective bibliography form the conclusion.

In view of the fact that a more detailed outline of the contents will be easily available to the American reader in E. Townsend Vermeule's review of the book in *A. J. A.*, LXI (1957), pp. 196-201, I shall confine myself to this brief summary and turn instead to the discussion of individual problems. This discussion will be limited almost completely to matters of a philological and linguistic nature; it will proceed from some remarks of a more general character to the study of a few selected questions brought to the fore by the book, and will then add notes to individual passages in the order of their appearance.¹

The book as a whole deserves praise for the great care the authors display both in details and in general approach. As for the details, the number of outright misprints is remarkably low; the following came to my attention: p. 39, signs for *qo* and *qi* inverted; p. 113, line 1, read: labour; p. 254, quotation mark after "(a sacrifice)" left out; p. 412, line 1, bold-face 220 left out. Care in details is also quite obvious in the technical handling of texts and translations; particularly elegant is the authors' practice of printing "doubtful and controversial translations" in italics, thus avoiding what they call "an impenetrable forest of question-marks" (p. 154).

Even more representative of the authors' cautiousness are some general statements dealing with their analysis of the materials. Thus, in a "summary of the limitations to our understanding" (pp. 26-7),

¹ Abbreviations used: A—Linear A ("Minoan") script; B—Linear B ("Mycenaean") script; Gk.—Greek, as known from alphabetic texts; Myc.—Mycenaean dialect of Greek; VC—Ventris and Chadwick (if followed by number, tablet reprinted in book under review; also identified by standard classification number). Periodicals abbreviated in usual form; . . . ~ . . . used for "... corresponding to . . .".

they stress the difficulties standing in the way of a safe use of Indo-European comparative data not confirmed by Greek forms; or, in their introduction to the chapter on proper names (p. 92), they emphatically state that information drawn from names is to be considered inferior to that obtained from other linguistic items since names do not permit a combinatory check of their meaning. In one instance, their cautiousness leads the authors to a definite understatement when they end the subchapter entitled "The language is Greek" with the remark (p. 23) that "a relative degree of certainty must be granted to the theory"—an understatement particularly in contrast to the remark on p. 332 that VC 236 (Ta 641) "has been invaluable in providing a conclusive check on the decipherment."

The first of the special problems I propose to discuss here is that of the relationship of Linear B ("Mycenaean") to Linear A ("Minoan") writing. Looked upon in terms of form only (distribution disregarded), A and B share the major part of their respective inventories: In the list on p. 33, 54 (or rather 55, if AL 102 is treated as two separate signs, corresponding to B 45 and 47, respectively) of 75 A signs with presumably phonetic, non-ideographic value are closely matched in B. (Possible disagreements on details may be passed over as not affecting the argument.) Conversely, the 55 A-B correspondences (45 of which are quite certain according to VC, p. 39) form the majority among the 87 (or 84) syllabic B signs. This leaves us with an overhead of 20 (21) signs present in A, absent in B, on the one hand, and 29 (32) present in B, absent in A, on the other. These overheads call for an explanation.

VC point out that an explanation of "innovations" in B as resulting from a need to accommodate Greek sounds alien to "Minoan" is made unlikely by a lack of system in the "innovations": whereas *go* and *qi* seem to be new signs and *qe* (as well as *qa*, VC's *pa*) old, *mo* "and possibly *me*"² seem to be new while *ma* and *mi* do not—there is no indication of entire sets of signs being newly introduced (sets either with constant vowel or constant consonant component), and an explanation other than by an assumption of wholesale innovation is desirable.

It is highly suggestive that we have to deal not only, as VC do, with an apparent overhead in B, but also with one in A. It is tempting to assume that at least part of the respective overheads is congruent—that is, that the overheads result in part from a failure to recognize sign correspondences.

Emphasizing again that we are arguing formal similarity only and not distributional factors (which may well be used eventually against an earlier sign identification once the linguistic structure of "Minoan" becomes known), it would seem possible to equate tentatively with one another AL 99/128 ~ B 42 (*wo*) and AL 33 ~ B 11 (*po*), once the change in the direction of a sign, as found in AL 53 ~ B 60 (*ra*) is taken into consideration. The observation that in AL 6 ~ B 69 (*tu*), AL 28 ~ B 40 (*wi*), AL 34 ~ B 29 (*pu*?), A shows the plus of a horizontal lower line, may lead us to compare AL 9 with certain forms (Mycenae!) of B 41 (*si*). VC's statement with reference to AL 98 ~ B 81 (*ku*) that many B signs are more ornate than

² Thus VC on p. 39; cf., however, fig. 6 (p. 33): AL 84/48 ~ B 13.

their A counterparts (which would also apply to AL 99/128 ~ B 42 [wo], just compared on other grounds) may be used to propose as equivalents AL 68/96 ~ B 65, AL 88 ~ B 53 (ri), AL 24 ~ B 44 (ke), and even AL 61 ~ B 24 (ne) or AL 21 ~ B 36 (jo).

If the equations suggested here should prove correct, the overheads would be reduced to 12 (13) and 21 (24) signs, respectively. Further reductions may well be possible, yet it is likely that on both sides a residue of rarely attested signs will remain unattached. Among this residue, B may contain certain innovations created to render typical Greek sound combinations, as, e.g., *pt-*. For the small group of signs thus isolated in B, attempts to identify their sound values with the initial consonant-vowel combinations of given Greek words may not prove quite as futile as VC believe—I am indeed inclined to consider Georgiev's view (*Slovar' krito-mikenskix nadpisej*, p. 61) that B 62 depicts a pair of wings and derives its value *pte* from *πτερά*, as a strong possibility. (It goes without saying, though, that no such Greek interpretation can be admitted for signs shared by B and A; Georgiev's attempt at explaining sign and sound value of B 29 ~ AL 34 by referring to Gk. *φύρον*, is untenable.)³

Some remarks seem in order concerning the relationship of A and B with Cypriot writing. VC emphasize that Cypriot is linked more closely with A than with B: both formal and historical criteria prevent us from deriving the use of a syllabary for writing Greek on Cyprus from the same practice on Crete and the Mainland; agreements, both in form and sound value, between Cypriot and B suggest rather a common source for both syllabaries, similar to, if not essentially identical with, A.⁴

Such more distant relationship does not, however, invalidate the importance of the agreements. On the contrary, if we do have formal and functional identity between B and Cypriot for signs such as *pa* or *po*, we are entitled to postulate signs of at least very similar shape and identical value for the common ancestor script. This, in turn, means that identity of value and similarity of shape must have prevailed at intermittent stages in the development of the related syllabaries; the assumption offered hesitantly by VC (p. 39), of a "wholesale reshuffling" of sound values at the point of transition from A to B, is to be rejected.

Formal and functional similarity or identity between B and Cypriot has been observed with seven signs (p. 66; the exactness of this as an absolute figure is of little importance). VC point out that agreements are found primarily among signs with the "simplest patterns"; they reject the notion of a chance origin of these agreements, but find it puzzling that apparently no correspondences can be shown to exist with more complex signs. To this may be said that in the process of restyling of scripts, signs with a relatively simple structure are often less subject to thorough modification and deformation than relatively complex ones. Suffice it to point to the relative stability of the omikron sign from Greek through the various

³ See, however, G. Neumann's attractive analysis of the origin of the use of the *ni* sign as ideogram for 'fig,' *Glotta*, XXXVI (1957), pp. 156-8.

⁴ Cf. also H.-G. Buchholz, *Minos*, III (1955), p. 151.

types of Armenian writing, in contrast to the reshaping of the *xi* sign, or to the fact that an *i* is little different in shape in English or German handwriting, printed Roman or Gothic type, whereas an *S* is hardly recognized in German writing or print by a person versed in English script only. It is, thus, not unexpected to find a sign of a few simple strokes, like *pa*, identical in B and Cypriot, while it would be rather surprising to discover a complex sign like AL 95 ~ B 80 (*ma*) preserved unchanged in the Paphian syllabary.

If Cypriot and Mycenaean writing systems are basically commensurable, a few points deserve our attention: Cypriot, in contrast to B, has a graphic distinction between an *r*- and an *l*-series. The one series in B agrees with the Cypriot *l*-set, as shown by the clear identity of Cypriot *lo* and B 2 (*ro*). For the immediate transcription purposes the choice of either *r*- or *l*- for B is, of course, irrelevant; it may, however, be worth remembering for attempts to evaluate inferences to the structure of "Minoan" that the selection of *l*- instead of *r*- is preferable in historical and comparative terms.—The one dental series of Cypriot agrees with the *d*-set of B, not the *t*-set: Cypriot *ta* clearly = B *da*, Cypriot *tu* clearly \neq B *tu* (Cypriot *ti* and *to* formally ambiguous). It may be possible to assume that the contrast *t*:*d* in "Minoan" was not one of stop *vs.* non-stop, so that both sets, at the point of reduction to one set for dental stops, were equally possible choices.

While syllabic writing survived until a rather late date on Cyprus, so far no material evidence is available for literacy on the Mainland and Crete between *ca.* 1200 B.C. and *ca.* 850 B.C. (p. 60). The question may be raised, even though no answer is possible at this time, whether there is a causal connection between the most significant innovation in Greek alphabetic writing, the introduction of vowel signs, and the fully developed rendering of vowels (in combination with preceding consonants or in isolation) in the Mycenaean syllabary.

A number of purely linguistic questions would deserve fuller discussion; for reasons of space, I shall select here only one, that of VC's handling of etymological matters.

An etymology is an attempt to establish and describe a formal and semantic relationship of linguistic items in two or more languages compared; the comparison implies a historical connection of the items and the languages they are part of, either in terms of contact or of genetic relatedness. An etymology may be probable or improbable; the degree of probability depends on the degree of clarification of details in the formal and, secondarily, the semantic correlation. If new data cannot be reconciled with an etymology so far accepted, then the etymology has to be modified or abandoned; etymologies are never data themselves, but only working hypotheses.

Viewed against this theoretical background, one can state with gratification that VC's attitude toward etymology is, on the whole, very sound. Only occasionally do they betray too much respect for the form in the handbook. If, on p. 79, they label the *-w*- in *me-wi-jo* 'smaller'— "intrusive" because it is "not expected from the etymology or dialect forms," they are indeed belittling the value of the new information. Much worse is a statement with reference to VC 247 (Ta 716) where they say of an obscure form *wa-o* that

"*ἄορ* 'sword' is excluded by its etymology (**awor* or **nsor*?)," apparently not realizing that, by the introduction of two conflicting "etymologies," they deny the very existence of one acceptable etymology and, therefore, lead their own argument *ad absurdum*.

VC are perfectly right in insisting (p. 27) that Mycenaean items should be compared with Greek words and not immediately with other Indo-European forms. Generally, they are rigid in their procedures, not allowing themselves identifications when discrepancies in details remain. On occasion, however, they have been too lenient: Myc. *di-pa*, name of a vessel, is equated by VC with Gk. *δέπας*. The Mycenaean materials provide no parallel for even a conditioned statement Myc. *i* = Gk. *ε*; *i-mi-ri-jo*, if proper name, is of no help. Since, in addition, nothing is known about the exact shape of a *di-pa*, it would certainly be advisable to exclude this word from the marked items in the Vocabulary, which "can, allowing for historical evolution, be directly equated with Homeric or classical forms" (p. 385).

Unexplained formal discrepancies between Mycenaean and Greek items must exclude their identification; formal discrepancies between Mycenaean forms and forms postulated for pre-Greek on the basis of Indo-European etymologies need not disprove the Mycenaean-Greek equation, but possibly only the proposed etymology. I have pointed out (*Language*, XXXII [1956], p. 506) that Brugmann's explanation of Gk. *πᾶς* is now shown to be wrong and has to be replaced by Meillet's equation with "Tocharian" B *po*, pl. *poñc* 'all.' (The arguments put forward to claim Myc. *pa* as development from labiovelar [or velar plus *w*] plus *a*, are not conclusive; pattern symmetry, lack of leveling of the distinction *pa*: '*pa*,' and the absence of a safe equation demonstrating *pa* < **qa*⁵ all contradict such assumption.)

There may be cases, though, where the etymology of a Greek word, which conflicts with the form of a Mycenaean item, may seem so well established that rather the Mycenaean-Greek equation will be abandoned than the etymology in question. A necessary condition is that some doubt exist as to the precise meaning of the Mycenaean word.—A possible example is that of Myc. *ra-pte*: Gk. *ράπτης*, *ράφεις*, etc. The Greek words have been connected with Lithuanian *vérpti* 'spin'—a connection which implies original *w-* for the Greek forms. Mycenaean shows, however, preservation of *wr-* in, e.g., *wi-ri-ne-jo*. These alternative solutions exist: One, *ra-pte* proves the absence of *w-* for Greek; then, the connection with *vérpti* is erroneous. Two, *ra-pte* is not to be equated with *ράπτης*, etc., at all; then, the connection with *vérpti* is possible. For the second solution, this could be said: The texts prove only that *ra-pte* is the name of a trade; there is no indication of work as a 'tailor' or the like. To be sure, VC 52 (An 207) would seem to point to an urban activity; the frequent occurrence of *ra-pte* on Ea (landholding) tablets, however, could be used for an argument to the contrary. VC, on the other hand, accept the identification of *ra-pte* as 'tailor' and consequently

⁵ The identification of *pa-ra-jo*, *pa-ra-ja* in VC 286 ff. as 'old' is far from certain; in other contexts, 'old' is virtually excluded, as in Cn 40, 254, 655, 719, An 298 (see also my remarks *ad* p. 200); finally, the etymology of *παλαιός* as such may be contested.

question the etymology of *ράπτης*, etc. (cf. particularly p. 82); things being as they are, it would seem best to leave the entire matter open for the time being.

The following are brief notes to individual passages in the book (identification by pages):

46, § 11: "Polysyllabic" is an ill-chosen term; "multiconsonantal" would be better. — 47 (cf. p. 253, 367, 373): "Vocalization" is not inclusive enough. — 48: *a-pu/ke-ka-u-me-no*: The slanting line should be used only as indicated on p. 154. — 77: The alleged examples of a vacillation *i/u* are rather not to be relied upon. — 78: Read "possibly faulty" in statement on *ko-to-no-ko*. — 81: For *e-ke-qe* see E. L. Bennett, Jr., *A.J.A.*, LX (1956), pp. 120-2 and now W. Winter, *Language*, XXXII (1956), pp. 506-8. — 82: *pe-re-qo-ta*, if related to *qe-re-qo-ta-o* at all, is more likely to show a result of dissimilation than a regular development *qe > pe*. — 85: If *-o-i* of the dative plural of *o*-stems is interpreted as *-oi²i*, why then *-a-i* of *ā*-stems as *-ā²i* and not *-ai²i*? — 87: To *mi* = *min* add, perhaps, *ke-ma-qe-me* in VC 161 (Uf 839). — 89: *e-e-to* in VC 28.3 (An 607.3) hardly an imperative form of 'to be'; in view of the dative *e-qe-ta-i* probably a form of *ἴημι*, perhaps 3rd pl. pf. med./pass. **ἔεντοι*? (Slightly different V. Georgiev, *Slovar*, p. 29; another suggestion by F. R. Adrados, *Minos*, V [1957], p. 55.). — 137: Consistent use of *ra₂* in forms of *e-ke-ra₂-wo* makes interpretation *Ekkhelāwōn* unlikely; Un 219.1 *e-ke-ra-ne* offers no safe argument to the contrary. — 163: The guess at the meaning of the abbreviation *pa.* is of little probability value in view of *pa.di.*, if *di.* belongs indeed with *διδάσκω*. — 167: Georgiev's assumption is further disproved by the occurrence of what would be a masculine form alongside *ma-te-de*. — 170: The explanation of *e-so-to* as 3rd pl. is more likely; *a-mo-ra-ma* must, then, be a fem. pl. in *-a₁*. — 196: More attractive than the assumption that the "undifferentiated" livestock signs denote the species *per se* or the young animal is the alternative that these signs indicate castrated animals; they clearly consist of the animal sign marked male, minus the two horizontal strokes. This would, of course, mean that sign B 109^a should be read 'bull' only, not 'ox'; whether it forces us to re-interpret *we-ka-ta* is best left open. — 200: *pa-ra-jo*, in close context with *a-ko-ra*, is more likely a noun meaning something like 'herd' (cf. *ai-ki-pa-ta*) than a form of *παλαιός* 'old.' — 209: The equation *pa-ra-ti-jo* in VC 78 (C 914) = *pa₂-ra₂-ti-jo* in Dg 1235 is too uncertain to warrant conclusions. — 246, § 11: Whence the insertion '(the shepherd)'? Version B does not justify this addition, cf. the fuller text of § 10 in version B as against the shorter wording in version A. — 252: It may be advisable to abide by a rigid rendering of *ko-to-no-o-ko* by 'plot-holder'; 'plot-owner' is possibly *ko-to-ne-ta* in VC 151 (Eb 901). — 263, § 6: *e-pi* 'in addition to'? — 271: If 1 DA is said to consist of 4 or more PA and to correspond to 6 acres (p. 270), then DA 1 PA 1 in VC 157 (Uf 835) is larger than 6 and DA 1 PA 3 in VC 158 (Uf 836) larger than 7 acres. Could one PA be one-sixth of one DA? — 279: Delete "For Hom. ἀλκτῆρ?" — 288: It is not proven that *me-u-jo* was disyllabic. — 311: *to-pe-za* possibly not meaning 'table' here — it is tempting to associate its probably containing a first element 'four' with its occurring on the fourth day of a calendar

arrangement. Is *e-pi i-ku-wo-i-pi* rather connected with *ισχύς*? — 325: The pointed foot of the *pi-a₂-ra* may indicate that this vessel was placed into embers; I have seen metal bowls of just this type in Northern Russia. — 336: The difficulties in VC 236.1 (Ta 641.1) can be resolved by assuming an asyndeton sequence of two modifiers in the singular: *ti-ri-po-de ai-ke-u ke-re-si-jo we-ke* 'two tripods, [one] *ai.*, [the other] *ke.*' (Different proposal by L. R. Palmer, *Minos*, V [1957], pp. 76-9.) — 340: How is *we-a-re-ja* "possibly a form of *ἰάλειος*"? — 343, bottom line; 344, line 3: "evidently"? — 371: The term "ancestor" is out of place in describing the relationship *harmota*: *ἀρματα*. — 391: Hittite *asantsi* is no adequate example of a "generalization of **es*."

In spite of minor disagreements, one cannot but be greatly impressed by the achievements of Ventris and Chadwick, which are so well presented in this truly important book. It seems bound to remain a classic.

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ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE. M. Tulli Ciceronis De Natura Deorum Libri III: Liber Primus. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1955. Pp. viii + 537. \$15.00. (Bimillennial Edition.)

Professor Pease confesses, in his Preface to this volume, to having spent the leisure time of twenty years in the collecting, sifting, and arranging of materials for this bimillennial edition of "our earliest extant work on the comparative study of the philosophy of religion" (p. 8). Volume I contains a general Introduction of more than one hundred pages and the text, apparatus, and commentary for the first book of the *De Natura Deorum*. A second and concluding volume consisting of the second and third books and an index to the entire work is ready for the press and it is to be hoped that it will appear before long. Professor Pease is surely modest in his estimate of his labors, since his scholarly interest in Cicero's two dialogues on religion—the other is the *De Divinatione*, edited by the author in 1920-3—dates back more than four decades to 1913 when his paper, "The Conclusion of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*," appeared in *T. A. P. A.* Long familiarity with every aspect of his subject and the authority which this lends are evident on every page. But exhaustive as this work is, one senses from a compression in the commentary that at times approaches the cryptic that there was gathered much more than what appears in print, much that had to be suggested or reflected in a few words. "Let it not be supposed," Pease says of the countless conjectural emendations he considered in constituting his text, "from the silence of the apparatus criticus that the editor has not weighed, before rejecting, a large and painful number of such solutions for difficulties real or imaginary." This in itself must have been a staggering task, for the list of editions of the *De Natura Deorum* which the author furnishes in his Introduction occupies some twenty pages. Of this list and the scholarly activity

it implies Pease writes (p. 103): "... for four and a half centuries there has seldom been a decade (and for the last century and a half seldom a half-decade) without the publication either of a specialized volume containing the *De Natura Deorum* or of a complete edition of Cicero containing it." We are grateful to Pease not only for what he has thought worthy to present but for what he has been charitable enough to suppress.

In view of the continuous attention which this dialogue has received from generations of scholars, why a new edition? Pease declares that his purpose is to make available "for appraisal and use" the results of scholarly investigation during the seventy years since J. B. Mayor completed his large edition of the work. This he does triumphantly and so performs a real service. His book is an encyclopaedia of the subject and a Baedeker as well, for the author valiantly attempts to guide the reader through a terrain bristling with parentheses, brackets, italics, numbers, names, titles, citations, and other obstacles. If the reader is sometimes left behind it is because Pease has over the years too well perfected his famous method of presenting evidence "without needless verbiage."

In his Introduction, which is proportionately as copiously annotated as the text itself, Pease discusses in a clear if somewhat unimaginative style, redolent of the handbooks, all matters relevant to a close study and many-sided interpretation of the dialogue: Cicero's qualifications as a philosopher; the form and purpose of the work; the Roman religious background; the sources; and the manuscripts, history, influence, and editions of the text. Some of this material is, as he admits, a restatement of the views set out in his article of 1913 and in his edition of the *De Divinatione*, views which he has seen no necessity to change. On the fundamental question of what impelled Cicero to write his philosophical treatises, for instance, Pease still adheres to the traditional view that he was performing the service of synthesizing for his countrymen the principal Greek systems. Cicero, he writes (pp. 7-8), "tried to set forth, in a judicial as well as a descriptive spirit, the views, not of a single philosophical sect, but of selected diverse schools, for he believed it the function of philosophy to confront men . . . with the impulse to repeated and ceaseless search for the probable." Pease, then, has apparently been unmoved by the arguments advanced in recent years by, among others, B. Farrington¹ and N. W. DeWitt,² that in the last two years of his life, during which he wrote the *De Natura Deorum*, the *De Divinatione*, and most of his other philosophical treatises, Cicero "was engaged in a campaign for the belittlement of Epicureanism"³ and "poured forth a stream of anti-Epicurean propaganda, the true nature of which he endeavored to screen by a façade of philosophy, but he skimmed his interlocutors for space in expounding the tenets of Epicurus while allowing their respondents more ample room for discharging the ammunition of rebuttal."⁴

¹ Cf., e.g. *Head and Hand in Ancient Greece* (London, 1947), ch. IV.

² *Epicurus and his Philosophy* (Minneapolis, 1954).

³ DeWitt, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

⁴ DeWitt, *op. cit.*, p. 345. But see H. A. K. Hunt, *The Humanism of Cicero* (Melbourne, 1954), for still another view of the purpose of these treatises: they represent a coherent statement in planned sequence of

Such arguments hinge upon the putative effect of the publication of the *De Rerum Natura*. For fearing (so this hypothesis runs) that so cogent and persuasive a work as Lucretius' masterpiece, which puts Epicureanism in its best light, might win adherents to this philosophy in a way such as the earlier "scribblings" of Roman Epicureans had been unable to do, Cicero worked furiously to counteract its influence. Hence not only the short shrift given to the Epicurean theology in Book I of the *De Natura Deorum* but also the unquestionable evidences of haste, carelessness, and revision in the composition of the dialogue. Extreme as this theory may appear, there may be something in it, especially if we assume, as I think we must, that the Roman readers of Lucretius would also be readers of Cicero's philosophical works. Of the influence of Lucretius on the *De Natura Deorum*, Pease says (p. 7, n. 2): "After making all due allowances for natural coincidences in the expression of commonplaces between two writers discussing in parts the same theme, I find no very notable indication of the influence of Lucretian ideas upon our work . . . the whole tone of the work is descriptive and scientific rather than sectarian and proselytizing. . . ."

Pease is well aware of the "inconcinnities" in the dialogue and has his own explanations for them (see pp. 26-7). With regard to the much-discussed final sentence of the work, in which Cicero paradoxically appears to prefer the *disputatio* of Balbus, the Stoic, to that of Cotta, a member of his own school, he concludes (p. 36), after a judicious discussion which reproduces his arguments of 1913: "Cicero desires to give the impression of impartiality, which would not be produced by two Academics voting alike at the end. He also wishes to show to the reader an example of Academic method rather than of a dogma which might have been (even though wrongly) inferred from the consensus of two Academics, and to suggest that an Academic might use his individual liberty to select and accept any practical working principle, no matter from what school." This explanation seems to me entirely satisfactory. In a note on this point Pease quotes an interesting remark of Bentley's on Cicero's observance of *decorum*. To this might be added Dr. Johnson's reply to Mr. Murray on the good humor of philosophical debate in antiquity.⁵

Since the publication of this volume Philip Levine⁶ has discussed in great detail not only the abrupt and surprising ending of the dialogue but its rather rough state generally and Cicero's departures here from the methods of composition characteristic of his other treatises. Levine suggests that the reason for these defects lies in the nature of the dialogue's subject: Cicero wanted to avoid being accused of subverting or undermining ancient Roman religious beliefs. His vote for the Stoic presentation of Balbus was his means

Cicero's own philosophical system ("humanism"). Epicureanism throughout has a "purely ancillary role" (p. 12), is "subsidiary to the main argument" (p. 15), and is used merely "to throw into relief" (pp. 132, 209) Stoic-Platonic doctrines.

⁵ Hill and Powell, ed., *Boswell's Life of Johnson* (Oxford, 1934), III, p. 10.

⁶ "The Original Design and the Publication of the *De Natura Deorum*," *H. S. C. P.*, LXII (1957), pp. 7-36.

of reassuring his readers. Indeed, he took himself virtually out of the dialogue, limiting his role to that of an auditor, because of such apprehensions. Levine's thesis is not new, although he has reargued the whole problem, and it receives its best reply from Pease himself (pp. 34-5): "The answer . . . is that he need not have published at all, had he really felt these fears. Also, his books, though influencing some readers, probably had no such wide circulation as his vanity would suppose, and so would hardly have started a religious revolution among the general public. If he had had such a fear he would hardly have revealed so clearly as he does the difference between exoteric and esoteric beliefs among Roman statesmen, nor would he have supposed that the mere literary device of using Cotta as a character in the dialogue would completely relieve the author from responsibility."

For those with a taste for *Quellenforschung* Pease provides ample fare. His bibliographical note on "the more important treatments" of the sources runs to three columns of fine print, while his own treatment of them occupies fourteen pages (36-51). This is all valuable, of course, but when the count is in we must still derive what comfort we can from reading that "others, perhaps more cautiously, would be contented to assume some unspecified Epicurean writer" (p. 39, of the Prooemium); that the exposition of Epicurean theology "has been traced to quite diverse sources" (p. 42); that "so varied and so inconsistent are the opinions of scholars on this question [a single source for Cotta's refutation of the Epicureans] that it seems prudent to adopt a certain Academic suspense of judgment concerning them" (p. 45); and that "irrespective of all attempts of scholars to discover few or many sources, the present work contains within it, at first or second-hand, ideas derived from a wide range of thinkers" (pp. 50-1). To what lengths such analyses can be carried is indicated from the solemn assurance that "Ciceronian are probably the statements introduced by *ut e patre audiui* . . . the reference to the 21 letters of the Roman alphabet . . . above all, the lengthy quotations from his own *Aratea*" (p. 45).

One can have nothing but admiration for Pease's survey of the text tradition, manuscripts, and editions of the *De Natura Deorum* (pp. 52-106). Seldom has there been collected, in so convenient and usable a form, so much hard-to-come-by information on the *subsidia* for a single ancient work. The author not only lists more than 125 MSS but adds precise details, in some cases amounting to a page, concerning the vicissitudes of the individual codices, with full bibliography. Here palaeography becomes an "archaeology of books," conforming to the recommendations of the Institut de Recherche. Pease, "with much hesitation," has drawn up a *stemma codicum* for the principal MSS (p. 85). This is a service, although it is unfortunate that one might conclude from this diagram alone that C is a manuscript rather than a *consensus* of DHG, as is made clear elsewhere.

The author has printed a Latin text of Book I which, though naturally founded on that of earlier editions, is often a witness to his judgment and independence. In clarity, in matters of orthography and punctuation, it marks a distinct improvement over the

Teubner of Plasberg. While the *apparatus criticus* is necessarily selective in an edition intended as exegetical, it is adequate everywhere and generous in places which present genuine difficulties. Examples of Pease's critical acumen are numerous. In the second sentence of the work (I, 1: *De qua . . . cohibuisse*), admittedly a hard case, the author's text differs from Plasberg's in five places. The readings in question here are set out and argued in three pages of commentary which consider all noteworthy attempts at solution. The result is a Latin sentence which does not require the assumption of an embarrassing *lacuna* at the very beginning of the dialogue. It is ingenious and it makes sense, even if the attempt to justify the omission of *ut* in a result clause that yet keeps the subjunctive (*debeat*) does not entirely convince.

It is possible here merely to suggest the nature of the commentary. It offers encyclopaedic information on all matters in every line of the text that could conceivably call for explanation, bringing the student abreast of recent scholarly work and providing in profusion apposite passages in Greek and Latin cited *in extenso*. Philosophical arguments, points of syntax and grammar, textual problems, details of history, biography, and geography—all are dealt with impartially and enthusiastically. Many of these notes are extremely valuable summaries of our knowledge on difficult and important questions: see, for example, pp. 120-1, on atheism; pp. 179-81, on the "eye of the mind"; pp. 280-3, on the poets' representations of the gods; and pp. 324-6, on isonomy. That celebrated sentence in I, 49 (*Epicurus autem . . . natura et aeterna*) in which Cicero struggles to describe the physical constitution of the Epicurean gods receives a commentary of some twelve pages, all of it probably deserved in view of the problem involved. In some cases, e.g. the Stoic notion of providence—touched upon in I, 23 but developed at length in Book II, it is evident that Pease has reserved a full treatment for his second volume. Addenda to the commentary, taking notice of very recent investigation, are promised for the concluding volume together with a comprehensive index, which should greatly increase the usefulness of the vast body of notes.

A commentary "in depth" of this kind requires in its author, above all, a highly-developed sense of proportion. It must be said that Pease is at times overzealous in his eagerness to share his learning with his readers. He fails occasionally to maintain the delicate balance between legitimate information and irrelevant minutiae which are distracting rather than helpful. It will suffice here to note one or two examples of this gratuitous erudition. In I, 88 the Academic Cotta inveighs against the argument for direct sense perception as a prerequisite of belief. Such a position would imply, he declares, that "if you had been born on Seriphus and had never left the island, where you had often seen small rabbits and foxes, you would not believe in the existence of lions and panthers when they were described to you." This remark precipitates two columns of notes in which Pease cites a great deal of ancient testimony principally to prove without a doubt that 1) Seriphus is indeed a small island and 2) rabbits have ever been a plague because of their "annoying fecundity." A reference (I, 101) to the usefulness to the Egyptians of the ibis as a killer of winged snakes prompts five columns of

commentary. And while Cicero mercifully lets us off with "I might speak of the usefulness of ichneumons, crocodiles, and cats, but I do not wish to be tedious," Pease, choosing not to take the hint, vouchsafes us two additional columns on these creatures.

This volume is truly a marvel of skill and accuracy in printing and proof-reading. I have noticed a few typographical errors here and there, but none that could cause serious misunderstanding, except, perhaps, for a slip in the numbering of the notes on p. 23. Even here, once the mistake is recognized, everything can be accounted for and nothing is missing. But granted that the book is a technical triumph, there must be some reservations as to the suitability of the format. The printing of text and corresponding notes on the same page is an admirable arrangement when the notes are chiefly grammatical and syntactical, intended to encourage the student and speed him along. In this volume the notes engulf the text; it is impossible to *read* Cicero's dialogue as presented by Pease. A very few pages have as many as ten lines of text, a great many have but one or two, and a considerable number have none at all. In these cases where text and notes fail to coincide (see, e. g., pp. 114-16; 119-22) the method, which the author has used for his other editions as well, surely defeats itself. Would it not have been more satisfactory to issue the Introduction and complete text in one volume and the commentary separately in a second and perhaps third? This is substantially the plan Mayor adopted for his three-volume edition, and Bailey chose it for his Lucretius, a most convenient set, as I think all who have used it would agree.

Such subjective matters aside, Pease's edition of the *De Natura Deorum*—and I here anticipate the early publication of Volume II—is a bimillennial memorial that Cicero himself would be proud, though probably astonished, to acknowledge. It is a monument as well to the meticulous and uncompromising scholarship of its author and a fitting culmination to his distinguished career. Very few of the younger generation of classical scholars possess the necessary qualifications—a combination of erudition, inclination, patience, and faith—for undertaking a work of like proportions. For this is not a book, but a library. Any student of Roman religion who is fortunate enough to have for ready reference Professor Pease's *De Natura Deorum* and Cyril Bailey's Lucretius will scarcely have need for other books: most of the essential materials are in one or the other edition. Works such as these will remain indispensable for many years to come.

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ERNESTO VALGIGLIO. *Silla e la crisi repubblicana*. Firenze, "La Nuova Italia," 1956. Pp. 251. L. 1000. (*Biblioteca di Cultura*, 60.)

This book is in many respects an attempt to explain Sulla, not to apologize for him. And yet, in doing this it necessarily does become a sort of apology. For Valgiglio sees that Sulla was indeed a child of his age, a natural feature in the development which was initiated in the Gracchan Age and which found its end in Caesar. Placed midway in the century of the great struggle between the aristocracy and the tribunate, Sulla's concept of the dictatorship was as much a landmark on the road to monarchy as Gaius Gracchus' concept of the tribunate had been. When constitutional matters had become so tangled and the policies followed by both parties so illegal, responsibility really cannot be assigned. And it is disconcerting to reflect that many of his ideals Sulla shared with that archaistic idealist, Tiberius Gracchus, and that he tried to put these into effect by using the weapons conceived and forged for him by the popular leader, Marius.

Valgiglio treats Sulla's career for the most part chronologically. In his account of it he gives a thorough presentation of the scholarly views on the many historical problems involved. The book becomes at once useful, therefore, for purposes of reference and bibliography on the Sullan Age. Although there are not many new resolutions of political and constitutional problems, there are some which deserve commendation or comment. In his treatment of the increase of the Senate by Sulla in 81 B. C. he defends ably the view that there were indeed two such increases (in 88 and 81 B. C.) but he also makes the most sensible suggestion so far offered to reconcile the disparity between the figures given in our sources as to the components of the Senate and what appears actually to have been its size. It has been calculated that there were 150 survivors of death and murder in it at the time of Sulla's reform, and he is said to have added 300. We know, however, that there were approximately 600 in the post-Sullan Senate. There are other explanations, but his suggestion that we should see in this disparity the number of fugitive senators who fled to the Orient during the period of popular control in Rome is most happy (pp. 94-6). Again, Mommsen believed that under the Sullan dispensation the consuls did not enjoy the *imperium militiae* during the year of their office in Italy, but Valgiglio refutes this view with such clarity and display of documentation (pp. 132-41) that there is no longer room for controversy. Less happy, I think, is Valgiglio's attempt to solve the crux concerning the enrollment of new citizens after the Social War. He suggests (p. 10) that the ten new tribes mentioned by Appian as being then created (*B. C.*, I, 49) are a mistaken addition by some historian of the tribes of two separate steps in the enrollment: the two tribes mentioned by Sisenna (Nonius, *s. v.* *Senati*) represent an intermediate step to the final eight tribes of Velleius (II, 20). But someone supposed that there were two separate acts and concluded that there were ten new tribes in all. On this problem, I think, scholarship has consistently gone astray in not reflecting on the conservative nature of the Roman aristocratic

government, a conservatism so thoroughly described in Valgiglio's account of Sulla's reform of the government. It had been normal in Roman history that when large blocks of new citizens were created they entered as members of new tribes. So far as I know no one thought in 241 B. C. that the members of the then newly created tribes, Quirina and Velina, should be distributed among the older 33 tribes. It may be that the two tribes mentioned by Sisenna represent the first two peoples in the Social War who defected from the Italian alliance, the Etruscans and Umbrians, and that the eight of Velleius are the Picentes, Vestini, Marsi, Paeligni, Marrucini, Hirpini, Frentani, and Apuli who capitulated later. If this plan had been carried out there probably would have been two more tribes for the Lucanians and Samnites. But they were reduced so late that by that time it had become politically wise for both parties to the Roman civil conflict to favor a distribution of the new citizens in the old 35 tribes rather than enroll them in new tribes approximating their *populi* as had been planned originally.

Most interesting and persuasive is the portion of this book dealing with the dictatorship. It is true that Sulla's dictatorship was irregular in its election, definition, and length of tenure, yet each of these irregularities deserves extenuating explanation. The appointment by the interrex, L. Valerius Flaccus, rather than by consuls, helped to appease the moderate party; and the confirmation by the people rather than by the Senate not only looked back to the great reconstructive decemvirate of 451 B. C. but also was a sign of the times: of the Gracchan appeal to the sovereignty of the Assembly and of the omnipotence foreshadowed by the Marian and Sullan armies. Unlike the ancient dictators', Sulla's powers were not clearly defined and were indeed practically unlimited. Now, he already had sufficient power to do his will and the times were shouting for one-man rule to bring order, yet he insisted on veiling this need in the garb of a constitutional name and even appointed a master of the horse for whom there was no real job. And, finally, although there was nothing in the *Lex Valeria* to limit his tenure, he kept faith with his republican ideals and laid down the dictatorship when he felt that the crisis was over. In later years Sulla's dictatorship was pictured as being as odious as Caesar's, while actually Sulla not only had not sought dictatorship but had condemned it. The enigma of Sulla the dictator is resolved only when we appreciate Sulla the aristocrat. His constitutional, agrarian, judicial, and social measures show a grasp of immediate problems and a yearning for the idealized political, economic, social, and moral atmosphere of the Early Republic. But he did not understand the irreversibility of Time's Arrow: that his Romans were irremediably changed, partly through the very historical acts in which he had participated. To wonder at Sulla laying down the dictatorship is to misunderstand completely his purpose and nature. He was still a general of the republican stamp, not the general-dictator-man of state of the Caesarian mold. In an intermediate stage between the republican dictator and Caesar, he was closer to the latter in form but to the former in spirit. He used the office for *republican institutions* as men of old had, but he was the deformed dictator of a deformed state. Each epoch gets its

appropriate men: Cincinnatus for his age, Sulla for his, and Caesar for his.

Valgiglio has done a considerable service by elaborating the religious and intellectual framework of Sulla and his world. At first perusal his fourth chapter, an extensive treatment of Sulla's view on Fortuna and of the relations of his Latin (Felix) and Greek (Ἐπαφρόδιτος) titles, appears quite disproportionate in length and detail. But the matters developed there are, in the sixth chapter, used to advantage in describing the intellectual bent of the Roman world in the last century of the Republic and of Sulla's place in it. From the days of the Scipionic Circle and the hey-day of Panaetius and Polybius there was a new and peculiar evaluation of the human personality. This was the basis of the desire for pre-eminence and the creation of the leader-guide, which individualistic ideal was typical of that century. The writings of the age had begun that tendency toward the analysis of the individual, study of character, autobiography, the ego, poetry of intimacy, labors of the soul and sentimental experience that led to the *neoteroi*, and Sulla's own writings were typical of his age, though probably unconsciously so. Parallel to this intellectual glorification of the personality was Sulla's view of his relations with Fortuna and Venus. Here a superior and always favorable force, Felicitas or Venus, was allied with the man's own *virtus*. And this interpenetration of fortune and *virtus*, far from minimizing the importance of 'man,' rather exalted him toward the fulfillment of the messianic yearnings of the age. Valgiglio notes the Roman fervor for the national ancestress, Venus, simultaneously in Sulla and Lucretius and comments that here their Epicureanism broke down and their Romanism became paramount. Here, of course, he has fallen into a popular misconception with regard to Epicurean religion. In each case the worship of Venus was strictly according to Epicurean tenets whereby the true worshipper of the gods is received and blessed by them.

The age of Sulla was an intermediate age. It looked to the past and gave an impulse to the future. It was the infancy of Caesarism. Sulla was placed between a tempestuous dying world and a world in the ferment of birth: he looked to the former but served the latter. Valgiglio has done much to clarify the obscurities of this twilight epoch.

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EMILIO GABBA. Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili. Firenze, "La Nuova Italia," 1956. Pp. viii + 266. L. 1500. (*Biblioteca di Cultura*, 59.)

Professor Gabba's purpose in this study is, through a re-examination of the text of the *Bellum Civile*, to establish more firmly a solution for the vexed problem of Appian's source or sources. To do this he has gone carefully over the work chapter by chapter using the polemic tone or the focus of interest of successive sections in order to establish the likelihood of unity or diversity of sources for

the various portions. By this method Gabba finds that (1) a major portion of the *Bellum Civile* was derived from a writer in Latin whose interests were Italian rather than Roman, who admired Julius Caesar, was friendly to Mark Antony, distrusted Octavian, and honored the republican ideal though feeling that it had been subverted and betrayed by senatorial incompetence and intransigence. When this chief source was not sufficiently oriented to Appian's special interest, (2) he used another source, sometimes Livian, sometimes Sallustian. And there are (3) Appian's own contributions such as the general framework and organization, the prooemion, connecting passages, passages found in his sources but where Appian's special interests have led him to particular emphases, and passages where there are allusions to or comparisons with the conditions of his own second century A. D.

Gabba lists (pp. 219 f.) fifty passages where Appian interjects himself to comment upon or to explain a given situation to his own second century audience. Interestingly enough, a major portion of these are in Book I, and most of them are very brief. The most notable passages in the *Bellum Civile* where Appian is clearly composing freely, however, are the prooemion (I, 1-6), which closely parallels the tone and sentiment of his general preface to his whole historical work, the comparison of Caesar and Alexander (II, 149-54), which reflects his approval of the man whom he considered the first monarch of Rome, and the catalogue of the proscribed (IV, 13-51). Not only was the last passage carefully elaborated by Appian in order to emphasize the happiness of his own age in contrast to the Civil Wars, but also it exhibits that love of bureaucratic classification which was dear to Appian and which the scheme of his whole history shows.

By far the major portion of the *Bellum Civile*, however, Gabba believes to have been closely adapted, sometimes nearly translated, from the Latin history of Asinius Pollio. He is to be identified, then, with the Italian writer described in the first paragraph of this review, and his history was the source for I, 7-53, II, 8-148, all of IV and V except for IV, 13-51, and all of III except for such portions as were drawn from pro-Augustan sources, one of which was Augustus' biography. He adduces twelve reasons for this belief and these certainly are impressive cumulatively: (1) Pollio embraced the cause of Caesar but without enthusiasm for Caesar's aims; (2) he was personally devoted to Caesar; (3) he complained in his letters of the ineptitude of the Senate; (4) he was a close friend of Antony by 43 B. C.; (5) Asinius (*Ad Fam.*, X, 33, 4) and Appian (III, 72) treat Antony's activities at Mutina in a similar fashion; (6) there is no explanation in Appian why Asinius joined Antony: it seems to be taken for granted; (7) Tacitus explicitly says that Asinius spoke well of Brutus and Cassius (*Annals*, IV, 34, 4); (8) Asinius resented Octavian's attempts to drive him from Cisalpine Gaul, and Appian is careful to explain the irresolution of Asinius and Ventidius during the Perusine War; (9) he was present at Brundisium and the account of the conference there is totally pro-Antony; (10) he was hostile to Plancus, Dolabella, and Cicero; (11) there are resemblances between the accounts of Munda and Pharsalus in Appian, Suetonius' *Caesar*, and the fragments of Asinius; and (12) Appian's work coincides with the references to Pollio's work in Horace *Odes*, II, 1.

As an enthusiastic Egyptian, it was Appian's plan to show how the *δμόνοια* and *ἐνταξία* of the Empire of his own day had been worked out through civil discord, that imperial values and the necessity for them were revealed implicitly and explicitly by the excesses that preceded them. He believed that the death of Tiberius Gracchus and the results of it were the beginning, and that the rise and rivalry of great war-lords with autocratic tendencies led inevitably to Augustus. He found the work of Asinius Pollio sympathetic in tone and generally covering the periods and matters in which he was interested. Where he did need greater detail he turned to a Livian source (I, 54-115), a Sallustian source (I, 116-II, 7), or to an Augustan one: III, 9-31 are from Augustus' autobiography and there are a few other pro-Augustan insertions in that book.

Gabba has used and digested previous work on Appian fully and has been generous and sensible in this respect. Inevitably a work of this character and scope involves a discussion of many historical problems of broader interest than an investigation of sources. Perhaps one example will suffice: he has a detailed discussion of chapter 27 of Book I, the agrarian legislation after the death of Gaius Gracchus (pp. 61-73). He believes that Appian's "15 years" is a round figure to represent the period from the activity of Gaius to 111 B. C., and that the three laws of Appian are (1) one making possible the sale of Gracchan allotments, (2) the *Lex Thoria* which he, like Hardy, believes to have imposed a vectigal but which he dates in 113 or 112 (instead of the more general 118) presumably because of the allusion to some agrarian measures of that date in the *Lex Agraria* of 111 B. C. line 29, and (3) the *Lex Agraria* of 111 B. C. In the much discussed last sentence of the chapter he construes *πεντεκαίδεκα μάλιστα ἔτεσιν* as a dative of "period within which" and a Latinism of Appian. He, like Rudorff, believes that there is a lacuna after *γομοθεσίας* and that the chapter was concluded by the statement that the triumvirs were reduced to inactivity by trials.

It seems to this reviewer that Gabba, like his predecessors, has furnished Appian with an extremely weak ending here. Chapter 27 summarizes the effects and fate of the Gracchan attempts to cope with profound economic and social changes among Romans and Italians in the second century, and it concludes with a statement of the utter failure of those attempts and the disastrous consequences: the loss of everything by the plebeians, the decline of citizens and soldiers, the revenue from and distribution of public land, and (according to Gabba) the cessation of activity of the triumvirs because of lawsuits. The last phrase is not only inaccurate (for I take it that the commission had been already abolished by the *Lex Thoria* mentioned earlier in the chapter, and to single out for the conclusion a hindrance of its earlier efforts seems at least odd), but also it is incongruously anticlimactic. I would suggest that, rather than supposing a lacuna or making elaborate grammatical changes (Carcopino), one might possibly emend *ἐπὶ δίκαις* to *ἐπιδεεῖς* which would then be construed with *γεγονότες* and the subject of *ἐσπάνιζον*. The woes of the people would thus be climaxed by the fact that through their lack of necessary resources they were reduced to idleness.

A book as provocative and informative as this is throughout is a most important addition to the stock not just of students of Appian but of all those who are interested in the last 100 years of the Roman Republic.

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PAUL PETIT. *Libanius et la vie municipale à Antioche au IV^e siècle* après J.-C. Paris, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1955. Pp. 446; 3 maps. (*Institut Français d'Archéologie de Beyrouth, Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, LXII.*)

The old rhetor of Antioch is a source of first importance for the social and economic life of his city and his age, yet a thorough exploitation of his voluminous writings has only now begun. Their relative neglect in the past may perhaps be attributed to both Libanius' rather unattractive personality and his style, which is often mannered and obscure in spite of his limited vocabulary. Though such scholars as A. H. M. Jones, Piganiol, Ensslin, Laistner, and Downey—not to exhaust the list—have long controlled the text in dealing with various broad problems of the fourth century, the production of monographs on Libanius himself has gained appreciable momentum only in the past decade or less. Publications in point are P. Wolf, *Vom Schulwesen der Spätantike: Studien zu Libanius* (Baden-Baden, 1952), and L. Harmand, *Libanius, Discours sur les Patronages* (Paris, 1955), a lengthy commentary on a speech (*Or. XLVII, De Patrociniis Vicorum*) of just eight pages. Several members of Jones' circle have also contributed to the elucidation of our author. Notably, A. F. Norman, of Hull University, has composed, in addition to several perceptive journal articles, a detailed study (still, I believe, awaiting publication) of the long and difficult autobiographical discourse (*Or. I*).

M. Paul Petit, of the University of Grenoble, has been indefatigably at work since 1950-51, when he investigated Libanius' use of the *Vita Constantini* (*Historia*, I [1950], pp. 562-82) and proposed the year 386 as a more satisfactory dating than 390 for *Or. XXX, Pro Templis* (*Byzantion*, XXI [1951], pp. 285-310). Even since the appearance of the present volume, or almost concurrently with it, he has brought forth, under the deceptively casual denomination of a "thèse supplémentaire," a solid treatise on Libanius' professional activity in which he identifies 198 of the sophist's students and seeks to fix even their distribution among successive academic terms, not to mention such things as their places of origin and social status, their recruitment, their relations with their professor, and their subsequent careers (*Les Étudiants de Libanius: Un Professeur de faculté et ses élèves au Bas Empire*, Paris, 1956 [*Études Prosopographiques*, I]).

The sixteen chapters of the work under review are apportioned among five parts, as follows: I, Les Institutions municipales; II, Les Grands Problèmes de la vie municipale; III, Les Problèmes impériaux dans la vie municipale; IV, La Vie politique; V, Société

et cité. Five appendices give us a prosopography of all the known curiales in Libanius, a detailed stemma for his family, an analysis of his financial means and way of life, a table showing the cultural background of high officials in 360, 364, and 390, whether literary, legal, or technical, and an account of the embassies in which curiales of Antioch participated. There are three maps: the plains of the Orontes, showing conditions of rainfall; the city of Antioch; the trade routes of northern Syria. Eight indices facilitate quick reference: Greek words; Latin words; subjects; proper names; *indices locorum* for Libanius, other ancient authors, and the Codes; and the modern writers cited or criticized.

A study so ample, so richly varied, and so subtly elaborated can hardly be summarized in brief: I shall be content to note a few of the more striking or independent arguments. Thus,—in the fourth century there was no longer any distinction between *decurio* and *curialis* (pp. 29-31, against Declareuil). The old Athenian concept of voluntary benefaction ("l'esprit d'évergétisme"), cherished by Libanius the traditionalist, who likes to tell of the *chorégiai* performed by the curiales, was yielding place to the Roman principle of *munus*, especially the *munus mixtum* which requisitioned both personal and financial services ("l'esprit de réquisition," pp. 49-52 *et passim*). *Venationes* were a regular feature of the Olympic Games, though they were forbidden by imperial authority in 360 (pp. 128-9, against Downey). Like Ammianus and Synesius, but unlike Themistius, that "deracinated" courtier, Libanius was alive to the barbarian menace and was not seduced by "le mythe du bon barbare" (pp. 184-6). The beginning of a "natural" economy is evidenced only at the level of the imperial government, not in the municipality, and gold coinage circulated freely, if unequally, through all classes of society (pp. 298-303, cf. the views of Mickwitz and Mazzarino). The prosperous villages of free proprietors of small holdings (*kômai megalai*) are no proof of the city's decadence, as they were in economic equilibrium with it (pp. 307-9, against Jones). The population of Antioch was increasing, not diminishing (pp. 311-13, against Heichelheim); this was not due to economic decay in the rural areas, but to the amenities of the city. A survey of building activity in Antioch shows that it continued without interruption during these many years, but the means were supplied chiefly by *honorati* and not by the municipality, save under compulsion; significantly, the curiales displayed no initiative in this activity (pp. 314-20). The curiales preferred to live in the city rather than upon their estates; Libanius himself had little taste for country life (p. 334, against Harmand). There was no rigid caste system that barred the way to the attainment of high posts in the imperial service (p. 362, against Seeck, Abbott and Johnson, and others). The military patronage described in *Or.* XLVII was purely a political, and not a social phenomenon or a symptom of a trend toward feudalism (pp. 375-8, against Harper and Piganiol).

In passing, three minutiae. (1) A famous passage (*Or.* XLVII, 13-16) tells how the Jewish tenantry on one of Libanius' estates (happily, all students now seem agreed that it was near Antioch rather than in Palestine, as Zulueta once maintained) gave him trouble when a certain *stratêgos* asserted patronage over them, and

when Libanius brought the case into court the judge ruled against him. Petit subscribes to Harmand's belief that the *stratêgos* was not, as one would assume, a *dux*, but merely "un chef de détachement stationné dans le plat pays" (p. 187, note 1; cf. p. 189, "un gradé local") and that the judge in question was not the governor of Syria but only "un juge local, sans doute un petit 'archonte' de village, en tout cas sûrement pas le *consularis Syriae*" (p. 188). Jones has demolished this notion in a recent review of Harmand, *C. R.*, LXXI (1957), pp. 35-6. (2) According to Petit (p. 143, note 4; cf. p. 351), Downey and I have erred in taking *Or. X*, 13 to mean that Libanius' uncle Phasganius was one of those who enlarged the seating capacity of the Plethrum. If so, it would have been in order to observe that our error was shared by Seeck (*Briefe*, p. 235): "Dabei (*sc.* on the occasion of the Olympic Games of 336) vermehrte er die Sitze der Zuschauer auf das doppelte." (3) Petit (p. 401) has apparently conflated two distinct individuals of the name of Domnus; see Norman, *C. Q.*, N. S. II (1952), p. 143 (Petit has neglected Norman's articles in this work, but he makes some use of them in *Les Étudiants . . .*).

Though it originated as a dissertation, the treatise has been much expanded. It is clearly the harvest of a prolonged meditation, and not an academic exercise necessarily pushed to completion within a set period. Petit's chalcidism and high competence, evident from the first, have ripened *pari passu* into an enviable enthusiasm for his rather arid subject and a virtual mastery of his sources. It would be no easy matter to think of an important question which he has not raised and done his best to answer. Of course it would be a miracle if he had everywhere avoided error, for, as Jones has well remarked (in the review cited above): "To elucidate Libanius' meaning and explain his allusions is a task hard enough to tax the abilities of the best scholars and historians." But the greater wonder is that he has succeeded in doing so much for his author. Indeed, it seems fair to say that solely by virtue of the bulk of his achievement he has ranged his name securely beside those of Seeck and Foerster as the three who thus far have done the most. Doubtless others among the best scholars and historians will feel moved sooner or later to challenge his solutions to some of these problems, but all of us who read Libanius with humbler pretensions will rejoice that we can now turn for help to so gifted an interpreter—one, moreover, as generous in acknowledging the merits of his predecessors as he is firm in adjusting their lapses or resolute in taking issue with their opinions.

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E. J. DIJKSTERHUIS. Archimedes. Copenhagen, Ejnar Munksgaard, 1956. Pp. 422; frontispiece. (*Acta Historica Scientiarum Naturalium et Medicinalium*, XII.)

In the Preface, the author begins with a word of homage to T. L. Heath, whose well-known work on Archimedes might well render

superfluous any further attempt to interpret for modern readers the genius of this greatest of all ancient mathematicians. But Professor E. J. Dijksterhuis asserts that his work differs *fundamentally* from that of T. L. Heath in that the latter interprets the work of Archimedes in modern notation and thus tends to miss the actual process of Archimedian thinking, whereas Dijksterhuis, although he too seeks by using notational abbreviation to avoid the cumbersome expression of mathematical concepts in ordinary language, carefully tries to avoid modern mathematical notation as an aid to mathematical thinking in the hope that he will thus more nearly produce in the reader the spirit of the original thinker.

This reviewer has given serious consideration to this claim and has examined in parallel studies the treatment of several topics as expounded by Archimedes himself, as interpreted by T. L. Heath, and as reinterpreted by the author.

The superficial difference in the three treatments is at once obvious, but the reviewer finds it hard to feel that there is really a *fundamental* difference. For instance, where the Sicilian Doric Greek might say ὁ λόγος ὅν ἂ AB ποτὶ τὰν ΓΔ ἔχει, Heath writes AB:ΓΔ, and Dijksterhuis writes (AB, ΓΔ). Clearly the words of the original Greek are efficiently abbreviated by either AB:ΓΔ or (AB, ΓΔ); but the difference between the latter two is purely formal, and any attempt to avoid thinking of (AB, ΓΔ) as the quotient of two numbers demands of the modern reader an act of self-discipline not likely to be aided by the mere substitution of the comma for the colon. The reviewer feels, moreover, that to get the true spirit of Greek mathematical thought it is not necessary, nor even desirable, to avoid thinking of (AB, ΓΔ) as a quotient, that is, a real number. The modern concept of real number (in the sense of Dedekind) and the ancient concept of ratio (in the sense of Eudoxus) are both highly abstract and essentially equivalent. The point is that the Greeks had an abbreviated geometrical way of thinking about their abstract concepts and we moderns have a way of thinking about ours, which, because of the systematic use of algebraic notation, is still more abbreviated. But, in so far as the concepts themselves are essentially equivalent, the methods of thinking about them, though superficially very different and expressed in different terms, must be fundamentally equivalent.

Even if we do admit that there exists such a definite cleavage as, for instance, the Greek tendency to geometrize algebra as compared to the opposite modern tendency of reducing geometry to algebra, there is no evidence that this cleavage (superficial though it may be) was neglected more by Heath than by Dijksterhuis. One needs only to cite Heath's comments on traditional geometrical methods, including the characteristically Greek method of application of areas, as given in § 1 of Chapter III of the introduction to Heath's *The Works of Archimedes*.

Again in connection with the quadrature of the parabola both Heath and Dijksterhuis carefully give the Archimedian treatment of the theorem which is now represented as a special case of the formula

$$a + ar + \cdots + ar^{n-1} = a \frac{1-r^n}{1-r} \text{ with } r = \frac{1}{4}.$$

Both give references to a previous and different treatment by Euclid. Following this, Heath merely draws attention to the special case of the modern formula, while Dijksterhuis gives a general formulation of how Archimedes *might* have treated the general geometrical progression with $r < 1$. The effect, which is otherwise most excellent, is somewhat spoiled under the Dijksterhuis desire to avoid the power of modern notation, because just at such points as this he uses it! Still this venture of Dijksterhuis appears to be characterized by sound scholarship and is certainly interesting.

As another minor aspect of the present work, it may be mentioned that the numerical details of the proof of the famous Archimedian inequalities,

$$3\frac{10}{71} < \pi < 3\frac{1}{7},$$

are given in the alphabetic notation of the ancient Greeks, though this is supplemented by an interpretation in Arabic numerals. Heath gives only the calculation in Arabic numerals.

Many other features of this type are scattered throughout the book. Each is in itself quite minor; but each is ensconced in sound scholarship; and the totality of them all is extremely impressive and constitutes, in the reviewer's opinion, the chief merit of the work of Professor Dijksterhuis rather than any exaggerated claim that he may have contributed anything *fundamentally* different.

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